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Abstract
Through a detailed study of the anti-racist association SOS-Racisme,
this thesis examines the relationship between party politics, anti-racism and
republicanism in contemporary France. It is based on fieldwork conducted in
Paris over an eighteen-month period (1993-1994), involving long-term
participant observation, semi-structured interviewing and archival research.
Two principal themes are explored: (1) how republican ideologies and
institutions have played a crucial part in determining both the form and
content of SOS-Racisme's opposition to racism; and (2) how the collective
identity of the association itself, as a part of a broader anti-racist movement
and in relation to the political process, has been (re-)negotiated over time by
its members, at both a local and a national level. It is argued that SOS-
Racisme's use of a 'republican' concept of integration and its relationship to
the sphere of party politics remain problematic and the implications of this
for the future efficacy of its action are discussed.
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In December 1994 the French anti-racist association SOS-Racisme marked the
tenth anniversary of its founding by organising a large 'birthday party1 for its
supporters at the Elysee-Montmartre, a popular concert venue in the heart of
Paris. The event was held in the main hall, with a podium, microphone and
projection screen on a raised stage, and fifty or so candle-lit tables arranged
in the floor space immediately below. A brightly-coloured banner bearing
the slogan 'The Ten Years of SOS' stretched across the wall at the back of the
stage.
At the opposite end of the hall there was standing-room and a makeshift bar.
As the final preparations were made on the stage and people started to take
their places at the tables, I stood chatting to some of the grassroots activists I
had come to know over the previous eighteen months. Every so often a
celebrity from the world of politics, the arts or show business would pass in
front of us, and I would be asked: 'Do you know who that was?' I would
then be informed of the person's identity and the role they had played in
either the association's creation or its subsequent development.
The initial part of the evening consisted of a retracing of SOS-Racisme's
history through a series of mini-interviews with its founder-members and
1
celebrity sponsors (parrains). These were interspersed with clips from
televised interviews and footage from the demonstrations and massive pop
concerts which the association organised throughout the second half of the
1980s. Then the stage was cleared and a table was set up on which a huge
birthday cake was placed. Peering over the heads of the rows of people
standing in front of me I was just able to see a small, frail-looking old man
being helped onto the stage by SOS-Racisme's president, Fode Sylla. He
walked slowly over to the cake and proceeded to cut it. After turning briefly
to face the assembled guests, he disappeared off into the wings as the hall
echoed with the sound of rapturous applause, cheering and whistling. 'It's
Mitterrand! Can you see?' shouted the activists beside me, smiling and
clapping enthusiastically. The applause lasted for several minutes while
people jumped up to get a better view of the stage and exchanged excited
comments with their neighbours.
After Mitterrand's departure, the tables and chairs in front of the stage were
cleared away, as the final part of the evening was to be given over to a
concert. As this was going on, the activists I knew from the local committee I
myself had joined discussed the significance of Mitterrand's appearance and
of the event as a whole. Although the evening was undoubtedly a
celebration of SOS-Racisme, several of the activists standing with me also
detected a more sombre note. They likened the evocation of the association's
history, and the presence of so many of the members and celebrities who had
played an active role in its development, to a funeral where everyone had
come to pay their last respects. It was, they remarked, as if SOS-Racisme had
outlived its purpose and was in the process of being 'buried (enterree)'
before our eyes.
2
This brief account of an event occurring at the end of my fieldwork in Paris
highlights a number of the key issues I will address in detail in the chapters
which follow. The first of these is the nature of the relationship between SOS-
Racisme, as an anti-racist association, and political parties, particularly but
not exclusively those on the Left. As well as Mitterrand, who at the time was
still President of the Republic, several prominent Socialist (PS) and
Communist (PCF) Party politicians, including notably Jack Lang, Lionel
Jospin and Robert Hue, were present that December evening at the Elysee-
Montmartre. What role, if any, did such figures play in SOS-Racisme's
creation and subsequent development? On the other hand, what impact has
SOS-Racisme had on the political process in France since the mid-1980s?
How, finally, have national-level and grassroots activists conceived the link
between anti-racism and political activism more generally? This is a first set
of questions which the thesis will be concerned to answer.
A second issue which emerged clearly in the exchanges between grassroots
activists was the future of SOS-Racisme as part of the broader French anti-
racist movement. As I explain more fully in Part II, the past decade has
witnessed an important debate in France, involving both scholars and
activists, about the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of anti-racism.
SOS-Racisme has frequently been a focal point, either explicit or implicit, of
these arguments. It has been suggested, for example, that the association
lacked a coherent strategy to prevent the continuous expansion of the far-
right National Front (FN) party in the 1980s. Alternatively, critics have
argued that SOS-Racisme incarnated a type of 'show business1 or media-
oriented anti-racism which was ineffectual or even counterproductive in the
struggle against racism. The association's activists, on the other hand, have
consistently denied these charges and claimed instead that one of SOS-
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Racisme's merits has been to change the terms of political debate away from
'assimilationism' towards a purportedly more progressive notion of
'integration'.
A third theme, which was highlighted by many of the interview clips shown
during the evening, is that of the relationship between anti-racism and
republicanism. Indeed, one of the aims of the present thesis is to explore the
ways in which references to 'republican values' and 'the republican tradition'
have framed SOS-Racisme's interventions on a range of different subjects. As
Cathie Lloyd has stated, 'the implications especially for the French anti-racist
left of republicanism, secularism, and universalism are very particular to
France' (Lloyd 1991: 67), and I intend to outline and discuss these through a
detailed analysis of SOS-Racisme's public actions and internal debates
during 1993-94. The organisation's approach has been described as 'a kind of
republican sense of citizenship (une sorte de civisme republicainy (Wihtol de
Wenden 1997: 60), and I will examine the extent to which this is an
appropriate characterisation. In the process, I will consider how members of
SOS-Racisme interpreted and articulated the three key notions mentioned by
Lloyd - republicanism, secularism and universalism - in the context of a
range of campaigns and debates.
Through a detailed study of the anti-racist organisation SOS-Racisme, then,
this thesis seeks to explore the relationship between party politics, anti-
racism and republicanism in contemporary France. The fieldwork on which
it is based was carried out over a period of eighteen months (July 1993-
December 1994) as a member of a Parisian committee of SOS-Racisme.
During this time, the organisation was engaged in campaigns against a
reform of the constitutional right to asylum, and the Pasqua-Mehaignerie
laws on entry and residence rights, identity checks and access to French
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nationality, introduced by the centre-right following their victory in the 1993
parliamentary elections (see, in particular, Chapter 9). The mobilisation
organised by SOS-Racisme and other groups against these measures was the
crucial first stage in a process which was to culminate four years later in the
1997 Weil reports and subsequent Socialist legislation on foreigners' rights
(see Weil 1997; Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise 1998; Hollifield
1999). This thesis examines the strategic and ideological debates which
characterised the early attempts by SOS-Racisme and others to build an
oppositional movement against the Pasqua-Mehaignerie laws.
In this introductory chapter, I lay the foundations for what follows in three
specific ways. Firstly, I situate my work in relation to the broader fields of
the anthropology of France, urban anthropology, and the anthropology of
'race' and racism. These are the three main areas of anthropological inquiry
to which the present thesis makes a contribution. Secondly, I review recent
debates about the republican tradition in France and about the existence of a
specifically 'republican' model of national integration. This prepares the
ground for the argument I develop in subsequent chapters that SOS-Racisme
has played a key role in the articulation and promotion of the idea of a
distinctively republican model of integrating foreigners into the nation-state.
Finally, I present a brief chronological account of SOS-Racisme's
development from its creation in 1984 up until the summer of 1993 when I
started fieldwork. In so doing, my intention is to highlight the key moments
in SOS-Racisme's history which are discussed in more detail later in the
thesis. (An overview of SOS-Racisme's organisational structure and its links
with other organisations is provided in the next chapter.) The present
chapter concludes with a brief summary of the thesis as a whole.
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Anthropology, Anti-Racism and Politics in Urban France
The anthropology of France has developed in important new directions over
the past twenty-five years. In general terms, there has been a gradual move
away from an anthropology of France's rural communities, closely linked to
museology and a concern with traditional ways of life threatened by
economic modernisation, towards 'an anthropology of the present (une
ethnologie du present)' of French society with its predominantly urban and
industrial characteristics (Althabe 1992; Auge 1994: 155-175). Until the late
1970s, in fact, both French and foreign anthropologists tended to choose only
relatively isolated, rural villages or small market towns as their field sites
and to focus on a correspondingly narrow range of themes, such as
traditional farming and craft techniques, kinship, local fetes and ceremonies,
and story-telling (Bromberger 1997: 294; Delamont 1995: 213-5). Since then,
attention has progressively shifted to aspects of modern, urban life and to
the central institutions of contemporary French society. This has resulted in
anthropological studies of a diverse range of themes and social settings, from
football matches (Bromberger 1992) and factories (Moulinie 1993), to the
prestigious grandes ecoles (Bellier 1992) and even the National Assembly
(Abeles 2000)4
During this period, the city has become the 'locus' and, to a lesser extent, the
specific 'focus' (Hannerz 1980: 3) of much anthropological research in France.
Initially, anthropologists carried out research mainly in particular areas or
neighbourhoods of large towns and cities (e.g. Selim 1982) or about
'excluded' or disadvantaged sections of the urban population such as
minority ethnic groups and young people living in peripheral housing
estates (see Althabe 1992: 250; 1998a and b).2 Subsequent anthropological
research in French cities has, however, also begun to explore more dispersed
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and varied social networks, as well as a wider range of social milieux,
including that of the bourgeoisie (e.g. Le Wita 1988).
The increasing number of anthropologists carrying out studies both in and of
Paris is indicative of this trend towards more urban-based research. In the
early 1980s, one commentator noted that Paris had been 'almost deserted
{quasi deserte}' by anthropologists because of the methodological difficulties
associated with conducting ethnographic fieldwork there (Le Wita 1982:197.
Cf. Loux 1983).3 Over the past twenty years, in contrast, more and more
anthropologists have undertaken research not only in the Parisian suburbs
(e.g. Brisebarre 1993; Benveniste 1999; Fainzang 1988) but also in some of the
most well-known sites of central Paris such as the metro (Auge 1986; 1996),
the Luxembourg Gardens (Auge 1985) and the Pere-Lachaise cemetery
(Petonnet 1982), as well as in many other settings, ranging from the office of
a large company (Guigo 1991) to cafes (Conord 2000) and gay bars (Busscher
2000). In so doing, they have investigated diverse types of Paris-based social
network, from associations of entomologists (Delaporte 1986) to those of
African women (Quiminal 1998, 2000).
The present thesis is intended as a contribution to this 'new anthropology
{nouvelle ethnologie)[ of contemporary France (Copans 1996: 103). As a
detailed, ethnographic study of the activities of the prominent anti-racist
association SOS-Racisme in Paris over an eighteen-month period (1993-94), it
has two particular aims in this respect. Firstly, it seeks to build on and
extend recent anthropological work on French politics. Over the past fifteen
years, Marc Abeles and a number of other political anthropologists have
produced a series of fascinating analyses of the ritual and symbolic aspects
of political representation and party competition in France.4 The role of anti-
racist and other social movements in the political process, however, has
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received far less attention. One of my goals is, therefore, to begin to address
this gap in the existing literature. Secondly, the thesis attempts to further the
development of an anthropology of urban France, and, in particular, of Paris.
Although anti-racist activism in France is not a specifically Parisian or even
urban phenomenon, the thesis highlights the crucial ways in which the
action of one of SOS-Racisme's neighbourhood committees was partially
determined by its location in the French capital, as well as by national
political processes which affected the association as a whole. In this sense,
the city became, in the terms of Hannerz's distinction, a 'focus' and not
simply the 'locus' of the research (see Chapter 2).
This thesis is not only a contribution to the anthropology of politics in
contemporary, urban France, however. It also contributes to the expanding
anthropological literature on racism and anti-racism. The study of 'race' and
racism has, of course, long occupied a prominent place within the discipline:
in American anthropology, it can be traced back to Boas and his students
(Harrison 1995: 52-3); in Britain, the anthropologists of the so-called
Manchester School were concerned with 'tribalism' and ethnicity from the
1950s onwards (see Banks 1996: 24-39); and interest in the subject also grew
among French anthropologists in the immediate post-war period (see, for
example, Levi-Strauss 1952). Nevertheless, as a number of commentators
have noted, the subsequent rise of a social constructionist model of ethnicity,
within British anthropology in particular, tended to direct attention away
from 'race' and questions of power and discrimination (Jenkins 1997: 48;
Banks 1996: 97-120). It is only in the last decade, in fact, that the discipline
(on both sides of the Atlantic) has emerged from 'a period of relative
indifference and inattention to matters of race and racism' and sought to
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develop a more critical analysis of such issues (Harrison 1999: 609. See also
Fassin, Morice and Quiminal 1997).
The current resurgence of interest in 'race' and racism within anthropology
has led to a re-examination of the different ways in which the discipline itself
has historically been involved not only in the construction of 'racial'
differences but also in challenging racial typologies and criticising racism
(Shanklin 2000). This attempt to recover 'anthropology's multiple traditions
of anti-racism' (Harrison 1995: 47) is extremely important. However, it has to
date been accompanied by relatively few anthropological studies of
contemporary, /70/7-scientific types of anti-racism. As recent reviews of the
literature have revealed, anthropologists have devoted significantly more
attention to ideas of 'race' and structures of 'racial' inequality than to anti-
racist movements and everyday forms of resistance to racism (Harrison 1995,
1999).5 A similar 'imbalance' exists in sociological, historical and
geographical research on racism and anti-racism (Bonnett 2000: 2).
The under-developed nature of social scientific research on anti-racism is
surprising, as the struggle against racism has been the focus of considerable,
and at times acrimonious, public discussion in the US, Britain and France,
especially in the post-war period. Nonetheless, academic research on the
subject remains relatively scarce. Indeed, in their review of (primarily
anglophone and sociological) work on anti-racism, John Solomos and Les
Back have noted that:
this is an issue on which there is little research, either on historical
trends or contemporary processes. It is largely as a result of the lack of
research that much of the public discussion about anti-racism remains
at the level of rhetoric and abstract generalisations. Without a detailed
analysis of the role of anti-racism in contemporary societies, however,
we shall not be able to understand the changing dynamics of racial
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ideologies and political mobilisations or the possibilities for defeating
racist movements [...]. (Solomos and Back 1996:103)6
Researchers in Britain have, admittedly, examined 'municipal anti-racism1 in
some detail (see Ball and Solomos 1990; Braham, Rattansi and Skellington
1992; Gilroy 1987: 136-48), but there have been surprisingly few studies of
individual anti-racist organisations.7 In France, too, as Jan Willem
Duyvendak has noted, scholarly works on the anti-racist movement are 'not
legion', although accounts written by activists themselves are fairly
numerous (Duyvendak 1994: 224n21).8 In fact, with a few exceptions, notably
Colette Guillaumin (1995), French sociologists (and anthropologists) have
until quite recently devoted little attention to the topics of racism and anti-
racism (see Crowley 1992: 167).9 The most important work in this area has
tended instead to be produced by political philosophers, such as Pierre-
Andre Taguieff (1990a, 1995, 1997) and Tzvetan Todorov (1993), who have
traced the historical development of racist and anti-racist ideologies in the
modern period.
A central argument of this thesis, however, is that the development of a
more sociological (in the broadest sense) perspective on the anti-racist
movement in France is an important task if public and academic debate
there, as in Britain, is to move beyond the general level on which it has
frequently been conducted. As I discuss in Part II, the philosophical critiques
of anti-racism advanced by Taguieff and others are of undoubted
importance, but too often they have presented a one-dimensional, outdated
or even caricatured image of the anti-racist movement. In particular, critics
such as Taguieff have tended to exaggerate the homogeneity of 'anti-racism'
in contemporary France and, crucially, to deny the capacity for self-analysis
and change of its constituent elements. In contrast, this ethnographic study
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of SOS-Racisme as an anti-racist campaigning organisation will seek to
emphasise the different ways in which the association is effectively 'in
movement'. Most obviously, the thesis will be concerned to situate SOS-
Racisme in the context of a broader anti-racist movement composed of a
range of other actors with both similar and conflicting political orientations
and strategies. However, it will also explore the various ways in which SOS-
Racisme itself has evolved since its creation in 1984, notably as a result of
changes in the association's leadership and in the wider socio-political
environment. In so doing, it will aim to offer a more nuanced and
contextualised account of SOS-Racisme's role within the contemporary
French anti-racist movement than those which have been published hitherto.
This section has introduced the three main areas of anthropological research
- urban France, French politics, and 'race' and racism - to which the present
thesis seeks to make a contribution. In the remainder of the chapter, I turn
from these anthropological debates to consider aspects of the wider
intellectual and historical context in France. Arguments about the nature and
contemporary importance of republicanism are a key component of this and
form the subject of the next section.
The Republican Tradition and 'Model' of Integration
Political traditions play an important part in shaping the form and content of
contemporary politics. Indeed, as the French historian Raoul Girardet (1987:
13) has observed, modern political traditions have 'a double role' which is
comparable to that of foundation myths in ancient societies. On the one
hand, they provide an explanation of the present and its concerns by
showing how these are rooted in (or, for that matter, depart from) the values,
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principles and modes of action of previous generations. On the other,
individuals and groups use political traditions to make sense of their own
place in society and in the historical process. Invoking a political tradition
can, for example, be a powerful way for a given group to claim historical
legitimacy for its political strategy or collective identity (Girardet 1987: 11,
1986:15-24; Hazareesingh 1994:12-27).
One of the most important political traditions in France over the past two
hundred years has been republicanism. The political culture and core
institutions of contemporary French society continue to bear its distinctive
hallmark. In the chapters which follow, I examine the influence of this
'republican tradition1 on anti-racist arguments and practices in the 1980s and
1990s. I assess the impact of republican institutions on the form of anti-
racism promoted by SOS-Racisme (Chapters 7-8), and also explore the
various ways in which the association has itself invoked republican ideology
('republican values') when intervening on key issues (Chapters 9-10). The
present section introduces the wider context for these chapters by providing
an historical overview of 'the republican tradition' and reviewing recent
debates about the 'republican model of integration'.
The history of republicanism as a political tradition in France has been
marked since the 1789 Revolution by a fundamental tension between, on the
one hand, the search for unity and indivisibility, and, on the other, the
plurality of forms in which this aspiration has manifested itself (Ozouf 1998:
1076; Nicolet 1994: 15). As Jean Petot has written, the republican tradition is
'both unitary and divided by divergent interpretations, faithful to its origins
and variable, reflected in ideas, political behaviour and juridical texts' (Petot
1989: 79).10 At the beginning of the Third Republic (1870-1940), to take just
one example, Radical and Opportunist republicans shared a commitment to
12
the founding principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, but defined and
ranked these in quite different ways (see Hazareesingh 1994: 80-81).
Historical scholarship has in fact revealed republicanism to be 'an extremely
elastic political concept [...] riven with ambiguities and internal
contradictions' (Hazareesingh 1994: 66). For this reason, a number of recent
authors have emphasised the importance of distinguishing between different
'shades' (Jenkins 1990: 81) or even 'subcultures' (Hazareesingh 1998: 19) of
republicanism, and of referring to 'republican doctrines' in the plural
(Nicolet 1994: 29).
Moreover, as Petot indicates in the passage quoted above, republicanism in
France is not only an ideology or set of values; it is also institutionalised in
the political, juridical and constitutional systems. The texts of the
Constitution and the workings of the Constitutional Court, the structure of
the party system and the nature of institutions such as the secular state
school (ecole lai'que) are all important contemporary expressions of French
republicanism. The republican tradition is, in short, 'an institutional reality1
as well as a body of doctrines (Nicolet 1994: 30; Agulhon 1993: 1). In
Chapters 9-10, I examine the relationship between these two layers of
republicanism (the ideological and the institutional) through an analysis of
SOS-Racisme's interventions in debates about Constitutional reform and the
secularism of state schools.
A further distinction traditionally drawn by historians is that between the
'revolutionary' (or 'classical') and 'modern' phases of French republicanism
(see Hazareesingh 1998: 233). The first of these covers the 1789 Revolution
and its aftermath; the second, usually assumed to begin with the
proclamation of the Third Republic in 1870, witnessed the consolidation of
the nation-state in France (Hobsbawm 1983b; Rosanvallon 1990; Weber 1976)
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and the emergence of modern democratic institutions (Nora 1997a; Nicolet
1994: 38-40).11 It was during this latter period that the idea of 'the republican
tradition (la tradition repubiicaine)' became established. As Odile Rudelle
(1987: 32) has explained, such a notion would have been literally unthinkable
for most of the nineteenth century. The hundred years which followed the
events of 1789 were characterised instead by ongoing political and
ideological conflict between, on the one hand, supporters of a new
Republican order and, on the other, defenders of the ancien regime and
traditional values. In fact, the first public 'synthesis' of these apparently
antagonistic political concepts, Republic and Tradition, occurred only in
1900, in the context of the Dreyfus Affair (Rudelle 1987: 32).
In January 1898, the writer Emile Zola published J'accuse, an open letter to
the President of the Republic, in which he called into question the conviction
of an army officer, Alfred Dreyfus, for espionage and treason (Cobban 1962:
56-7; Cahm 1996). The political crisis which followed led to the appointment
of Rene Waldeck-Rousseau as head of a government of 'republican defence'.
The challenges facing the new administration were to reassert and reinforce
the legitimacy of the Third Republic's political institutions and to defuse the
potentially explosive situation created by the Dreyfus Affair. Subject to a
series of attacks in 1900 from the political Right, Waldeck-Rousseau reacted
by declaring that his government was acting in accordance with 'the
republican tradition'. More specifically, he presented his administration as
the defender of a political tradition traceable back through 'a long line of
liberal (liberaux) republicans' and constituted by '[sjecular and
parliamentary liberalism, military and colonial patriotism, the confidence
placed in its government by the majority group (within Parliament) elected
through universal suffrage, [and] economic and social progress' (Rudelle
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1987: 34-5).12 In so doing, Waldeck-Rousseau sought to attach the weight and
legitimacy of a specifically 'republican' historical tradition (associated with a
commitment to these fundamental political principles) to his government
and to the institutions of the Third Republic more generally.
The conception of the republican tradition first articulated by Waldeck-
Rousseau at the height of the Dreyfus Affair played an important part in
shaping French politics over the next forty years (see Rudelle 1987: 35-40).
This was to change, however, with the military defeat of 1940 and
subsequent occupation of France by the German army. In the first place, the
republican tradition's close association with the discredited institutions of
the Third Republic, widely regarded as responsible for the country's
collapse, significantly diminished its prestige thereafter. Secondly, the post¬
war modernisation of France made references to 'the republican idea (l'idee
republicaine)[ appear increasingly 'out-dated (desuety (Ozouf 1998). Finally,
the influence of republicanism was further weakened after 1945 by the
development of two competing political traditions: Gaullism and
communism. After the proclamation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, for
example, a 'symbolic system of honour and independence (/une] symbolique
dhonneur et d'independance)' (Rudelle 1987: 41) evolved around the figure
of de Gaulle which, for a time, overshadowed the republican tradition as a
legitimating ideology.13 In a similar way, an alternative revolutionary
tradition was available to the Left during this period in the form of
communism (Nora 1997b: 563-564).
According to Rudelle (1987), a resurgence of interest in the republican
tradition only became possible in the 1980s, after the death of de Gaulle and
in the context of 'disillusionment' with both the liberal and the socialist
policies subsequently pursued by Presidents Giscard d'Estaing and
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Mitterrand respectively. The perceived failure of the political projects
associated with Gaullism and socialism, she suggests, led to a re-examination
of traditions such as republicanism which appeared, in contrast, to have
'stood the test of time (fait leurspreuves)[ (Rudelle 1987: 31. See Nora 1997b:
564 and Girling 1998: 48 for a similar argument.). The meaning and relevance
of the republican legacy for French social and political life at the end of the
twentieth century thus became the focus of a wide-ranging public debate,
one which intensified during preparations for the Bicentenary of the 1789
Revolution.
In an important respect, arguments about the republican tradition in the
1980s differed significantly from those which had taken place at the
beginning of the century. As noted earlier, the Dreyfus affair (1894-1906) had
polarised public opinion and precipitated a political crisis which threatened
the very survival of the Third Republic. Against this background, Waldeck-
Rousseau's invocation of the republican tradition can be interpreted as an
attempt to assert the legitimacy of a republican political order in the face of
sustained opposition. By the 1980s, however, the existence of the Republic
and its institutions had ceased to provoke the same level of hostility on the
part of the political Right. Almost a century after the Dreyfus affair, the
legitimacy of a republican regime no longer appeared to be contested by any
of the major political formations. On the contrary, it was generally accepted
that 'the foundational principles of republicanism had become firmly
embedded in the fabric of French politics and society' (Hazareesingh 1994:
93). In particular, the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity were now
formally embraced by parliamentary parties of the mainstream Right as well
as the Left, with significant convergence as to the meaning and ordering of
these principles.
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There was, thus, a widespread perception in the 1980s that the basic tenets of
republican ideology were the object of broad political agreement in France. It
was generally held that 'the republican tradition1 had come to be equated,
consensually but rather narrowly, with a core set of founding principles or
'old minimal values (vieilles valeurs minimales)' (Nora 1997b: 566). As
Rudelle accurately observed: 'in the 1980s ... evoking the "Republican
Tradition" signifies nothing other than remembering the set of public
freedoms on which the political consensus in France is based' (Rudelle 1987:
41).14 This process of ideological convergence was interpreted by many
commentators as marking the beginning of a new era in the history of French
republicanism. The historian Pierre Nora, for example, emphasised the
'weakening (affaiblissement)' of republican ideology in the post-war period,
arguing that it had 'lost its bite (perdu de son mordant)' and become 'a form
without content (une forme sans contenu) (1997b: 565, 562). Republicanism
in France, he concluded, had completed its revolutionary and modern
'cycles' and was now entering a new phase in which it would exist 'neither as
a combat ardently waged, nor as a tradition to which one is accustomed', but
instead as 'a site of memory' (1997b: 566).15 In a similar but more pessimistic
vein, Petot claimed that young people in the 1980s were simply 'indifferent'
to the key figures and ideas of the republican tradition, and that debates
about secularism and the state school system seemed 'anachronistic and
sterile (anachroniques etsteriles)' (Petot 1989:100).
Not all commentators, however, have viewed the emergence of 'a republican
consensus' in the 1980s as evidence of a decline in the relevance or
importance of republicanism in contemporary France. Flazareesingh (1994),
for example, has drawn the opposite conclusion, arguing that during this
period the 'absence of ideological dissonance was not ... a symptom of the
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demise of republicanism; indeed, it constituted a triumph of the eminently
republican notions of accommodation and compromise1 (Hazareesingh 1994:
96). He claims that the 'essence' of republicanism lies precisely in this ability
to cut across the political divisions of French society and to attract wide-
ranging support for such fundamental notions as equality, democracy and
secularism (1994: 67). For Hazareesingh, then, the emergence of a consensus
over the meaning of these principles in the 1980s was a sign of
republicanism's continued vigour and relevance rather than proof of its
ossification.
This debate about republicanism's role in shaping contemporary French
politics and society is an important part of the background to the present
study. In the chapters which follow, I argue that the language and strategies
of anti-racist organisations such as SOS-Racisme continue to be heavily
influenced by republican ideologies and institutions. In particular, I suggest
that the late 1980s and 1990s witnessed the formulation of a new or
reinvented republican philosophy of national integration which has since
dominated public discussion of immigration and anti-racism. Intellectuals,
politicians, policy-makers and, I shall claim, SOS-Racisme were all active
during this period in defining and promoting a 'republican model of
integration (modele republicain d'integration)' as the basis for policies
towards minority ethnic groups (see Chapter 7). In the final part of this
section, I will introduce the main features of the so-called integrationist
'model' in France and outline the argument that it is currently in crisis.
The idea of a 'republican' model of integration, as a distinctive and coherent
approach to immigration and to cultural and ethnic pluralism, began to gain
currency among French politicians, policy-makers and intellectuals in the
mid-1980s. Since then, it has quickly become the 'dominant idiom' in which
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such issues are debated in France, replacing the narrower preoccupation
with immigrants' socio-economic insertion previously characteristic of state
policy (see Favell 1998: 41ff.). A powerful consensus has now emerged that
contemporary immigration and integration policies should be based on
'republican' concepts of citizenship and the nation originating in the
Revolutionary period and more fully elaborated during the Third Republic
(1870-1940). It is argued that the classic conception of France as 'a universal
nation of equal and free citizens', which underpinned both the unification of
the French regions and the assimilation of European immigrants in the late
nineteenth century, continues to be relevant today. Typically presented as a
distinct model of political unity, republican citizenship is, in other words,
also regarded as 'a formal institutional legacy which is (or should be)
determinant of the nature of current immigration and integration policies
(see Favell 1998: 44).
The republican model of integration, therefore, reformulates policies on
immigration and minorities in terms of a particular 'French' philosophy of
citizenship and the nation, which Favell has referred to as the 'idiom of
republican citizenship' (1998: 41). In so doing, it departs from more
pragmatic approaches (such as insertion) concerned primarily with the
management of social welfare issues. There are three main features of the
republican model of integration which are usually highlighted in public (and
academic) discussion of the topic. The first is its universalism,
cosmopolitanism or inclusivity: access to French nationality and citizenship
is presented as potentially open to all residents (regardless of origin) who
adhere to the 'republican values' on which polity unity is founded. This leads
directly to the model's second characteristic which is an emphasis on the
voluntaristic or elective basis of French national unity. The 'French'
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conception of the nation, it is argued, makes active political participation and
a conscious commitment to republican principles the conditions of
membership, rather than ties of blood, ethnicity or 'race' (see Favell 1998: 61).
Finally, the republican model defines integration as an individual process
and excludes any official recognition of ethnic and cultural minorities by the
state. It is, for example as individual citizens rather than as members of
minority groups that immigrants are to be granted equal rights, with their
'integration' occurring not collectively but instead 'individual after
individual (individu apres individuy (Kepel 1991: 381).16 Underlying this
aspect of the republican model of integration is a key distinction between
public and private spheres: while the existence of cultural and ethnic
pluralism in the private sphere is to be accepted and even encouraged, there
is a refusal to institutionalise ethnic, cultural or religious differences in the
public sphere or to distinguish between different categories of French
citizens according to their origin (see Favell 1998: 70ff.)
The consolidation of a broad political consensus among elites in France
about the distinctiveness and superiority of this 'republican' approach to the
integration of minorities into the nation-state is one of the most important
developments in French politics since the mid-1980s. In Chapter 7, I argue
that the framing of contemporary immigration and integration policies in
terms of a republican 'model' dating back to the Third Republic can be
analysed both as an example of 'the invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm and
Ranger 1983) and as an attempt to redefine French national identity for the
1990s. I want to conclude this section, however, with a very few brief
comments on recent debates, in which SOS-Racisme has played a prominent
part, about the 'crisis' of the republican model of integration (see, also,
Chapters 7 and 10).
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As Michel Wieviorka (1997a: 7) has noted, the idea that the republican model
of integration is currently in a state of crisis has become widespread since the
mid-1980s. In a 1991 newspaper interview, for example, Harlem Desir (SOS-
Racisme's first president) declared that 'we have a society in France which
has in the past been a wonderful melting-pot [but] whose model of
integration has now broken down' (L'Humanite\ 21 March 1991).17
Underpinning such assertions is a belief that it is increasingly difficult for the
Republic's core institutions to perform their 'traditional' role of integrating
individuals into the nation-state by promoting respect for republican values
and opening access to citizenship. Of these institutions, the state school has
tended to be the focus of recent debates. On the one hand, there is a
perception that rather than reducing social inequalities and facilitating
integration state schools are actually contributing to processes of segregation
and exclusion. On the other, the appearance at a number of state schools of
young Muslim women wearing headscarves has led many commentators to
speak of a 'crisis' of secularism. These developments, along with urban
deprivation, rising unemployment and the declining influence of trade
unions are frequently assumed to be undermining the foundations of the
republican model of integration (see Wieviorka 1990).
In this section I have presented a preliminary account of ongoing French
debates about the contemporary significance of 'the republican tradition' and
about the origins and current 'crisis' of the republican model of integration.
The argument which I develop over the course of the thesis is that SOS-
Racisme has played an influential role in public discussion of these (and
other) issues. More specifically, I suggest that the association has articulated
and actively sought to promote a distinctively 'republican' conception of
national integration, and made prominent interventions in controversies
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over the 'crisis' of anti-racism, the meaning of secularism and the future of
the state school system. In each case I will situate the particular positions
adopted by SOS-Racisme in their wider political, institutional and
intellectual context. SOS-Racisme's contribution to debates about
republicanism or anti-racism, however, must also be viewed more narrowly
against the background of the association's own creation in 1984 and
evolution over the subsequent decade. In the final section of this
introductory chapter, therefore, I provide an overview of SOS-Racisme's first
ten years as a way of contextualising the more recent events which are the
thesis's primary focus.
SOS-Racisme: 'Touche pas a mon pote'
The origins of SOS-Racisme can effectively be traced back to the victory of
the Socialist Party (PS) candidate Francois Mitterrand at the May 1981
presidential election. The left-wing government which was subsequently
formed under Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy quickly introduced several
pieces of legislation intended to signal its determination to break with the
repressive immigration policies of the previous centre-right administration.
One of these new, and symbolically important, measures was the law of 9
October 1981 which granted foreigners the right of association. Previously,
foreigners had been required to obtain prior authorisation from the Interior
Minister before forming an association and stringent conditions were
attached. The new Socialist legislation removed these restrictions and
resulted in a significant increase in the political mobilisation of North
Africans (Wihtol de Wenden 1991: 320-1,1992; Weil 1988: 58-9,1995: 212ff.).18
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The associations formed by young people of immigrant origin in the suburbs
of cities such as Paris and Lyons after 1981 were initially designed to
promote their self-organisation and participation in local life (Dabene 1990;
Dazi-Heni and Polac 1990). However, several events occurred over the next
two years which were to radicalise the activity of many of these groups and
focus it on issues of racism, equal rights, unemployment and police violence.
The summers of 1982 and 1983 witnessed a series of racist incidents in which
young people, predominantly of North African origin, were shot and killed
either by police officers or by other (white) inhabitants of their housing
estates. In the intervening period, a group of Franco-Maghrebians living on
the Lyons high-rise estate Les Minguettes staged a twelve-day hunger strike
to protest against poor housing conditions. The leader of the hunger-strikers,
Toumi Dja'idja, was himself later shot and nearly killed by a police officer in
June 1983. The fact that the perpetrators of such crimes were frequently
either acquitted or given light sentences by the courts only served to increase
the sense of injustice experienced by young people of immigrant origin. The
success of the far-right Front national in the September 1983 municipal by-
election in Dreux (sixty kilometres west of Paris) further fuelled their fears
about racism in French society (Jazouli 1992: 43-52; Hargreaves 1991; Singer
1991).
In response to these events, Toumi Djai'dja and other young people living in
Les Minguettes estate decided to organise a nation-wide march, as a form of
non-violent protest to the racism, police brutality and poverty with which
they were confronted. Assisted by a Catholic priest, Christian Delorme, they
prepared the 'March For Equality and Against Racism' {la Marche pour
1'egalite et contre le racisme)19 which left Marseilles in October 1983 almost
unnoticed by politicians and the (Parisian) media alike. When the march
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finally arrived in Paris on 3 December 1983, however, the demonstrators
numbered 100,000 and a delegation was received by President Mitterrand in
the glare of the national media. Mitterrand used the occasion to announce
the creation of a single residence and work permit (valid for ten-years and
automatically renewable) for foreigners (Hargreaves 1991; Bouamama 1994).
The 1983 March brought the existence of the so-called 'second generation' to
public attention. It also represented a key stage in the political mobilisation
of young people of immigrant origin in France (see Wihtol de Wenden 1994,
1995a and b). Nevertheless, the subsequent attempt, in June 1984, to create a
national structure for the movement revealed significant divisions between
the Parisian and Lyons-based collectives which had been formed after the
march. In particular, a split emerged between those who favoured the
construction of an autonomous 'Maghrebian' movement, and those
committed to working closely with French anti-racist and other
organisations. This led to the disintegration of the Parisian collective, but a
group of its former members launched an appeal in July 1984 for a second
march which came to be known as Convergence 84. The organisers aimed to
highlight the culturally and ethnically mixed nature of French society and
also the importance of strategic co-operation between Franco-Maghrebian
and traditional anti-racist associations. However, the unfolding of
Convergence 84 served instead to underline the gulf between French anti-
racist activists and young people of immigrant origin and the march ended
in Paris in an atmosphere of disillusionment and recriminations (Jazouli
1992: 81-94; Bouamama 1994: 89-107).
It was at the final Parisian rally of Convergence 84 that members of SOS-
Racisme made their first public appearance, selling a badge bearing the
slogan 'Hands off my pal (Touche pas a mon pote)' (see Figure 1).
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The association had been founded several months previously by a group of
Paris-based students and political activists opposed to racist violence and the
rise of the FN. The badge proved extremely popular with young people and
by the end of March 1985 over 300,000 had been sold (Liberation, 25 March
1985). In the intervening period, SOS-Racisme's articulate and charismatic
president, Harlem Desir, appeared on a current affairs television programme
and generated valuable publicity for the new association.20 Thereafter, its
profile was further raised by prominent intellectuals, entertainers, media
figures and politicians who agreed to wear the badge publicly and act as
sponsors (parrains) (see Chapter 2). All of these factors contributed to a
highly successful first six months for SOS-Racisme which culminated in the
organisation of a free concert at the Place de la Concorde in Paris on 15 June
1985 which was attended by an estimated 300,000 people (Desir 1985;
Hargreaves 1991).
The rapid rise of SOS-Racisme did, however, generate a significant amount
of controversy. The Franco-Maghrebian associations which had participated
in the 1983 March and Convergence 84, for example, accused SOS-Racisme of
attempting to marginalise their movement and of substituting a moral(istic)
denunciation of racism for their specific demands for equal rights. The
presence of members of the Jewish students' organisation UEJF (Union des
etudiants juifs de France) and the perceived under-representation and
limited influence of Franco-Maghrebians within the leadership of SOS-
Racisme also caused concern (Le Monde, 10 May 1985; Kettane 1985: 33).
Moreover, Harlem Desir's repeated insistence that SOS-Racisme was an
independent and apolitical movement against racism and the FN
increasingly came to be questioned. Critics on both the political left and right
claimed that the PS was manipulating SOS-Racisme in order to mobilise
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young people for the forthcoming legislative elections (Le Figaro, 28 March
1985 and Le Monde, 21 September 1985).21
In spite of these criticisms, SOS-Racisme continued to play a key role in
French political life throughout the second half of the 1980s. The political
context changed in March 1986 when the victory of the RPR-UDF at the
legislative elections resulted in a period of 'cohabitation' between Jacques
Chirac's centre-right government and the Socialist President Mitterrand.
SOS-Racisme maintained a high public profile, however, particularly
through its involvement in the student movement of November-December
1986 which forced the government to withdraw proposed reforms of higher
education and the nationality code (Dray 1987; Brubaker 1992: Ch. 7). The
following year, Harlem Desir's appearance on the television programme
L'Heure de Verite was watched by 5 million viewers (L'Evenement du jeudi,
27 August-2 September 1987). As I explain in Chapter 7, Desir's remarks on
this programme were widely interpreted as signalling SOS-Racisme's move
away from 'multiculturalism' to a republican model of integration, and from
a 'moral' to a more 'social' or grassroots form of anti-racism.
The re-election of Frangois Mitterrand as President of the Republic in May
1988, and the Socialists' subsequent victory at the legislative elections,
brought the first period of cohabitation to an end but renewed speculation
about SOS-Racisme's links with the PS. It was claimed that Harlem Desk-
had, in effect, instructed the association's members to vote for Mitterrand
during a rally held in the run-up to the presidential election (Le Figaro, 15
March 1988; Le Canard enchaine, 16 March 1988). Similarly, the election of
one of SOS-Racisme's founder-members, Julien Dray, as a PS deputy was
regarded by many commentators as confirmation of the association's close
relationship with the Socialists, in spite of Harlem Desir's constant assertion
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of its independence (Liberation, 18-19 June 1988). These allegations damaged
SOS-Racisme's reputation but its campaigns, concerts and other initiatives
continued to enjoy widespread public and media support in 1988.
However, the next few years witnessed a noticeable decline in SOS-Racisme's
popularity and influence, partly as a result of its views on the so-called
Islamic headscarf affair of 1989 and the Gulf War of 1990-91. The headscarf
affair began in October 1989 when Ernest Cheniere, the head-teacher of a
state school in Creil (to the north of Paris), suspended three young Muslim
students for wearing headscarves. According to Cheniere, the young
women's insistence on wearing the headscarf to their classes constituted an
infringement of the secularism (lai'cite) of the Republican school, enshrined
in French law. In the public debate which ensued, SOS-Racisme aligned itself
with Education Minister Lionel Jospin in opposing the women's exclusion.
As I explain in Chapter 10, this position alienated many of the association's
traditional supporters on the so-called 'secular left' (la gauche lai'que). In a
similar way, SOS-Racisme's opposition to the Gulf War of 1990-91 provoked
the departure of many of its celebrity sponsors and tension within the
association itself (Le Monde, 19 and 20-21 January 1991; Dray 1991).
The late 1980s and early 1990s were, therefore, difficult years for SOS-
Racisme during which its positions on major issues of the day were often at
variance with large sections of political and public opinion. This was in
striking contrast to the situation in the mid-1980s, when it was the most
influential and important organisation in France, not simply within the anti-
racist movement but in the country as a whole (Duyvendak 1994: 23S).22
After the criticism of its stance over the Gulf War, SOS-Racisme was now
described by many media commentators as having 'lost momentum (en
perte de vitesse)[ and requiring 'a new lease of life (un second souffle)'.
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Speculation about the association's future intensified when Harlem Desir
announced in 1992 that he intended to resign as president in order to create a
new political party (Liberation, 13-14 June 1992).
Harlem Desir's departure effectively brought the first phase of SOS-
Racisme's development to a close. Under his presidency, the association had
become established as a feature of the socio-political landscape, with
committees in secondary schools, universities and neighbourhoods
throughout France and in other European countries. It had also played a
major part in shaping debate about immigration and integration in France
during the second half of the 1980s. However, SOS-Racisme was
experiencing increasing difficulty in making its voice heard and had been
subject to repeated and sustained attacks in the press, particularly after the
1989 headscarf affair. The challenge facing Desir's successors was to relaunch
the association with a strategy which would ensure its long-term survival
and enhance the effectiveness of its interventions.
At a meeting of SOS-Racisme's National Council in September 1992, Fode
Sylla and Delphine Batho were elected as the association's new president and
vice-president respectively. Both had previously held positions of
responsibility in subsidiary organisations attached to SOS-Racisme: Sylla
was president of OBU (Organisation des bardieues unies) which worked
with young people in the suburbs, while Batho had headed the secondary
school students' federation FIDL {Federation independante et democratique
lyceenne) (see Chapter 2 for more information on these and other
organisations linked to SOS-Racisme). Their election symbolised the
apparent transfer of power to a younger generation with a different type of
political experience to that of the association's founder-members. In
particular, the choice of Sylla was widely interpreted in the media as a sign
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that SOS-Racisme intended in the future to focus more on the question of the
suburbs (bardieues) and the social problems experienced by their young
inhabitants (Liberation, 5-6 September 1992; LeMonde, 8 September 1992).23
The victory of the centre-right at the March 1993 legislative elections,
however, radically changed the political context and determined the focus of
SOS-Racisme's first campaign under its new leadership. The incoming
government immediately tabled proposals for a reform of the nationality
code and for legislation on immigration controls and asylum rights. Over the
next few months, SOS-Racisme organised a series of demonstrations to resist
these measures, which they represented as an attack on the rights of
foreigners and their children in France (Le Monde, 28 April 1993; Wayland
1993). At the association's fourth Congress, which took place in July 1993,
delegates reaffirmed their opposition to the government's plans and debated
strategies for widening the protest. The nature of SOS-Racisme's subsequent
mobilisation against the proposed reform of asylum rights is examined in
detail in Chapter 9 of this thesis.
The July 1993 Congress is a significant moment in SOS-Racisme's history
more generally because it provided the first real opportunity for the new
leadership to outline its reflections on the association's future development.
The National Bureau used the occasion to present delegates with a set of
propositions and identified four main types of activity upon which SOS-
Racisme's long-term survival depended: (1) the defence of immigrants
(immigres); (2) implantation in the social fabric; (3) campaigns to influence
public opinion (campagnes d'opinion)) and (4) work with young people
(SOS-Racisme 1993b: 7-8). As a study of SOS-Racisme's initiatives and
debates in the eighteen months which followed the July Congress, this thesis
will explore how the association's members attempted to translate these
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'orientations' into practice. Crucially, this involved decisions about the
relative importance to be attached to each of the four activities mentioned
above, and individual chapters will examine how priorities were determined
in a range of specific contexts.
In this section I have presented a brief historical account of the main events
leading up to SOS-Racisme's creation in 1984 as well as an overview of how
the association evolved in the course of the next ten years. The present thesis
focuses on the eighteen months following the July 1993 Congress which
effectively 're-launched' SOS-Racisme under a new leadership. As I will
show, however, the association's development during this later period was
constrained, although to a lesser extent it was also enabled, by earlier
political strategies and positions. Many members of the public, for example,
continued to identify SOS-Racisme with its first president, Harlem Desir,
despite the change of leadership. Similarly, the circumstances surrounding
the association's creation and the nature of its links with the Socialist Party
remained highly controversial matters. I will suggest, in fact, that there are a
number of different and competing narratives of SOS-Racisme's history
which constitute an important part of the contemporary context within
which it operates (see Chapters 5-6). One of the tasks of this thesis will be to
examine critically both the activist and academic forms of such narratives,
and to challenge some of the received ideas about SOS-Racisme which they
contain.
Conclusion and Summary
This thesis is an ethnographic study of the French anti-racist association SOS-
Racisme, based on fieldwork conducted in Paris between July 1993 and
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December 1994. For reasons which will have become apparent in the last
section, the summer of 1993 was an exciting and interesting time to begin
research on SOS-Racisme. In the first place, the association had recently
elected a new president and vice-president and appeared, to all intents and
purposes, to be attempting to 're-launch' itself with a clearly-stated set of
priorities and objectives. Secondly, the victory of the RPR-UDF coalition at
the March 1993 legislative elections had radically altered the political context
for anti-racist action in France. The new centre-right government under
Prime Minister Edouard Bahadur enjoyed a huge parliamentary majority
and clearly approached 'cohabitation' with Socialist President Mitterrand
from a position of strength. Far-reaching reforms of the nationality code and
asylum rights were immediately introduced which encountered little serious
opposition from a divided and demoralised Left. The challenge facing SOS-
Racisme's leadership and grassroots activists was therefore of developing
effective anti-racist strategies largely without the institutional support of
their traditional political allies. How the association, itself undergoing
internal changes, responded to this transformation of the political climate
will be the subject of detailed examination in the pages which follow.
In this introductory chapter I have reviewed recent trends in the
anthropology of France and in the discipline's approach to racism and anti-
racism, summarised debates about the importance of republicanism in
contemporary France, and provided a brief account of SOS-Racisme's
creation and subsequent evolution. The material discussed forms a key part
of the broader intellectual, historical and political context for the present
study. Against this background, the main themes of the thesis, highlighted at
the very beginning of the chapter, can now be re-stated. Firstly, a key issue
addressed in the following thesis is the 'crisis' ofanti-racism in contemporary
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France. Over the last fifteen years, there has been mounting criticism of the
strategic and conceptual weaknesses of the French anti-racist movement. A
particular focus of attention has been the perceived shortcomings of SOS-
Racisme, one of the most prominent anti-racist organisations to have
emerged since the 1980s. Through a detailed, ethnographic study of SOS-
Racisme, this thesis investigates the nature and extent of the contemporary
'crisis' of anti-racism in France, reaching conclusions which differ
significantly from those of many other (mainly French) commentators.
A second major theme is the republicanism of anti-racism in contemporary
France. This issue is addressed in two distinct but related ways. On the one
hand, the thesis examines how republican ideologies and institutions have
played a crucial part in determining both the form and content of SOS-
Racisme's opposition to racism. On the other, it also explores SOS-Racisme's
role in the re-invention of 'the republican tradition' and, more specifically,
the notion of 'the republican model of integration' in the late 1980s and early
1990s. One of the main arguments I develop, however, is that the
association's attachment to a 'republican' philosophy of integration has
seriously limited the effectiveness of its contribution to the struggle against
racism.
The final core concern of this thesis is with the politics of anti-racism in
contemporary France. The term 'politics' here should be understood in both
of the senses covered by the French (feminine) noun politique, namely policy
as well as party politics and activism.24 Although the emphasis in what
follows will be on the complex relationship between SOS-Racisme and
political parties, the concrete measures proposed by the association over the
years to combat racism will also be discussed. Analysis of these aspects of
anti-racist politics, it will be argued finally, generates important insights into
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the nature of the contemporary 'crisis' of mainstream republican anti-racism
in France.
The thesis has three parts. Part I ('Movement') introduces SOS-Racisme in
more detail, develops a theoretical and conceptual framework for the thesis
as a whole, and also provides a discussion of methodological issues. Chapter
2 describes SOS-Racisme's organisational structure and links with other
organisations, and then considers different recruitment patterns and
conceptions of the relationship between associative and political party
activism. In the third chapter I examine current theoretical debates in social
movements research and identify a set of core analytical concepts. The fourth
chapter focuses on research methodology, comparing the strengths and
weaknesses of an ethnographic approach to social movements with those of
other methods. Building on the final section of the introductory chapter, Part
II ('Tensions') moves on to discuss in detail the controversy over SOS-
Racisme's origins and also the nature of its interventions in debates about
national identity in the 1980s and 1990s. In Chapters 5 and 6 the existing
literature on SOS-Racisme is reviewed and influential recent critiques of the
conceptual weaknesses and ideological contradictions of the French anti-
racist movement more generally are summarised and evaluated. The seventh
chapter explores SOS-Racisme's role in the development of a form of
republican nationalism during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and presents a
critical analysis of the association's use of terms such as metissage and
integration.
The chapters in Part III ('Practice') are based more directly on empirical
material collected during anthropological fieldwork on SOS-Racisme in Paris
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from July 1993 to December 1994. The eighth chapter explores the
relationship between collective identity construction, leadership strategies
and the evaluation of political opportunities through a detailed examination
of SOS-Racisme's involvement in a series of events which occurred during
the run-up to the 1994 European elections. The next two chapters analyse the
ways in which SOS-Racisme framed its interventions in a number of key
public debates during 1993-1994 in terms of an appeal to 'the republican
tradition'. Chapter 9 focuses on the strategies adopted by SOS-Racisme in its
autumn 1993 campaign against government proposals to restrict the right to
asylum. The tenth chapter then discusses SOS-Racisme's apparent change of
position between 1989 and 1994 on the question of whether the secular
Republic required the exclusion of young Muslim women wearing the hidjab
from state schools. The conclusion reviews the thesis's main arguments and
assesses the implications of this ethnographic study of SOS-Racisme for




1 Bromberger (1997) has provided a comprehensive review of this literature
(see also Bromberger 1998 for a more recent collection of articles).
2 This is similar, of course, to the way in which an urban anthropology
developed in other places (see Hannerz 1980: 5). See Sanjek (1990) and Low
(1996) for more recent reviews of the anthropological literature on cities
published in English.
3 The methodological problems associated with conducting anthropological
fieldwork in an urban environment such as central Paris are addressed in
Chapter 4 of the present thesis.
4 See, for example, Abeles (1986, 1988a, 1990, 1991), Abeles and Jeudy (1997)
and Pourcher (1990,1991).
5 A notable exception is the work of Steven Gregory (1993a and b, 1994).
6 Almost a decade earlier, Aptheker had argued in a similar way that: 'A
literature on anti-racism is well overdue' (1987: 32).
7 An example is Brittan's (1987) work on the Anti-Nazi League (ANL).
8 But see Juhem (1998), as well as the work of Cathie Lloyd (1991,1994, 1996,
1998) and Jim House (1997), two British researchers who have written on the
French anti-racist movement from a sociological and historical perspective.
A number of published accounts of the movement by its activists are
discussed in some detail in Chapter 5 of the present thesis.
9 In 1970, for example, Pierre-Jean Simon claimed that 'the sociology of
interethnic and racial relations {la sociologie des relations interethniques et
des relations racialesy was one of the most 'underdeveloped {sous-
developpees)[ areas of French social science. It is in fact only in the past
decade, with notably the work of Michel Wieviorka (1991,1992,1993a and d,
1998) and his colleagues at the Centre d'analyse et d'intervention
sociologiques (CADIS) in Paris, that a wide-ranging sociology of racism and
anti-racism in contemporary France has begun to emerge.
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10'[...] a la fois unitaire et divisee par des interpretations divergentes, fidele a
ses origines et variable, traduite dans les idees, les conduites politiques et les
textes juridiques.'
11 Both Hazareesingh (1998) and Nord (1995), however, have argued that this
second or 'modern' phase in the history of French republicanism began
during the Second Empire (1852-1870) and not, as much traditional
republican historiography has asserted, only after the Franco-Prussian War
(1870-1871).
12 'Liberalisme laic et parlementaire, patriotisme militaire et colonial,
confiance majoritaire du suffrage universel, progres economique et social :
tels sont done, apres trente ans d'existence, les quatre piliers d'une «tradition
republicaine» vivante ...'
13 As Guichard (1985: 298ff.) has shown, however, de Gaulle also used
revolutionary and republican symbols (such as La Marseillaise and
Marianne) to invest his power with legitimacy. Visual imagery involving the
figure of de Gaulle himself is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.
14 '...dans les annees 80 qui sont les notres revocation de la «tradition
republicaine» ne signifie rien d'autre que le rappel de 1'ensemble de libertes
publiques sur lequel est fonde le consensus politique de la France.'
15 'Ni combat vecu dans l'ardeur, ni tradition vecue dans l'habitude. Un lieu
de memoire.'
16 In the words of the Haut conseil a l'integration, an official body set up by
Socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard in 1990, in the wake of the first
'headscarves affair': 'the French conception of integration must conform to a
logic of equality [of individual citizens] and not to a logic of minorities (la
conception franyaise de l'integration doit obeir a une logique d'egalite etnon
a une logique de minorites)' (HCI 1993: 35, original italics). This quotation
provides a good illustration of the normative nature of much elite discussion
of the republican model of integration (see Lorcerie 1994).
17 '...nous avons une societe franyaise qui a ete un formidable creuset et dont
le modele d'integration est en panne.' The notion of 'the French melting-pot
{le creuset frangais)' is also widely used in academic discussions of
immigration and integration in France (see, for example, Noiriel 1988).
18 Viet (1998: 428) notes that between 1981 and 1993 the number of
associations increased from 600 to 4 000.
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19 The media subsequently labelled it 'The March of the Beurd, this being the
backslang (verlan) term used primarily (but not exclusively) by young
people of North African origin in the Parisian suburbs to define themselves.
In this thesis, however, I will retain the original title 'The March For Equality
and Against Racism' for two main reasons. Firstly, the term Feuh originated
and was employed chiefly in the housing estates around Paris; young people
of North African origin in the suburbs of Marseilles and Lyons, where the
idea of the march was conceived, did not generally refer to themselves as
Feurs' but rather as ymaghrebind (Wihtol de Wenden 1991: 330). The media's
subsequent adoption and often indiscriminate use of the category 'beur' has
increasingly led to its rejection by young people even in Paris (Hargreaves
and McKinney 1997: 20; Barbara 1992.). Secondly, the label 'The March of the
Beurd gives the impression that only people of North African origin were
involved, whereas marchers from other 'immigrant communities' were also
present, albeit in lesser numbers (Bouamama 1994: 68-70). In the light of the
above points, I will refer throughout this thesis to young people of North
African origin as Franco-Maghrebians and avoid the term 'beub as far as
possible.
20 As Negrouche (1992: 49) has indicated, Harlem Desir became 'a sort of
Robin Hood of antiracism, highly prized by journalists (une sorte de Robin
des Bois de l'antiracisme, tresprisepariesjournalistes).'
21 See also Chapter 5 of the present thesis.
22 Writing in 1988, the sociologist Alain Touraine even described SOS-
Racisme as 'the most important and most positive of the movements which
have traversed French society over the past few years (leplus important etle
plus positif des mouvements qui ont traverse la societe franqaise ces
dernieres annees)' (Touraine 1988b).
23 See Sylla and Kowalevski (1993: 146ff.) for Sylla's own account of his
involvement in OBU and subsequently SOS-Racisme.
24 The meaning of the French word politique also varies depending on
whether it is accompanied by the masculine or the feminine article. In the
former case-le politique-it refers to politics in general, 'the political side of
things', while un politique is a politician. In the latter case-la politique-it
means either policy, as in la politique exterieure du gouvernement (the
government's foreign policy), or politics in a narrower sense, e.g. faire de la
politique (to be a political activist, to be in politics). These examples are taken





Structures, Actors and Identities
One day near the beginning of August 1993,1 was walking along one of the
seemingly interminable corridors of a Parisian metro station. I had arrived in
the French capital a few weeks earlier, had started to rent a small studio flat
and was now starting to get my bearings. (I had only been to Paris twice
before for short visits.) As I walked along I glanced at advertisements,
posters and graffiti on the walls of the metro station. Among these was a
poster which contained a reference to a law against racism and an invitation
to collect 'a passport against racism (un passeport contre le racisme)' from
one of the six organisations listed at the bottom. I noted the details and duly
visited the headquarters of each of these anti-racist and human rights
organisations in turn, asking about the 'passport' and conducting several
preliminary interviews (see Appendix 2B).
One of these organisations was SOS-Racisme. When I visited its
headquarters I explained to the member of the National Bureau who
received me that I was writing a thesis about anti-racism in France and
would be interested in finding out more about the association. At this point I
had not yet decided to focus on SOS-Racisme and simply intended to obtain
some general information. The National Bureau member briefly retraced the
association's history and described the campaigns in which it was currently
involved, and then invited me to attend a meeting of its National Council the
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following weekend. When I arrived at this meeting I sat down, quite by
chance, next to one of the members of the local committee for the area in
which I had rented a flat. At an interval we struck up a conversation and she
invited me to the next meeting of the committee. Over the next eighteen
months I participated in the activities of this committee of SOS-Racisme
(members knew I was conducting research), and in other initiatives
organised by the association at a national level.
In this account of my 'arrival' at SOS-Racisme I have referred to several
levels of the association's structure - National Bureau, National Council and
local committee. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of SOS-
Racisme's organisational structure and an indication of the important links
which it had with other organisations at the time of my fieldwork (1993-94). I
also introduce some of the activists with whom I worked and consider how
they became involved in the association. The chapter ends with a more
general discussion of the concepts of identity and unity.
The Organisational Structure of SOS-Racisme
In France, the principle of freedom of association is enshrined in a specific
provision of the Common Law known as 'the 1 July 1901 Law' (Journal
Officiel de la Republique Frangaise 1901). This defines an association as 'the
agreement by which two or more persons combine their knowledge or act
together for a purpose other than that of profit-sharing' (Article l).1 The right
of French citizens to form such associations freely, without the need for
government authorisation or a preliminary declaration, is a cornerstone of
the 1901 Law (Article 2). The latter also contains provisions allowing
associations to obtain 'legal competence Ja capacite juridique)\ i.e. the right
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to bring cases to court, or recognition as bodies 'with charitable status
(id'utilitepubliquey, thus enabling them to receive subsidies (Articles 5, 6 and
10). In both cases, however, associations must first register and present their
articles at the appropriate Prefecture (see Barats 1994: 332-4). These articles
must, in addition, conform to a standard type or pro forma drawn up by the
authorities and cover the association's composition and aims, administration
and functioning, annual resources, internal regulations, and the modification
of its articles and dissolution (see Debbasch and Bourdon 1997:116-125).
In common with many other non-profit-making organisations in France,
SOS-Racisme has the legal status of an association under the terms of the
1901 Law. It was officially registered as such in Paris in November 1984, with
a view to obtaining legal competence and recognition as an association with
charitable status (Desir 1985: 16). This was quickly followed by the creation
of numerous local sections throughout France. Each section was registered as
a separate association, and given the generic title 'Stop Racism Committee
(Comite Stop-Racismey followed by the name of the specific town or district
where it was based. To all intents and purposes, however, the Stop Racism
Committees operate as the local sections of the association SOS-Racisme and
their formally distinct existence will have little bearing on the issues
discussed in this thesis. Nevertheless, the name 'SOS-Racisme' strictly
speaking denotes only the original association founded in 1984 and
effectively existing uniquely at a national level.
The creation of SOS-Racisme and the Stop Racism Committees as
associations regulated by the 1901 Law had important implications for their
organisational structure. As I have already mentioned, an association
seeking legal competence and/or charitable status must operate on the basis
of a standard set of articles (modele de statuts) prescribed by the authorities.
42
This pro forma includes articles relating to the association's basic structure,
administration and modus operandi. There is a stipulation, for example, that
the association be administered by a 'management committee (conseil
d'administration)* elected at a general assembly meeting of its members. This
committee is in turn responsible for electing a 'bureau' composed of a
president, one or more vice-presidents, up to three secretaries, a treasurer
and an assistant treasurer (see Debbasch and Bourdon 1997:119-120).
Figure 2.1 presents an overview of SOS-Racisme's organisational structure.
At the foot of the diagram are the organisation's local or grassroots branches,
the Stop Racism Committees. As a formally constituted association in its own
right, each one is administered by a management committee from which a
smaller bureau is drawn. According to SOS-Racisme's president, 350 Stop
Racism committees existed in 1996 (Sylla 1996a: 156).2 Every two to three
years, the members of these committees are invited to attend a National
Congress of SOS-Racisme.3 This is the meeting of the association's general
assembly, at which members are elected to serve on the National Council
(the equivalent of a 'Management Committee').4 The National Council
normally meets every two to three months, although 'extraordinary'
meetings can also be called in the intervening period should the need arise.
During my fieldwork, all National Council meetings were held in Paris, a
situation resented by many activists from the provinces (see Chapters 7 and
9)-
It is the National Council which, in turn, elects the members of SOS-
Racisme's National Bureau. As well as the association's president, vice-
presidents), secretary and treasurer, the National Bureau includes a number
of other members with national responsibilities (relations with the press or
with other organisations, for example). In 1993-94, meetings of the National
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Elects members
Figure 2.1 The Organisational Structure of SOS-Racisme
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Bureau usually took place on a weekly or fortnightly basis at the
association's Parisian offices, with around twenty people in attendance.
Several activists I interviewed described the National Bureau as the
equivalent of a 'government' in that its role was primarily 'executive'. The
National Council, on the other hand, was likened to a 'parliament' where
issues were debated and decisions taken after a vote. Although it was
acknowledged that the National Bureau also played a decision-making role,
the higher authority (or 'sovereignty') of the National Council was
repeatedly stressed.5
The final two parts of SOS-Racisme's organisational structure highlighted in
Figure 2.1 are the Legal Commissions and the International Federation. The
Legal Commissions (Commissions juridiques) are frequently attached to and
staffed by members of the Stop Racism Committees. They exist to provide
legal advice to the public on matters such as racism and discrimination, the
entry and residence rights of foreigners, and asylum procedures. In 1996,
SOS-Racisme claimed to operate 100 Legal Commissions in towns and cities
across France (Sylla 1996a: 154). The International Federation of SOS-
Racisme, on the other hand, groups together the various organisations of this
name which now exist across the world. It is composed of 15 organisations
mainly from Europe, but also from countries such as Brazil, Canada and
Senegal (Sylla 1996a: 157). The International Federation meets on an annual
basis and the different branches are in close contact by telephone, fax and e-
mail.6
In addition to these different parts of SOS-Racisme's organisational structure,
it is important to distinguish between different types of participant in the
association. Hedoux (1988: 170-1) has proposed an empirical definition of


























classification here (see Figure 2.2). The 'members (adherents)' of an
association, firstly, can be defined as those who have paid their annual
subscription, and are thus not simply 'users (usagers)' of services which it
may provide.
A further distinction can be drawn between the following types of members:
'activists (militants)' regularly devote their time, energy and other resources
to the association and perform the various tasks which are necessary to its
daily operation; 'mobilisable members' are those whose direct involvement
in the association's activities is more sporadic and who constitute the main
group which activists seek to mobilise for specific events; 'sympathiser'
members, finally, are those whose participation in the association is limited
to the payment of the annual subscription fee.
The association's 'leadership (direction)' can be considered as a part of the
activist category, and comprises salaried officials, such as the president and
vice-president, and elected representatives. In the case of SOS-Racisme, the
National Bureau can be regarded as the equivalent of the association's
leadership.
The present thesis will be primarily concerned with activists in SOS-Racisme
at both local and national levels, although long-term participant observation
in a local committee did enable me to make contact with members and
supporters whose involvement was more sporadic. Later in this chapter I
introduce some of the activists in the committee of which I was a member,
but first it is necessary to consider the links which exist between SOS-
Racisme and other organisations and which make up what I propose to call
the association's 'nebula'.
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The SOS-Racisme 'Nebula' (1993-94)
The anti-racist movement in France can be viewed as a network of
organisations, groups and individuals committed to combating racism and
discrimination. The joint committees (collectifs) formed to organise national
and local demonstrations (and other initiatives) are important nodal points
of this network. Lists of organisations calling for a demonstration are
routinely printed in the press or on collectively-written leaflets; these are
material expressions of links which most of the time are not publicly visible
but are, in Melucci's (1989: 70) terms, 'submerged' or 'latent'. As part of the
anti-racist movement, SOS-Racisme is involved in such relationships with a
range of other anti-racist, immigrant and ethno-cultural organisations.
However, SOS-Racisme is also closely associated with a number of specific
political parties, student unions and other organisations not directly part of
the anti-racist movement. I propose to refer to this cluster of groups,
including the anti-racist association itself, as the SOS-Racisme 'nebula' (see
Figure 2.3). For analytical purposes, the organisations and/or groups of
individuals concerned can be divided into two distinct types. The first
comprises organisations and bodies which were themselves created by SOS-
Racisme; I shall refer to these as 'dependent' organisations in the sense that
they came into being after, and to a large extent through the action of, the
anti-racist association. The second type is represented by organisations such
as the Socialist Party (PS), the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) and
UNEF-ID (a student union) which were already well-established by the time
SOS-Racisme was formed in the mid-1980s. In each case, SOS-Racisme is
effectively linked not to the organisation as a whole but rather to one of its
factions or tendencies. All three organisations also contain factions which are
actively hostile to SOS-Racisme. I propose, therefore, to refer to this second
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Figure 2.3 The SOS-Racisme 'Nebula' (1993-94)
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type as 'non-dependent' organisations. The various 'dependent' and 'non-
dependent' organisations composing the SOS-Racisme nebula during the
period of my fieldwork (1993-94) will now be described.
The bodies and groups which I am labelling 'dependent' organisations are
the following: celebrity sponsors, Brain-Potes, FIDL, Maison des Potes, and
OBU (see Glossary). Shortly after the creation of SOS-Racisme, its founding-
members actively sought the support of celebrity 'sponsors (parrains)'
among the intelligentsia and in the fields of the arts, show business and the
media. According to Harlem Desir, the philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy (or
'BHL', as he is popularly known) played a key role in persuading other
celebrities to join a 'sponsorship committee (comite de parrainage)' which
helped to publicise the newly-formed association (Desir 1985: 47). Although
a number of these celebrities subsequently broke publicly with SOS-Racisme
(particularly over the latter's opposition to the Gulf War), the association was
still able, in 1993-94, to attract the support of stars such as the ra'i singer
Khaled for concerts and other events which it organised.
The working group of intellectuals and academics 'Brain-Potes' was formed
in the aftermath of a conference which SOS-Racisme organised at the
Sorbonne in June 1987 (Liberation, 20-21 June 1987; Le Quotidien de Paris, 24
June 1987). Its stated objective was to assist members of the association in
formulating policy proposals on immigration and integration, and its work
has resulted in a number of publications (Desir and SOS-Racisme 1987; SOS-
Racisme 1990). During the period of my fieldwork (1993-94), however, a
more prominent role was played by a group of jurists who worked with
SOS-Racisme to produce a guide to the legislation governing foreigners'
rights (Barats 1994).
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The FIDL (Federation independante et democratique lyceenne) is a
federation of secondary school students (lyceens) which was created by
Julien Dray and others close to SOS-Racisme during the 1986-87 student
movement. In 1994 it claimed to have 1 000 members, mainly concentrated in
the Paris area (Le Monde, 30 March 1994). Delphine Batho, who was elected
vice-president of SOS-Racisme in 1992, had previously been the president of
FIDL and played a prominent part in the 1990 secondary school students'
movement.
The 'Maisons des Potes' are the advice or community centres which members
of SOS-Racisme have created in the suburbs (banlieues) of a number of
French cities since 1989. Their stated objective has been to act as 'relays
between the administration and the social sector (des relais entre
I'administration et le secteur social)', through the provision of workshops,
homework clubs (soutien scolaire) and advisory services (Le Monde, 7
February 1989). By 1993, the various centres in France had been linked in a
'National Federation' based in Saint-Denis which published a quarterly
magazine Potapote.
The 'Organisation of United Suburbs' (OBU) was founded by Fode Sylla and
other members of SOS-Racisme in December 1990 following violent
disturbances at housing estates (cites) in Vaulx-en-Velin, to the east of Lyons
(Le Nouvel Observateur, 6-12 June 1991. Cf. Sylla and Kowalevski 1993: 163-
166). By the start of 1992, sixty youth organisations based in the suburbs
(banlieues) of French cities had become federated under the umbrella of
OBU. Its stated objective was to act as an intermediary between the State and
urban youth, drawing attention to the latter's problems in the areas of
schooling, training, work, housing and so on (Le Monde, 25 January and 19
May 1992). The leading spokesperson of OBU, Fode Sylla, was elected
president of SOS-Racisme in September 1992.
In addition to the above, three 'non-dependent' organisations can be
distinguished: the Socialist Party, the Revolutionary Communist League, and
UNEF-ID. The nature of the relationship between SOS-Racisme and the
Socialist Party (PS) has been the subject of considerable debate and even
controversy since the association's creation in 1984 (see Chapter 5). In my
view, the most useful way of approaching this question is, however, to
explore SOS-Racisme's links with particular factions or currents within the
PS, rather than with the party as a whole. As Bell and Criddle (1988: 220-245)
have explained, the Socialist Party is not a homogeneous entity, but is
instead composed of a number of rival groups usually identified with an
existing or potential party leader or presidential candidate. These internal
divisions were played out in the field of anti-racism in the mid-1980s: SOS-
Racisme attracted the support of the currents associated with Franqois
Mitterrand and Laurent Fabius, whereas a competing organisation, France-
Plus, was promoted by the Lionel Jospin and, later, the Michel Rocard
currents (see Geisser 1997: 34; Bouamama 1994:126).
During the period of my fieldwork (1993-94), SOS-Racisme was closely
identified, both inside and outside the organisation, with the 'Socialist Left
('Gauche socialiste)' current in the PS. This is not surprising, as the Socialist
Left was established by one of the founders of SOS-Racisme, Julien Dray,
who was elected as a PS deputy for the Essonne in 1988. Formerly known as
'Socialist Questions (Questions socialistesy or 'New Socialist School
(Nouvelle ecole socialiste)', and comprising many ex-Trotskyists from the
LCR (see below), it views itself as the left-wing of the Socialist Party (see
Amard et al 1997). Other prominent members are the PS Senator for the
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Essonne Jean-Luc Melenchon, and the former Housing Minister and now
Socialist deputy of the European Parliament, Marie-Noelle Lienemann. The
current publishes a journal, Donnees et arguments ('Data and Arguments')
and a weekly newsletter, A gauche ('Left').
Although the Socialist Left and SOS-Racisme are not connected in any formal
sense, they are nevertheless linked in a number of important ways. In the
first place, the founder of the Socialist Left, Julien Dray, continues to play a
decisive role within SOS-Racisme, even though he resigned as Vice-President
of the association in 1988 following his election to the National Assembly {Le
Monde, 21 June 1988). During my fieldwork, the nature of Dray's influence
was indeed the subject of debate among grassroots activists on several
occasions (see Chapters 7 and 9). Dray is widely recognised as the
intellectual leader of SOS-Racisme, although he has also at times provided
limited financial support (several circulars I received from the association,
for example, acknowledged Dray's contribution towards the costs of printing
and postage). A second indicator of the close relationship between SOS-
Racisme and the Socialist Left is the high level of membership and activism
in both groupings. In 1993-94, the majority of those sitting on SOS-Racisme's
National Bureau were thus also members of, and in some cases actively
involved in, the Socialist Left tendency of the PS. Within the anti-racist
association as a whole (and particularly in Paris), activists identified with the
Socialist Left similarly constituted the most influential 'tendency'.
Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that not all SOS-Racisme activists are
members of the Socialist Party: a significant number are 'nowhere (nulle
part)\ i.e. not associated with any particular political party, while a sizeable
minority are supporters of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR).
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The Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) is the French Section of the
Fourth International founded by Trotsky in 1938. It was formed in 1974 and
currently claims around 2 000 members spread over fifty towns and cities. In
June 1999, the LCR's official 'spokesperson (porte-parole)', Alain Krivine,
was among the five far-left candidates elected to the European Parliament.
Of all the Trotskyist movements in France, the LCR has been described as
'the most Leninist' in view of the importance which it attaches to
organisation and ideological instruction (Borella 1990: 227-231). The LCR
publishes the weekly newspaper Rouge and, at the time of my fieldwork,
contained several competing currents or tendencies.
Many of SOS-Racisme's founding-members were active in the LCR and in
student politics during the 1970s, before joining the Socialist Party in 1981-
1982 (Spire 1996: 298). Their subsequent decision to launch the association
was, however, not supported by all tendencies within the LCR. Indeed, the
dominant tendency, associated with Krivine, was openly critical of SOS-
Racisme from the outset. It was instead the members of a minor tendency,
known as ' tendance 1 (Tl) ' and led by Gerard Filoche, who joined SOS-
Racisme in large numbers and sought to influence its future development
(Filoche 1998: 279). During most of my fieldwork, the presence of Filoche
and other members of the LCR constituted an important counter-balance to
the influence of the Socialist Left within SOS-Racisme (see Chapter 8). There
was, nonetheless, significant common political ground between the
Trotskyist current and the Socialist Left, as subsequent events confirmed.
Following the effective exclusion of Filoche's tendency from the LCR in June
1994, the majority of its members voted to join the Socialist Party and in the
summer of 1995 they fused with the Socialist Left into a single current (see
Filoche 1998: 321-335).
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The final 'non-dependent' organisation is the student union UNEF-ID. In
1971, the main student union in France, UNEF (Union nationale des
etudiants de France/National Union of French Students), divided into
several separate organisations. The tendency close to the French Communist
Party (PCF) formed UNEF-Renouveau, which later became UNEF-SE
(UNEF-Solidarite etudiante/UNEF-Student solidarity). The Socialist current
(UNEF-US), on the other hand, joined in 1980 with two other non-
communist groupings (MAS and COSEF) to form UNEF-ID (UNEF-
Independante et democratique/UNEF-Independent and Democratic). At the
time of my fieldwork, UNEF-ID was the largest student union in France,
claiming around 10 000 members (Le Monde, 30 March 1994).
A number of different political currents exist within UNEF-ID, generally
reflecting divisions inside the Socialist Party, to which the union is politically
close. One such tendency is linked to SOS-Racisme and the Socialist Left, a
connection which can be traced back to the 1986 student movement (Dray
1987). During the 1990s, the 'SOS-Racisme' current has been actively
involved in shaping the internal composition and future direction of UNEF-
ID. In January 1993, for example, a new tendency (Independence et action
[IA]) was created by eight members of the union's National Bureau who had
previously belonged to the majority current. IA then joined the currents
associated with SOS-Racisme (Tendance TSOD), the Revolutionary
Communist League (LCR) and supporters of Jean-Pierre Chevenement (a
prominent figure in the PS) in forming a larger block called the Tendance
independence et democratie (TID). At UNEF-ID's 73rd Congress in May
1993, the TID succeeded in winning 15 seats on the National Bureau
(including treasurer and vice-president), compared to 17 for the majority
current (Le Monde, 4 February and 13 May 1993). In December 1994, near
the end of my fieldwork, UNEF-ID held its 74th Congress in Paris, and again
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the 'SOS-Racisme' current was heavily involved in challenging the
incumbent majority {Le Monde, 15 December 1994).
A Parisian 'Stop-Racism' Committee
The 'Stop Racism1 committee which I joined in Paris in the autumn of 1993
was in the process of being 're-launched' after a period of relative inactivity.
For the first few months during which I was involved, meetings were
usually attended by between four and seven activists and the focus of the
discussions was on electing a new team of office-holders (or Bureau). Over
the course of the next year, however, the number of people regularly
attending meetings gradually increased to around a dozen, as new members
arrived and several former members returned to play an active part in the
life of the committee. For the most part, committee activists were in their late
20s or early 30s (although a few were older), professionals or white-collar
workers (teachers, clerical assistants, employees in state-owned or partially
privatised industries), and white, French nationals (although one member
was from North Africa and another from sub-Saharan Africa).
Meetings were usually held on a fortnightly basis in central Paris. I attended
these and participated in other initiatives which the committee organised,
such as public meetings, distributions of leaflets, joint activities with other
local associations and so on. Initially, my lack of fluency in spoken French
meant that I contributed little in meetings although I was able to
comprehend most of the discussions (on the other hand, it took me some
time to learn Parisian argot). However, when a new Bureau was elected in
the spring of 1994, a range of more informal 'posts' was created and I was
invited to assume responsibility for co-ordinating the distribution of leaflets.
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The three main political 'tendencies' within SOS-Racisme which I
distinguished earlier (Socialist Left current of the Socialist Party,
Revolutionary Communist League, and those without a party political
affiliation) were all represented in the local committee. The acting president,
when I arrived, was Laurence (all names of local activists are pseudonyms), a
teacher in her early 30s and an active member of the Socialist Left. She
became an activist in the association in the late 1980s, although she had been
closely acquainted with it from the outset:
I knew SOS-Racisme from the start from the inside. I was right at the
heart of things because I was friends with the people who were
among those who founded SOS-Racisme. (Tape-recorded interview
with Laurence, 7 December 1994)7
For Laurence, participation in the association's activities formed part of a
larger political project, that of the Socialist Left current of which she was a
member:
For me SOS-Racisme is an association, from my point of view as an
activist of the Socialist Left, whose function is to be an instrument
which allows us to be in contact with the population, with people who
are not in [political] parties, in other words, in contact with that part
of the society which is the world of associations.8
The place of SOS-Racisme in the broader political strategy of the Socialist
Left was also described to me by Luc, who was to become the committee's
president in 1994. He had participated actively in the launch of SOS-Racisme
and explained that:
We developed this association because we wanted ... Our analysis
was to say: 'We need to have one foot outside the political party, and
one foot inside.' So, we need to carry weight within the party, notably
the Socialist Party, and, at the same time, we need to have a mass
organisation outside which pushes [the party]. And SOS-Racisme is
that mass organisation. (Tape-recorded interview with Luc, 3
November 1994)9
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The role of associations such as SOS-Racisme, in other words, was to put
external pressure on the Socialist Party through mass action.
The only committee member closely identified with the Revolutionary
Communist League, Didier, had been involved since the mid-1980s. He told
me:
I joined SOS in 1986. Why? Well, because at the time I was in a
political current which was the Revolutionary Communist League.
And I was in a tendency which is roughly speaking the tendency in
which Gerard Filoche was present. And that tendency analysed SOS
in positive terms. And as there was an increase in problems of racism
and xenophobia, and more and more attacks on immigrants, at a
certain point SOS appeared a bit like the organisation that was
leading the fight against that and so I joined. (Tape-recorded
interview with Didier, 28 November 1994)10
Here again, links to SOS-Racisme's founder members and their political
groupings were a key factor in the process of recruitment to the association.
In a similar way to the activists already mentioned, Didier also placed his
activity in SOS-Racisme in the context of a wider political project, which in
this case was the development of a revolutionary party:
As far as I'm concerned, in the building of a revolutionary party there
is an element of political training, understanding the State,
understanding the nature of the bourgeois State and so on. So, that is
necessary, that education must be given. But at the same time the role
of revolutionary activists is also to be actors in mass movements, to
allow workers, young people, etc. to organise and to score points in
the battle of forces with the enemy, the State.11
For members of both the Socialist Left and the Revolutionary Communist
League, in other words, SOS-Racisme had a clearly defined political role and
it was in relation to this that they explained their own participation.
However, the local committee also included several people whose decision
to join SOS-Racisme had been motivated by other reasons. For example, a
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student in her mid-20s who had been the committee's secretary when I
arrived, told me that:
I started to be an activist at SOS in 1990. At the time I was living with
a member of my family who was very close to the National Front,
who talked in an overtly racist manner. I was surrounded by a certain
number of people who had those kinds of ideas. And well, before
that, I had been quite, I was rather sympathetic towards the anti-racist
movement but I was not directly involved. But I reacted then very
strongly, because I was afraid, I felt that everyone [...] was in the
process of becoming like that [i.e. racist]. So, that's it. So, I went ...
One morning I knocked on the door [laughs]. And I was received by
[a member of the National Bureau] who talked to me a bit about the
association and made me want to stay [...]. (Tape-recorded interview
with Ariane, 3 December 1994)12
Another committee member, Christophe (a public-sector worker in his late
30s), explained his own involvement in SOS-Racisme as an alternative to
membership of a political party and as a way of building a social network:
I've always had extreme difficulty in situating myself politically ... I
have internal conflicts and it seemed to me that joining SOS-Racisme
was a way of promoting my values ... which didn't bring me into
conflict with political parties. In other words, I didn't have to take a
stand for the Communist Party or the Socialist Party. [...] I returned to
Paris in 1988 and [joining SOS-Racisme] was also a way for me to
recreate a network of personal relations, with people who seemed to
share my viewpoint on a political and a human level ... It was a way
of meeting people too. (Tape-recorded interview with Christophe, 19
October 1994)13
The difference between membership of a political party, on the one hand,
and of an association such as SOS-Racisme, on the other, was also important
for Alain, a soixante-huitardwho was the oldest activist in the committee:
I've always been involved in grassroots movements, neighbourhood
things. I've never been able to join a political party ... I can't join in the
sense that I would be obliged to take on the party's position and
defend its positions even if I didn't agree with them. That, I couldn't
do. It doesn't correspond with my state of mind to join a political
party. (Tape-recorded interview with Alain, 22 November 1994)14
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For Alain, as for Christophe, involvement in an association appeared
attractive as it represented a less constraining or partisan form of political
participation than membership of a political party.
The local committee of which I was a member, then, included people with
quite different underlying personal and political projects. Different views
also existed about the nature and role of the committee itself. To a large
extent, these reflected a long-running debate within the association as a
whole about whether it should concentrate on high-profile, national
campaigns or alternatively focus on local-level, daily action against racism
through legal advice and support. As Laurence explained:
After 1988, the association did a lot of soul-searching about whether it
should try to carry out much more in-depth work in the suburban
estates {la banlieue), a local kind of work, or whether it would
continue with its first aim which was to be a vector for public opinion.
And it's not the same kind of activist work. We don't have the
strength to be both the vector of public opinion and relay all the
national campaigns and devise campaigns ourselves and hold an
advice session each week, follow up case files and so on. It's not
possible. We can't do both. [...] Myself, and the people who were with
me, were more favourable to the vector approach ... we wanted more
to be a vector for public opinion. So, we didn't push at all for a local
action.15
Other members of the committee, however, believed strongly that it should
concentrate on action at the local level. At meetings, for example, Didier
consistently argued in favour of 'regular interventions {interventions
regulieres)' locally, such as a weekly distribution of leaflets at street markets,
which would enable the committee to raise its public profile and establish
regular contact with the area's inhabitants 'on the ground {surle terrain)'.
Nevertheless, most members agreed that being based in Paris, where the
association's National Bureau and headquarters were situated, posed
particular problems with respect to the committee's development and the
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possibility of regular concrete action at a local level. Laurence provided a
particularly clear assessment of the situation:
In Paris we're completely cornered. Because in the first place, the
national body is there and we don't receive subsidies, they go to the
national body. The committees don't have subsidies. And then, a
committee is very small to cover an arrondissement... [...]. Also we,
the Parisian activists, are liable to be exploited mercilessly by the
National Bureau. That is, as soon as there's a national campaign it's
the committees, the Parisians who have to distribute leaflets over
Paris, put up posters over Paris, at the Gare du Nord, the Gare de
Lyon. We are also the primary source of force for the National Bureau.
Because otherwise the National Bureau is completely on its own. The
National Bureau doesn't have activists as such, everyone is in a
committee. So it's the Parisian committees [which are] the hub of
activist reserves.16
For another member, Ariane, the issue was not just one of resources; it was
also a question of the political autonomy and independence of the Parisian
committees with respect to the National Bureau and the leadership:
The problem is that in Paris it's a bit difficult. Often the Parisian
committees do nothing more than pass on the message from the
national level. [...] One of the problems of ... There is a lack of
independence on the part of the local committees in Paris with respect
to the National Bureau. This is because the people who 'direct', in
inverted commas, the Parisian committees, well it was like that two or
three years ago in any case, they belong to the National Bureau. So the
Parisian committees tend to be simply the driving belt for the national
level. Whereas in the provinces ... it's more anchored in the local
reality, they have their own mode of functioning.17
According to these two activists - and their views were widely shared, not
only within the committee but also by other members of the association to
whom I spoke at National Council meetings and similar events - Parisian
committees confronted particular practical and political problems, which
their provincial counterparts did not or to a much lesser extent.
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In this section I have introduced some of the members of the local committee
with which I was primarily involved during my fieldwork. As I have
indicated, different political perspectives co-existed within the committee
and although there was broad agreement about specific problems which it
faced as a result of its Parisian location, opinion differed as to the nature and
function of its activities. This raises the issue of the relationship between
identity, difference and unity which has been the subject of considerable
debate in recent social theory. In the final section of this chapter, therefore, I
want to consider a number of points emerging from these more theoretical
discussions.
Identity, Difference and Unity
A useful way to begin unpacking 'identity' as a concept is by recognising that
it pre-dates both contemporary (post-structuralist) theory and so-called
identity politics movements. As Sharon Macdonald reminds us, for example,
it is customarily used in mathematics and logic as 'a neutral synonym for
sameness or equivalence' (1993: 7). Similarly, in philosophy the term
'identity' has traditionally referred both to 'what gives a thing or person its
essential nature, i.e. its eidos or form, and thus its continuity through time,
and second, what makes two things or two persons the same' (Zaretsky 1994:
199-200). David Hume's brief discussion 'Of Personal Identity' in A Treatise
on Human Nature is, in this respect, exemplary in its definition of identity in
terms of the criteria of continuity and invariability (see Hume 1874: 533-543).
Contemporary theoretical discussion of the concept of identity continues, I
believe, to revolve around ideas of essence and sameness, although these are
now generally regarded as much more problematic. Most resistant to
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change, in my view, has been a tendency to assume that identity necessarily
implies some sort of homogeneity or unity.
Before I consider this point, however, I would like to turn briefly to the
subject of identity politics, the politics of difference, and the relationship
between them. The label identity politics is currently used as a shorthand
way of referring to the various movements (feminist, gay liberation, African-
American and those of other ethnic groups) which have emerged in late
capitalist societies since 1968. For several commentators (Gitlin 1994;
Zaretsky 1994) the rise of identity politics marked the collapse of the New
Left and its attempt to construct a universalist politics which broke to some
extent with traditional Marxism. In contrast, identity politics has been
characterised as an assertion of 'difference' and of 'particularist identities' in
opposition to a false universalism regarded as an instrument of hegemonic
domination (see Zaretsky 1994:198-199).
Although the wholesale assimilation of identity politics to a politics of
difference can be disputed (see Best and Kellner 1991: 205-213), it is
undeniable that post-sixties movements have, on occasion, articulated their
demands in terms of difference. In France, for example, dominated groups
such as women in the late 1960s, and North African 'immigrants' and their
children in the early 1980s , have each claimed 'the right to be different (le
droit a la difference). These groups have expressed a politics of difference in
cultural terms, as an assertion of the legitimacy of non-hegemonic forms of
cultural identity (see Vichniac 1991).
The long-term effectiveness of grounding political action in a notion of
cultural difference has, however, been contested by the French feminist
scholar Colette Guillaumin (1993, 1995). She argues that a demand for
difference reflects the growing realisation on the part of dominated groups
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that formal independence and equality have failed to produce real
independence and equality. Claiming 'the right to be different', in her view,
fails to address the reasons why previous struggles for legal equality have
failed to produce the desired results. This would require a political analysis
of the nature of the relationship between dominant and dominated groups.
According to Guillaumin, the ultimate irony is that dominated groups are
already defined as 'different' by the relations of exploitation and
appropriation which produce their alienation. Consequently, demanding 'the
right to be different' leaves structures of domination more or less intact.
Guillaumin herself writes, as a member of a dominated group:
When we think difference, we think: 'We'll not harm you, so spare us'.
When they think difference, they think: 'They'll stay in their place'.
(1995: 248, emphases in original)
In another article, Guillaumin (1993) shows how the concept of cultural
difference, which had been used to challenge various forms of racism in
France during the late 1970s and early 1980s, was quickly adopted and
modified by parties on the far right such as Le Pen's National Front (FN) to
legitimize racist proposals (see also Chapter 6 of this thesis). Guillaumin here
reveals the double-edged nature of a politics of (cultural) difference: while
the concept can form the basis of a critique of domination, it is also liable to
be appropriated by dominant groups in order to justify the exclusion of
specific categories of the population.18
A more positive assessment of the potential contribution of the notion of
'difference' (in a slightly different sense) to progressive politics has,
nevertheless, been made in Anglo-American feminist theory. In a review of
recent debates, Michele Barrett (1987) has distinguished three different uses
of the concept-as 'experiential diversity', 'positional meaning' and 'sexual
difference'. The first expresses a recognition of the fact that class and 'race'
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are major axes of difference between women, and reflects the criticism
voiced by working-class women and women of colour of the idea that all
women share the same experience of oppression. As bell hooks (1994) has
argued, however, the acknowledgement of differences among women has
contributed to a strengthening of feminist politics as it has 'compelled
feminist thinkers to problematize and theorize issues of solidarity, to
recognize the interconnectedness of structures of domination, and to build a
more inclusive movement1 (1994:102). In other words, a politics of difference
raises important questions about the preconditions of political unity and
action.
The nature of political solidarity and alliance in late capitalist societies has
been a central theme in recent feminist debates and among those committed
to radical politics more generally (see, for example, Laclau and Mouffe 1985).
In the light of the issues raised by the identity politics movements discussed
above, certain writers have emphasised the need to theorize identity and
unity 'across' differences between political actors (Bottomley 1991: 210; Lorde
[1984] 1992: 54) and to avoid a tendency to consider differences 'only one-at-
a-time' (Mercer 1992: 425). Thus, if post-structuralist theory has been
responsible for a shift of focus from a politics of identity to a politics of
difference, as Zaretsky (1994: 200) has claimed, there now appears to be a
move back in the direction of a concern with identity as a prerequisite of
effective political action. In the final part of this section I will draw out the
implications of this return to a politics of identity defined as unity.
The question of unity in feminist politics has been posed in a particularly
acute way by Judith Butler in her discussion of Gender Trouble: Feminism
and the Subversion of Identity (1990). Butler asks, crucially, whether
feminism requires a concept of 'women' as a stable and coherent category in
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order to ground its politics. Black and working-class women have, she
argues, already revealed the problematic nature of this assumption in their
criticism of the idea that women share a common experience of oppression.
For Butler, the point here is that 'the insistence upon the coherence and unity
of the category of women has effectively refused the multiplicity of cultural,
social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of "women" are
constructed' (1990: 14). In other words, to attribute a single and universal
'identity' (here implying a notion of sameness) to women is to deny the role
of 'race', class and ethnicity in also constituting their identities.
The conclusion which Butler draws from this argument is that feminism
cannot appeal to the category 'women' as a universal subject which it can
claim to represent. Recent post-structuralist theory, she argues, has shown us
that the formation of a stable subject necessarily involves 'the exclusion of
those who fail to conform to unspoken normative requirements of the
subject' (1990: 6). Thus, the attempt to construct a feminist politics on the
basis of a discrete 'identity' which would be common to all women is
doomed to failure. According to Butler, the constitution of a feminist subject
of this nature depends on a range of 'exclusionary practices' which preclude,
as a feminist objective, the very possibility of extending political
representation to all women.
Where does all this leave feminist politics, if an appeal to 'women' as a
category or identity is regarded as 'exclusionary' and 'globalizing' (Butler
1990: 14)? For Butler the answer appears to lie in the creation of an 'open'
coalitional politics which presupposes neither the unity nor the identity of
women. Her reason for rejecting unity as a prerequisite of effective political
action is hinted at by the following rhetorical question:
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Does 'unity' set up an exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of
identity that rules out the possibility of a set of actions which disrupt
the very borders of identity concepts, or which seek to accomplish
precisely that disruption as an explicit political aim? (Butler 1990:15)
I believe that a chain of equivalences is being set up here between unity,
solidarity and identity which is deeply problematic and politically self-
defeating. The question quoted above implies that feminist unity/solidarity
(the two terms are almost treated as synonymous) as a political goal should
be abandoned for the same reason that feminist action premissed on the
category 'women' was rejected; namely that both set normative constraints
which ultimately exclude 'different' identities based, for example, on 'race',
class and ethnicity.
I would suggest, however, that to conceptualise unity in this way is to
confuse it with an interpretation of identity as sameness borrowed from
mathematics and philosophy. Butler appears to believe that unity requires
political actors to share, prior to their engagement in forms of collective
action, 'some stable, unified, and agreed upon identity' (1990: 15). As I
understand it, her point is that various types of intervention which might
challenge hegemonic identities will be precluded if unity in this sense is
considered as a precondition of effective political action. The open coalitions
she advocates are presented as sites at which multiple and contingent
identities converge or separate as the political need arises; unity, on the other
hand, is described as 'obedience to a normative telos of definitional closure'
(Butler 1990:16).
An initial difficulty I have with this argument is in imagining what exactly
an open coalition would look, sound and act like in practice. However, the
underlying problem, in my view, is that while Butler is right to link unity to
ideas of 'oneness' and 'sameness', it is not necessarily the case that this also
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implies homogeneity. In other words, we may in fact be able to characterise
the relationship between a set of political actors as solidarity or unity,
without having thereby to accept the proposition that they share a basic
identity. In short, a commitment to unity as a political objective should not
be equated with spurious claims to universalism. An additional reason for
resisting Butler's abandonment of unity as a political objective is suggested
by Todd Gitlin's remark that at the moment the Left needs a concept of
unity, if only to contest the idea of integration through a single market
proposed by the Right (Gitlin 1994:171).
A more sophisticated and progressive understanding of unity as a political
concept has, however, been developed by Rosalind Brunt in an article on
'The Politics of Identity' which appeared in Marxism Today in October 1988.
Brunt shares with Butler both an openness to post-structuralist theory and a
concern with identifying the preconditions of effective political action, but
differs in her evaluation of the place of unity in a radical political agenda.
Recognising that in the contemporary world political identities and forms of
resistance to power are multiple, she argues for 'a return to the principle
valued by the old Bolsheviks steeped in dialectical philosophy: unity-in¬
difference' (Brunt 1989:158). The comments which accompany this statement
provide a clear indication of the conceptual distance separating Brunt's
position on unity from that of Butler, and are therefore worth quoting at
some length:
This [i.e. unity-in-difference] actually represents an advance on more
recent thinking about 'broad democratic alliances' or 'rainbow
coalitions' because it recognises the need for unity around common
concerns whilst also understanding that the basis for unity is not
homogeneity but a whole variety of heterogenous, possibly
antagonistic, maybe magnificently diverse, identities and
circumstances. Unity-in-difference opens up the potential, witnessed
in all the activities supporting the striking mining communities in
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1984-85, that people can act in political solidarity in ways that do not
subsume or deny real differences, divisions and diversities in the
name of some abstract greater good that is predefined as the struggle
for socialism. (Brunt 1989:158. Cf. Lorde 1992: 51)
As is evident from this passage, Brunt is able to retain a commitment to
unity as an essential component of a 'transformatory' political project
because, unlike Butler, she distinguishes between unity and homogeneity.19
For Brunt, solidarity does not imply identity, in the mathematical sense of
sameness, but rather a dialectical relationship between identity (unity) and
difference. Instead of leaving us to imagine a politics without unity, Brunt
outlines a 'politics of identity1 in which the nature of the relationship
between heterogeneous identities and political unity is central.20
Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided an account of SOS-Racisme's organisational
structure and also described the constellation of other bodies and
organisations which have links with the association. An awareness of the
different levels of SOS-Racisme's structure and the importance of specific
political groupings within the association is crucial for the chapters which
follow. I have attempted to illustrate these through a brief introduction to
the perspectives of actors in the local committee in which I participated over
the course of my fieldwork. Finally, I have examined recent debates about
concepts of unity and identity, in order to begin to theorise the relationship
between solidarity and difference within the committee.
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Notes
1 'L'association est la convention par laquelle deux ou plusieurs personnes
mettent en commun, d'une fagon permanente, leurs connaissances ou leur
activite dans un but autre que de partager des benefices.'
2 This is similar to the estimates I was given by members of the association
several years earlier. Such a figure, however, undoubtedly includes
committees with only a handful (or fewer) active members, and which
effectively exist on paper only.
3 SOS-Racisme held its first National Congress in Epinay-sur-Seine (Seine-
Saint-Denis) in February 1986. A second Congress was held in Noisiel
(Marne-la-Vallee) in April 1988, and a third in Longjumeau (Essonne) in
April 1990. The latter coincided with the publication of the association's
Manifeste pour l'integration (SOS-Racisme 1990). SOS-Racisme's fourth
Congress took place in Creteil (Val-de-Marne) from 9-11 July 1993, only a
few weeks before I arrived in Paris to begin fieldwork.
4 According to Fode Sylla (1996a: 156), committees from 250 towns and cities
are represented on the National Council. The National Council meetings
held in Paris during the period of my fieldwork (July 1993 to December 1994)
were generally attended by around 200-250 activists. The meetings were not,
however, open only to National Council members (although only they could
vote), and a significant number of those present were ordinary members of
committees based in the Paris region (Ile-de-France). The inadequate
representation of provincial committees at such meetings was repeatedly
raised as an issue of internal democracy by activists based outside Paris.
5 '[...] le Conseil national, il a le role d'un parlement. Et issue de ce conseil
national il y a un Bureau national qui a un role d'executif, qui a aussi un role
de decisions et un role d'executive. Mais en dernier ressort [...] le Conseil
national, c'est l'instance qui est decisionnaire.' (Tape-recorded interview with
Ariane, 3 December 1994)
'[...] le Bureau national, c'est l'equivalent du gouvernement, done, qui prend
des decisions, qui reflechit pour prendre des decisions. [...] Et le Conseil
national, c'est plutot le parlement. C'est la ou l'on met a l'ordre du jour des
debats, et quand quelque chose est vote en Conseil national, le Conseil
national est plus souverain que le BN [Bureau national], c'est lui qui ... Si la
70
decision est prise en Conseil national, elle peut pas etre mise en cause au
BN.' (Tape-recorded interview with Helene, 10 November 1994)
6 SOS-Rasisme in Norway has created a useful Website containing a page
with Hypertext links to the organisation's sites in seven other European
countries, including SOS-Racisme France
(<http://home.sol.no/~sosau/pekere.html>). For an overview of SOS-
Racismo in Spain, see Ortun and Andreotta (1992). I am grateful to Sarah
Gore for supplying me with this and other Spanish references. I would also
like to thank Manishanker and Maria Fernandes Bhatt, who kindly provided
me with copies of several publications by SOS-Racismo in Portugal.
7 'J'ai connu SOS-Racisme des son entree de l'interieur. J'etais tout au coeur
parce que j'etais copine avec les gens qui etaient parmi les gens qui ont fait
SOS.'
8 'SOS-Racisme pour moi c'est une association, de mon point de vue de
militante de la Gauche socialiste qui a comme but d'etre un outil qui nous
permet d'etre en contact avec la population, avec des gens qui ne sont pas
dans les partis, done etre en contact avec une partie de la societe qui est dans
le monde associatif.'
9 'On construisait cette association, parce qu'on voulait...nous, l'analyse,
e'etait de dire 'II faut un pied en dehors du parti politique, et un pied a
l'interieur.' Done il faut peser dans le parti, dans le PS notamment, et en
meme temps, il faut avoir un appareil de masse dehors, qui pousse. Et
1'appareil de masse, c'est SOS-Racisme.'
10 'J'ai adhere a SOS vers 1986, quoi. Alors pourquoi? Ben, parce qu'a l'epoque
j'etais dans un courant politique qui etait la LCR. Et j'etais dans une tendance
qui est en gros la tendance dans laquelle se retrouvait Gerard Filoche. Et
cette tendance-la analysait SOS plutot positivement. Et comme il y avait la
montee des problemes de racisme et de xenophobie, de plus en plus
d'attaques contre les immigres, si tu veux, a un moment SOS est apparu un
peu comme l'organisation qui menait un combat contre ga et done j'ai adhere
a ga quoi.'
11 'Pour moi, la construction d'un parti revolutionnaire, si tu veux, il y a une
formation politique de comprendre l'Etat, de comprendre ce que c'est l'Etat
bourgeois et tout ga. Done, il y a ga qui est necessaire, il faut donner cette
education-la. Mais en meme temps le role des militants revolutionnaires c'est
aussi d'etre des acteurs du mouvement de masse pour permettre aux
ouvriers, aux jeunes, etc., de s'organiser, de marquer des points dans le
rapport de forces avec l'ennemi, l'Etat et tout ga.'
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12 'J'ai commence a militer a SOS en 1990. A l'epoque j'habitais chez quelqu'un
de ma famille qui etait tres proche du Front national, qui tenait des discours
ouvertement racistes et j'etais entouree d'un certain nombre de gens qui
avaient ces idees-la. Et bon, avant ga j'etais assez, j'etais plutot sympathisante
dans le mouvement anti-raciste mais je ne m'y appliquais pas. Mais la j'ai eu
une reaction tres forte, parce que j'ai eu peur, j'avais l'impression que tout le
monde [...] etaient en train de devenir comme ga. Done voila. Done je suis
allee ... Un matin j'ai frappe [rires] a la porte. Voila. Et j'ai ete regue par [un
membre du BN] qui m'a parle un peu de l'association et qui m'a donne envie
de rester [...].'
13 'J'ai toujours eu d'extreme difficulty a me situer au niveau politique ...
J'avais des conflits internes et il me semblait qu'adherer a SOS-Racisme,
e'etait une maniere de promouvoir mes valeurs ...qui me mettait pas en
conflit avec des parties politiques. Done je n'avais pas a prendre parti pour le
Parti communiste frangais ou pour le Parti socialiste. [...] Je revenais a Paris
en 1988, et [adherer a SOS-Racisme] e'etait egalement une maniere pour moi
de me recreer un reseau de relations de personnes qui me semblait partager
ma sensibilite a la fois politique et humaine ... C'etait une maniere de
recontrer des gens egalement.'
14 'J'ai toujours ete dans les mouvements de base quoi, les trues de quartier.
J'ai jamais pu adherer a un parti politique ... je ne peux pas adherer au sens
ou les discours du parti, je serais oblige de le prendre en charge, et si je ne
suis pas d'accord, il faut quand meme que je defende le discours du parti. Et
ga, je ne peux pas. Ca ne correspond pas a mon etat d'esprit d'adherer a un
parti politique.'
15 'Apres 1988, l'association s'est beaucoup cherchee a savoir si elle devait
essayer de faire un travail beaucoup plus en profondeur sur la banlieue, un
travail tres local ou si on devait continuer dans notre ambition premiere
d'etre un vecteur d'opinion. Et e'est pas le meme type de travail militant. On
n'a pas les forces pour faire les deux choses. Un comite ne peut pas faire et le
vecteur d'opinion et etre le relai de toutes les campagnes nationales et soi-
meme imaginer des campagnes et tenir une permanence toutes les semaines,
suivre les dossiers et tout. C'est pas possible. On ne peut pas faire les deux.
[...] Moi et les gens qui etaient avec moi, on etait plutot des gens du cote du
vecteur ... on avait plus envie d'etre vecteur d'opinion. Done on n'a pas du
tout pousse a faire un travail local.'
16 'A Paris, on est completement coince, quoi. Parce que deja le national est la
et on n'a pas de subventions, elles vont au national. Les comites n'ont pas de
subventions. Et puis, un comite pour un arrondissement c'est tout petit
...[...] Puis nous, les militants parisiens, on est corveable a merci aussi par le
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Bureau national. C'est a dire que des qu'il y a une campagne nationale, c'est
les comites, les parisiens qui doivent coller Paris, qui doivent differ Paris, la
Gare du Nord, la Gare de Lyon. On est aussi la premiere main d'ceuvre du
BN. Parce que le BN autrement il est tout seul. II n'a pas de militants, le BN
en tant que tel, tu sais, tout le monde est dans un comite. Done c'est les
comites parisiens [qui sont] des poles de reserves de militants.1
17 'Le probleme, c'est qu'a Paris c'est un peu difficile. Souvent les comites
parisiens ne font que repercuter le national. [...] Un des problemes de ... II y
a un manque d'independance des comites locaux parisiens par rapport au
Bureau national. C'est que les gens qui dirigent entre guillemets les comites
parisiens, enfin e'etait le cas il y a deux ou trois ans, ils faisaient partie du
Bureau national. Done les comites parisiens avaient tendance a etre
seulement la courroie de transmission du national. Alors que dans la
province ... c'est plus ancre dans la realite locale, ils ont un fonctionnement
bien a eux.'
18 Of course this is not to hold anti-racist movements responsible for the
growth of racism in recent years, as the New Right in France and Britain are
fond of arguing.
19 It is interesting to note that Henrietta Moore has recently argued the same
point, i.e. that identity and sameness need to be distinguished (see Moore
1994:1).
20 In this respect Brunt's discussion is strikingly similar to Knowles' and
Mercer's interest in the formation and development of political
'constituencies' (see, Knowles and Mercer [1990] 1992). I am grateful to Jan
Penrose for drawing my attention to their work.
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Chapter 3
Social Movements, Politics and
Anthropological Research
Recent post-modernist positions notwithstanding, the rigorous definition of
concepts and construction of 'objects of knowledge1 by the analyst remains a
precondition of knowledge production in anthropology and sociology as a
scientific activity (Hamel 1999:17-22). One aim of this chapter is to develop a
theoretical and conceptual framework for the social scientific study of SOS-
Racisme as part of the anti-racist movement in contemporary France. It does
so by drawing on the work of a number of influential theorists of social
movements and collective action. The first section describes the main
theoretical 'schools' which have emerged in social movements research since
the late 1960s and highlights recent attempts to synthesise elements from
each in an 'integrated' theory of social movements. It then introduces and
defines four key concepts from the field of social movements research: social
movement, social movement organisation, collective identity and political
opportunity structure. These are the analytical tools which will be used in
subsequent chapters to explore different aspects of SOS-Racisme's republican
anti-racism.
A review of the social movements literature reveals that social
anthropologists have generally not played a prominent role in theoretical
74
and conceptual debates within this field of research. What has prevented
anthropologists from engaging in a theoretically-informed analysis of
contemporary social movements? Why is there an established sociology but
not an anthropology of social movements? What does this absence tell us
about the politics of anthropology and the anthropology of politics? The
chapter's final section addresses these questions and considers a range of
possible reasons for the 'invisibility' of social movements in anthropology. It
is argued that anthropology's failure to study social movements is largely
attributable to how political anthropology constructs its object, and
particularly to the weakness of its concepts of politics and practice. The
chapter's conclusion is, therefore, that the development of an anthropology
of social movements will depend on a more general re-orientation of the
discipline's approach to politics. This is the project to which the present
thesis aims, in a modest way, to contribute.
Theory and Concepts in Social Movements Research
Social movements research is a field of social scientific activity which has
undergone rapid expansion over the past thirty years. During this period an
impressive range of both theoretical and empirical work has been carried out
on social movements and other forms of collective action. Recent studies
have, for example, examined the connections between social movements and
class, gender, culture, 'globalisation', political protest, and processes of
democratisation and economic change in the South.1 Although British social
scientists have in the past tended to pay comparatively little attention to
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social movements, there is some evidence that even this is now changing (see
Bagguley 1997).
Theoretical Perspectives on SocialMovements
An important aspect of the development of the social movements field has
undoubtedly been the emergence of clearly identifiable 'schools' or
'traditions' of research and analysis. This has stimulated debate and acted as
a motor for theoretical and methodological innovation. As della Porta and
Diani (1999: 3) have noted in their recent introduction to the social
movements literature, four main approaches can currently be distinguished:
collective behaviour, resource mobilisation, new social movements and
political process. The collective behaviour approach can be traced back to
Chicago School sociologists such as Herbert Blumer (1995), although it has
subsequently been elaborated more fully by, notably, Ralph H. Turner
(1969), Lewis M. Killian (Turner and Killian 1957) and Joseph R. Gusfield
(1962, 1968). Drawing on symbolic interactionism, this perspective stresses
above all the importance of collective action in producing and establishing
new social norms. Social movements have thus been presented by collective
behaviour theorists as relatively loosely-structured, informal initiators or
opponents of change at the level of a society's value system (see Turner and
Killian 1957: 3-19, 307-330; della Porta and Diani 1999: 4-7).
The second approach, resource mobilisation, has been developed
predominantly in North America, where it has enjoyed considerable
popularity.2 Associated in particular with the organisational-entrepreneurial
perspective of Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (e.g. McCarthy and
Zald 1977; Zald and McCarthy 1987) and the political conflict model
elaborated by Charles Tilly (1978, 1986), the focus of resource mobilisation
theories (RMT) is on the organisational structure of social movements and on
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the rational or strategic logic of collective action. In the analysis of large-scale
mobilisations, proponents of such theories insist on the central importance of
'objective' factors such as recruitment networks, links with pre-existing
organisations and the availability of financial resources and professional
expertise. An examination of the organisational structure of social
movements is characteristically combined, in the resource mobilisation
paradigm, with an emphasis on the logic of instrumental rationality which, it
is claimed, governs the cost-benefit calculations performed by collective
actors in pursuit of their interests and objectives (see Cohen 1985: 674-690;
Jenkins 1983; Morris and Herring 1987:157-171).
In contrast, the new social movements (NSMs) perspective places processes
of identity formation and the creation of solidarity, rather than strategic
interaction and organisational resources, at the centre of analysis. Jean
Cohen has highlighted the work of Alain Touraine and other European
sociologists as exemplifying this third 'identity-oriented' approach (Cohen
1985: 690-705). For NSMs theorists, contemporary forms of collective action
involve the articulation of novel identities and conflict over cultural
orientations through complex interactional processes which cannot be
understood simply in terms of a logic of instrumental rationality. As Cohen
indicates, the nature of the relationship between social movements and
large-scale societal or cultural changes such as a transition to post-
industrialism or post-modernity has also been a central issue in 'European'
theories, notably in the work of Touraine (e.g. Touraine 1978).
The fourth approach currently dominant in the analysis of social movements
is represented by 'political process' theories (della Porta and Diani 1999: 9-
11). Those associated with this perspective are critical of previous resource
mobilisation and new social movements theories for their 'neglect of politics'
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(Tarrow 1988: 423), in particular their failure to examine the relationship
between social movements and the state (Birnbaum 1993: 166). In contrast,
political process theorists have highlighted the crucial role played by social
movements in bringing about political change and the implementation of
new policies, as well as the importance of the state in shaping forms of
collective action. Most influentially, proponents of this approach have
developed the concept of political opportunity structure as a way of
analysing how political systems can either facilitate or block the emergence
of social movements (see Tarrow 1994; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995,1996)
Until the late 1980s, the four schools of social movement research and
analysis which I have just described developed separately, with little cross-
fertilisation or even mutual awareness. Surprisingly perhaps, it is only
within the past decade that researchers have really begun to debate the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the different perspectives. The outcome
of this has been a widespread recognition that 'each of these approaches
showed but one side of the coin' (Klandermans 1991: 17). As a result, the
1990s have witnessed an increasing number of attempts to link together
elements from the collective behaviour, resource mobilisation, new social
movements, and political process schools in an 'integrated' theory of social
movements.3
Building on this work, I argue in the present thesis that an in-depth analysis
of SOS-Racisme as part of the anti-racist movement in France requires a
combination of the theoretical perspectives outlined above. In so doing,
however, I recognise that there are important underlying differences in the
ways these approaches conceptualise collective action (see Eyerman and
Jamison 1991: 28-34). Recent formulations of 'a synthetic, comparative
perspective on social movements' (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996b: 2)
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have, in my view, tended to downplay the extent to which their component
elements are rooted in quite distinct, and even opposing, traditions of
European and North American social science. In contrast, the present thesis
should be viewed as a more modest attempt to develop a series of partial
connections between the main theoretical approaches in social movements
research introduced in this section while remaining firmly grounded in one
particular 'tradition'. Its primary concern is with the processes of identity
formation and solidarity construction to which European theorists have
attached such significance, but at the same time it seeks to show the essential
contribution of resource mobilisation and political process perspectives to
the analysis of these phenomena. This is most apparent in Part III of the
thesis where the impact of recruitment networks, organisational resources
and political opportunity structures on the construction of collective
identities is discussed in detail. The exploration of such interconnections is
the intended contribution of the present thesis to the longer-term project of a
fully integrated theory of social movements.
SocialMovements andSocialMovement Organisations
One of the major obstacles to the development of a comprehensive theory of
social movements remains the failure, on the part of many scholars, to define
even basic notions with sufficient rigour and clarity. According to two recent
critics of social movements theory, for example, the very concept of social
movement itself is 'usually underdefined' in the literature (Jordan and
Maloney 1997: 48), a view shared by some of the most prominent researchers
in the field (e.g. Diani 1992: 2; Pizzorno 1990: 74). To avoid confusion,
therefore, the main concepts which I intend to use to study SOS-Racisme as
part of the anti-racist movement in France will now be introduced and
defined. As will become apparent, a feature of the analytical framework I
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propose to apply is that it brings together concepts - social movement
organisation, collective identity and political opportunity structure - from
resource mobilisation, new social movements and political process
approaches respectively. The meaning of and relationship between these
terms, along with the concept of 'social movement' itself, will be clarified
here, and their use by other researchers to understand forms of collective
action in contemporary France briefly reviewed.
In this thesis, I follow previous writers in the field in drawing an analytical
distinction between sociopolitical and sociocultural types of social
movement. Sociopolitical movements are those which are directed primarily
towards changing the nature and distribution of political power within a
society, while sociocultural movements tend to focus instead on effecting
social change through a transformation of cultural codes and individual
conduct. These labels provide a useful way of distinguishing analytically
between broad types of movement in terms of their 'overall orientation',
although of course most empirical movements are concerned to some extent
with the relationship between 'polities' and 'culture' (Neidhardt and Rucht
1991: 450. See also Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998b: 2).
As an investigation into the politics of a section of the contemporary anti-
racist movement in France, this thesis has tended to be influenced mainly by
previous work on sociopolitical movements. The latter can be characterised
more precisely as:
(1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity,
which mobilize about (3) conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent
use of various forms of protest, (della Porta and Diani 1999:16)
This definition emphasises, firstly, that sociopolitical movements (and social
movements more generally) are not organisations, like political parties or
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interest groups, but rather are networks, composed of a diverse range of
interconnected and interacting individuals, groups and organisations. It
follows that 'a single organisation, whatever its dominant traits, is not a
social movement1, although it may form part of one if it displays the four
characteristics listed above. Equally, however, individuals may participate
regularly in social movement networks without belonging to a specific
organisation. Only by distinguishing clearly between social movements, on
the one hand, and social movement organisations (which may include
parties and interest groups under certain conditions), on the other, can these
points be understood (della Porta and Diani 1999:16-9).4
A second feature of a sociopolitical (and a sociocultural) movement is the
presence of a collective identity. This refers to the sense of belonging and the
shared beliefs and values which, as I explain in greater detail below,
movement participants develop in the course of interaction. A social
movement's collective identity links together individuals and groups in a
way which transcends specific organisational identities (although without
destroying these) and provides a sense of continuity during periods of less
intense activity. In so doing, it differentiates social movements not only from
sects and interest groups, whose distinctiveness is limited to the
organisational level, but also from isolated protest actions and types of
network such as political coalitions, which tend to operate on a more
instrumental basis and fail to produce identities which persist after a given
initiative is over (see della Porta and Diani 1999:17-20).
Thirdly, sociopolitical movements are characteristically engaged in political
conflict with other actors over a range of issues. These may include the
control and distribution of resources, and the meaning of core political
values, as well as social changes of a more 'systemic' nature, involving the
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transformation or defence of structural relationships of domination. The
conflictual action of sociopolitical movements typically involves regular
recourse to forms of public protest: in della Porta's and Diani's view, this is
the fourth 'distinctive feature1 of such movements and the one which
perhaps most clearly separates them from sociocultural movements (1999:
15). Many commentators have regarded the use of 'non-conventional' or
'non-institutional' types of protest action (for example, street demonstrations,
occupations or violence) as a characteristic of social movements, in contrast
to more 'conventional' forms of participation such as voting or political
lobbying (e.g. Duyvendak 1994: 50-1). As della Porta and Diani point out,
however, the forms of public protest previously mentioned 'have become, to
an increasing degree, part of the consolidated repertoire of collective action,
at least in western democracies', making it somewhat inappropriate to
continue referring to these as 'non-conventional' rather than, say,
'confrontational' (1999: 15).5 It is the frequency with which public protest
actions are initiated by social movement actors which is the essential issue
here and not their supposed un-conventionality.
In my view, the definition of sociopolitical movements proposed by della
Porta and Diani is sufficiently precise in nearly all respects to distinguish
such movements from other forms of collective action. The only slight
criticism I would make concerns the reference to social movements in
general as 'informal interaction networks' (1999:14,16), since it is not clear to
me how the term 'informal' is to be understood in this particular context.6
On the one hand, the authors appear to mean that the structure of social
movements is 'looser' (1999:16) than that of organisations (although whether
in the sense of being more diffuse or less hierarchical or both it is again
difficult to judge). On the other hand, such an interpretation is apparently
contradicted by an acknowledgement elsewhere that while networks may be
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characterised by 'very loose and dispersed links' they can also be 'tightly
clustered' (1999: 14). The implication here is that social movements may not
always take the form of relatively unstructured or flexible networks; indeed,
it is possible that, under certain conditions, they might adopt a fairly rigid or
even hierarchical type of organisational structure. If this is the case - and the
authors' own research tends to support such a hypothesis (see, for example,
della Porta and Diani 1999:116) - then there are strong grounds for rejecting
the notion of an 'informal' network structure as a characteristic feature of all
social movements and simply omitting the term from the definition quoted
above.7 I would argue that such a change removes a potential source of
confusion without a loss of analytical focus, the remaining elements being
sufficient to distinguish sociopolitical movements from organisations and
other forms of collective action. With this minor modification, della Porta's
and Diani's conceptualisation of sociopolitical movements will, therefore, be
used as the point of departure for the following thesis.
In defining a sociopolitical movement in the way outlined above, della Porta
and Diani draw attention to two further concepts which form part of the
present study's conceptual framework. The first is the concept of social
movement organisation (SMO), a notion which proponents of resource
mobilisation theories in particular have used for many years to explore the
organisational structure of social movements. According to McCarthy's and
Zald's classic formulation, a social movement organisation is 'a complex, or
formal, organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social
movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals'
(McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). In recent years, scholars from traditions
other than resource mobilisation theory have also tended to adopt this
general definition, and I will do likewise here.
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Not all subsequent commentators, however, have followed McCarthy and
Zald in asserting, more specifically, that the difference between SMOs and
other types of formal organisation, such as interest groups, is that the former
are less 'institutionalised' and have less 'stable ties' with governmental
agencies (1977: 1218, note 8). In Kriesi's view, for example, the two
distinctive characteristics of SMOs are that 'they mobilise their constituency
for collective action and [that] they do so with a political goal, that is, to
obtain some collective good (avoid some collective ill) from authorities'
(1996: 152). He argues persuasively that the first distinguishes SMOs from
interest groups and political parties, which tend to rely on the activity of an
elite rather than the large-scale mobilisation of members, while the second
highlights the fact that SMOs, in contrast to, say, internally-oriented self-help
groups, are centrally concerned with political mobilisation and conflict (see
Kriesi 1996: 152-3). I believe that Kriesi's criteria - the mobilisation of
constituents and politically-oriented action - provide a more precise way of
identifying the specificity of SMOs than those suggested by McCarthy and
Zald, and my own discussion will be based primarily on his definition of the
SMO concept.8
Social movement organisations are, therefore, an important element of the
'mobilising structures' of a social movement (McCarthy 1996: 141). But, as
della Porta and Diani stressed in the passage discussed above, social
movement organisations should not be confused with social movements.
There are several different reasons for this. Firstly, unless a clear distinction
is drawn between a social movement, on the one hand, and the various
organisations which form part of it, on the other, there is always a danger of
'analytical confusion' (Diani 1992: 14) and of misplaced generalisation from
specific organisations to the movement as a whole. Piven and Cloward, for
example, have argued that explicit and well-defined projects of social
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transformation - what they call 'articulated social change goals' - are features
of formal social movement organisations and should not be equated with the
eruptions of collective 'defiance' and 'insurgency' which serve to identify
social movements (1979: 4-5). Jordan and Maloney (1997), on the other hand,
have shown how studies of environmental movements often assume,
mistakenly, that the goals and characteristics of active members of
organisations such as Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace reflect those of
people broadly sympathetic to environmental issues more generally. A
similar conflation of a movement with one or more of the organisations
linked to it has underpinned much of the discussion of anti-racism in
contemporary France. The anti-racist movement in that country has thus
frequently been reduced to or equated with SOS-Racisme, although mainly
by its critics (e.g. Yonnet 1993).
There has also, however, been a tendency among other scholars to refer to
SOS-Racisme itself as a '(social) movement' rather than as a social movement
organisation.9 The description of single organisations as social movements is
widespread in the literature and probably reflects, at least in part, the looser
use of the latter term in everyday speech. Nevertheless, it obscures the fact
that social movements are not organisations, but rather are networks of
interaction which may (or may not) include formally-structured
organisations. According to della Porta and Diani, a failure to distinguish the
two results in 'the application to social movement analysis of concepts
borrowed from organisational theory, concepts that only partially fit the
looser structure of social movements (1999:16). Although the extent to which
social movements can always be characterised in terms of a fluid or flexible
structure is open to question, as I have already noted, the underlying point is
still valid. A formal organisation may be a part of a social movement, but it
does not in itself constitute one. As a result, social movement analysis cannot
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be reduced to the investigation of specific organisations; it must instead
examine wider networks of interaction between such organisations, less
structured groups and individual participants.
This distinction between social movements and social movement
organisations helps to clarify the nature and the limits of the present work.
Strictly speaking, the object of investigation will not be a 'movement' as such
(neither 'the anti-racist movement' in its entirety nor an organisation
considered as 'a movement'), but rather an organisation which forms part of
a wider movement. More specifically, the thesis is intended as a study of
SOS-Racisme viewed as an SMO within the anti-racist movement in
contemporary France.10 Approaching SOS-Racisme in this way can be
justified on a number of grounds. In terms of della Porta's and Diani's
definition, SOS-Racisme is clearly part of an interaction network engaged in
political conflict on the basis of related organisational and movement
identities and with regular use of protest action. It is also centrally concerned
with the mobilisation of its 'constituency' and politically-oriented action -
Kriesi's two criteria of an SMO (see Parts II and III of this thesis). Finally,
SOS-Racisme is characterised by a greater degree of formal organisation and
structure than other sections of the anti-racist movement. It is an officially
registered 'association' with legal competence and charitable status, under
the terms of the 1901 Law which continues to form the basis of the freedom
of association in France. This legislation subjects associations to a system of
state regulation and, notably, includes the stipulation that they must have a
formalised organisational structure comprising a 'management committee'
and a 'bureau' (see Chapter 2).
The chapters which follow, then, provide a detailed analysis of one
particular organisation within the anti-racist movement in contemporary
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France, examining its modes of action as well as the types of link which bind
it to other organisations, groups and unaffiliated individuals. In order to
understand SOS-Racisme as an anti-racist SMO, however, I have not made
extensive use of previous anthropological or sociological studies of
organisations (e.g. Wright 1994). Instead, the argument which I wish to
develop is that if, as della Porta and Diani have pointed out, it is a mistake to
apply organisational theory and concepts to social movements (which are
networks and not organisations), much may nevertheless be gained by
bringing social movement theory and concepts to bear on analysis of specific
(social movement) organisations. In my view, concepts such as collective
identity and political opportunity structure, which have normally been
formulated and used with respect to social movements as a whole, can also
be valuable analytical tools for understanding processes at an organisational
level. This is the one of the thesis's central contentions and will be illustrated
more fully in Parts II and III below.
Collective Identities and Political OpportunityStructures
If social movement and social movement organisation constitute the first
pair of related concepts which will be used to analyse SOS-Racisme in this
thesis, the concepts of collective identity and political opportunity structure
form the second. The notion of collective identity was introduced earlier as a
key component of della Porta's and Diani's definition of a social movement.
In general terms, it refers to the shared set of beliefs and sense of belonging
which link individuals and groups together in a social movement. The
concept of collective identity has been associated mainly with the so-called
'New Social Movements'11 theorists in Europe, and has traditionally found
little favour among resource mobilisation theorists in the United States
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although this may currently be in the process of changing (see Munck 1995:
22, note 6).
One of the most influential formulations of the concept of collective identity
is to be found in the work of the Italian sociologist and psychologist Alberto
Melucci, where it is defined in terms of a processual and constructionist
approach to social movements. In Nomads of the Present (1989) and, more
recently, in Challenging Codes (1996), Melucci argues against what he
regards as the widespread tendency in social movements research to reify
collective action by presupposing both its 'factual unity1 and its 'collective
dimension'. He maintains that not only have scholars often assumed that the
collective phenomena (social movements, for example) they were
investigating actually had a unitary or unified character rather than being
simply 'concomitant forms of individual and group behaviour'; they have
also treated the collective nature of the action in question as a 'given', rather
than as something which it is necessary to explain (1996: 14-5). According to
Melucci, an analysis which is premised on these assumptions takes for
granted the existence of a social movement as a relatively unified collective
actor, deflecting attention away from the ways in which collective action is
produced and sustained. He proposes that collective phenomena such as
social movements should be considered instead as social constructions, as
'the result of multiple processes that favour or impede the formation and
maintenance of the cognitive frameworks and the systems of relationships
necessary for action' (1988: 331). A social movement is not a homogeneous
entity or 'unified subject', he insists, but rather 'a composite action system'
involving a diverse range of interactive processes, orientations to action and
types of relationship (1989: 28).
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In Melucci's view, this processual and constructionist approach to collective
action avoids the reification of social movements and their unity which has
characterised many previous studies. It emphasises the plural and
heterogeneous nature of social movements and suggests that whatever unity
they possess must be understood as the fragile and probably transitory
outcome of compromise and the negotiation of shared meanings among a
range of actors. The researcher can no longer simply assume or take for
granted this unity; instead, the challenge is to explain how it is produced. As
a result, identification of the processes underlying the construction of
collective action, the production of unity and the involvement of individuals
becomes an essential task for social movements research (see Melucci 1989:
20).
These processes include, crucially, the formation and maintenance of a
collective identity by movement participants. Melucci insists that neither
'objective conditions' (common position in the class structure, for example)
nor the 'dysfunctions' of the social system are sufficient to explain the
emergence of collective identities. He argues that a collective identity is not a
simple reflection of underlying structural conditions but is rather:
an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals
(or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the
orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in
which the action takes place. By 'interactive and shared' [he continues]
I mean a definition that must be conceived as a process because it is
constructed and negotiated through a repeated activation of the
relationships that link individuals (or groups). (Melucci 1995a: 44)
The construction of a collective identity is, in other words, a process
involving three related aspects: the elaboration of shared understandings of
the objectives, strategies and context of the movement's or group's action by
its members through negotiation and discussion; the development of
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relationships between actors enabling them to formulate a sense of 'we' or
common identity through collective action and decision-making; and the
emotional investment of each member in relationships with others perceived
as sharing her/his interests or aspirations (see also Melucci 1989: 35).
A valuable distinction which Melucci draws in his discussion of collective
identity is between visibility and latency as the contrasting 'poles' of
collective action (1989: 70-71). He argues that 'visible' forms of social
movement activity, such as demonstrations or other public mobilisations, do
not constitute the totality of collective action. Rather, the mobilisation of a
social movement depends on the construction of a collective identity and the
production of alternative or conflictual meanings by actors through their
participation in networks which are 'hidden' or 'submerged' in everyday life.
Melucci describes such networks as 'cultural laboratories' in which
'experiments are conducted on the existing relations of power' through a
reinterpretation of reality and a redefinition of the limits of politics (1989:
208). These networks of social relations and the negotiation of shared
meanings conducted within them together constitute the conditions of
possibility of subsequent mobilisations. It is in this respect that collective
identity formation during a movement's 'latency' phases can itself be
considered as the product of collective action as well as the basis for future,
visible forms of activity.
The constructionist approach to social movements developed by Melucci
conceptualises collective identity, in other words, as the process whereby
actors develop a shared understanding of the means, ends and context or
environment of their action (Melucci 1988: 332-3). In this thesis, I follow
Melucci in considering collective identity formation in processual terms and
in distinguishing between visible and latent phases of collective action.
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However, where Melucci formulates these points in relation to a social
movement as a whole, my argument is that similar processes occur - and can
be studied - at the level of a social movement organisation such as SOS-
Racisme.12 The chapters in Parts II and III of this thesis are, in fact, centrally
concerned with how members of SOS-Racisme negotiated and expressed a
sense of collective identity and distinctiveness within a broader anti-racist
movement. The relationship between organisational and movement
identities and the interplay between periods of latency and visibility (at an
organisational level) are two of the key issues which I propose to address in
my discussion.
As Melucci explains, an important aspect of the construction of a collective
identity by participants in a social movement is the negotiation of a common
or shared understanding of the wider context of their action. This includes
evaluating the extent to which, at specific times and places, the political
process can be influenced by collective action. One way in which social
scientists have attempted to analyse and compare the political 'environment'
for social movement action is through the concept of political opportunity
structure. An early version of the notion was presented by Eisinger (1973) in
his discussion of urban protest in the United States, and it has subsequently
been developed and refined by theorists working mainly within the 'political
process' tradition of social movements research (e.g. Kitschelt 1986). As
Gamson and Meyer (1996) have recently warned, however, the concept has
been defined in so many different ways that it 'threatens to become an all-
encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form
the context for collective action' (1996: 275). In an attempt to clarify how
'political opportunity structure' will be interpreted in this thesis, three of the
main problems with previous uses of the concept will now be discussed.
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A first difficulty with the concept is that scholars have defined it in terms of
a wide range of different variables. Tarrow (1994: 85-9), for example, has
distinguished the following four 'dimensions' of the political opportunity
structure: the extent to which access to formal political participation is open
or closed; the stability or instability of ruling political alignments; the
availability of influential allies; and the existence of divisions within and
between elite groups. Changes in these aspects of the political and
institutional context can, he suggests, create opportunities for social
movements to engage in collective action. Kriesi (1995) and his colleagues
(Kriesi et al 1995; Duyvendak 1994), on the other hand, have used the notion
to refer to three key elements: the formal institutional structure of a state,
including the degree of centralisation and concentration of power; the
procedures and strategies employed by authorities to exclude or integrate
external demands; and the configuration of power within and between
political parties. Piven and Cloward have argued instead that the crucial
aspects of 'the institutional context1 which structure protest are the electoral
system and social patterns and roles (see Piven and Cloward 1979:14-37).
Underlying such variation is often a difference of emphasis on 'stable' as
opposed to 'volatile' elements of political opportunity structures. As Gamson
and Meyer have pointed out, certain aspects of the political and institutional
context are relatively fixed and, in normal circumstances, are beyond the
control of social movements: these include the institutional structure of the
state and the nature of the party and electoral systems. Other aspects,
however, are more dynamic and volatile and play an essential role in
generating 'windows of opportunity' for specific mobilisations: policy
changes and shifts in the balance of power between elites or political parties
could be considered under this second category. Formulations of the political
opportunity concept, such as those outlined above, have generally included
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elements of both types, although not always with equal weighting (see
Gamson and Meyer 1996: 277-9).
A second problem concerns the failure of many scholars to acknowledge that
political opportunities are not simply 'objective' features of the political and
institutional context but also have a 'subjective' dimension. A good example
of this is Kriesi's restriction of the concept of political opportunity structure
to 'those aspects of a political system that determine movement development
independently of the purposive action of the actors involved (Kriesi 1995:
168, my emphases). While it is undeniable that social movement action is
objectively structured and conditioned by 'stable' elements of the political
and institutional context such as the nature of the party and electoral
systems, as Kriesi suggests, political opportunities are also interpreted and
debated (and sometimes even created) by movement actors themselves. This
is precisely the point which Melucci makes in his discussion of collective
identity formation. He describes it as a process in which movement
participants evaluate not only the means and ends available to them but also
the extent to which the social and political context is or may become
favourable to their action. How actors assess a potential political opportunity
- or indeed if they perceive it as such in the first place - can, therefore,
significantly affect its impact on their action. It follows that Kriesi's approach
is too restrictive: both objective and subjective components of political
opportunities, structure and agency, need to be taken into account (see
Tarrow 1988: 430; Gamson and Meyer 1996: 283).
Thirdly, scholars have tended to focus on the ways in which the political
opportunity structure constrains or enables the action of a movement
generally; much less attention has been given to the particular and
potentially unequal effects of changes in this structure on the different
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SMOs, other groups and individuals which together constitute a movement
as an interaction network. As Gamson and Meyer have pointed out, there is
consequently a danger that '[v]alid statements about changes in movement
opportunity as a whole may hide important changes in relative opportunity'
(1996: 284). I would argue, further, that it is important analytically not to
confuse or equate opportunities for a social movement in general with those
for a specific organisation or group which happens to form part of it. This is
one of the problems with Duyvendak's otherwise incisive analysis of the
relationship between successive Socialist governments and social
movements in France during the 1980s (Duyvendak 1994).
Duyvendak maintains that when a progressive government is in power in
France it can choose to promote certain social movements and in such cases
'these movements will be among the organisations sponsored by the
government and whose demands could even be granted force of law' (1994:
100, my emphases).13 Reducing movements to organisations in this way,
however, obscures the fact that governments may attempt to influence the
overall direction of a movement by aiding or even creating individual SMOs,
with the result that other (perhaps more radical) organisations or groups
within the movement are disadvantaged or marginalised. To take a specific
example, I would argue that Duyvendak is mistaken when he implies that
'the anti-racist movement' as a whole received 'considerable support (un
soutien important)' from the governing Socialist Party in France during the
1980s (1994: 142). This assumes that both the anti-racist movement and the
Socialist Party are unitary and homogeneous entities and that a simple and
direct relationship can be traced between them. In reality, the early 1980s
witnessed an attempt by rival currents within the Socialist Party (grouped
around Laurent Fabius and Lionel Jospin) to increase their power and
influence by assisting and even launching competing anti-racist
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organisations (SOS-Racisme and France-Plus respectively). Other anti-racist
and 'Beur' organisations did not enjoy an equivalent level of official support
(see Geisser 1997: 168-70 and Part II of this thesis). It is crucial, therefore, to
distinguish clearly between, on the one hand, those political opportunities
which exist for a social movement as a whole and, on the other, those which
may only be available to specific organisations, individuals or groups within
it.
The use of the concept of political opportunity structure in the present thesis
attempts to avoid these three problems. I will follow Kriesi in defining the
concept in terms of three key variables: the formal institutional structure of
the state, the dominant procedures and strategies employed by the
authorities in the face of external demands, and the configuration of political
power. The first two are relatively stable aspects of the political system
whereas the third is more dynamic and volatile. As I show in subsequent
chapters, it is change in the balance of political power (both within and
between political parties) which has been the most significant of these factors
in constraining and enabling the action of SOS-Racisme as an anti-racist
organisation since the mid-1980s. In line with Gamson and Meyer (1996:
285), however, I place greater emphasis than Kriesi does on the role of the
media in validating whole movements or specific SMOs as 'credible' political
agents (see Part II). I also differ from Kriesi in arguing that both the objective
and the subjective dimensions of political opportunities must be examined,
although I will tend to devote more attention to the second of these; how
members of SOS-Racisme interpreted and debated the political opportunities
available to them during 1993-94 will be the main focus of my discussion (see
Chapters 8 and 9). Finally, and this should be obvious from the preceding
comments, I intend to use the concept of political opportunity structure to
analyse the emergence and subsequent development of one particular SMO,
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SOS-Racisme, rather than the evolution of the anti-racist movement more
generally. Although originally defined and most commonly considered in
relation to a social movement as a whole (as in the case of the concept of
collective identity), the notion of political opportunity structure can, I will
suggest, equally help to explain variations in the fortunes of specific SMOs.
Toward an Anthropology of Social Movements
The theoretical and conceptual debates which I have reviewed in the
previous section are an important indication of the remarkable growth of
social movements research as a field of social scientific inquiry over the past
three decades. As Arturo Escobar has perceptively observed, however,
1 [a] nthropologists have been largely absent from this extremely active and
engaging trend' (1992a: 396), in marked contrast to their colleagues in
sociology, political science, women's studies and history. Writing in the early
1990s, Escobar lamented the 'invisibility' of social movements in
anthropology and the discipline's failure to contribute significantly to
debates about contemporary forms of collective action. Nearly a decade
later, there is little evidence to suggest that Escobar's call for anthropologists
to 'pay serious attention' (1992a: 396) to social movements has been heeded.
Although some anthropologists (e.g. Bergendorff 1998; Nash 1992) have
recently begun to explore this topic, they have generally failed to relate their
work to the theoretical debates outlined above.14 Even the present trend
towards a 'cultural analysis' (Johnston and Klandermans 1995b) of social
movements appears to be passing anthropologists by as well as bypassing
anthropology.15
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The 'Invisibility' ofSocial Movements in Anthropology
Given the steady growth of interest in social movements within the social
sciences generally, it is important to examine the reasons why
anthropologists have made such a limited contribution to our knowledge
and understanding of this phenomenon. After all, there is no shortage of
anthropological work on millenarian and other religious movements. What,
then, has prevented anthropologists from engaging in a theoretically-
informed analysis of contemporary sociopolitical and sociocultural
movements? Why is there an established sociology but not an anthropology
of social movements? These are the questions I will attempt to answer in the
next two subsections. In the article cited above, Escobar explains the
invisibility of social movements in anthropology in terms of five different
factors and I will use these to structure the first part of my own discussion
here. Following Escobar I argue that anthropology's failure to study social
movements is partly attributable to the weakness of its concepts of politics
and practice. Nevertheless, I go on to suggest in the chapter's final subsection
that recent debates about the future of political anthropology indicate
possible ways forward for those currently involved in social movements
research.
According to Escobar (1992a), a convergence of five factors has been
responsible for the 'invisibility' of social movements in anthropology.16 The
first of these is the prominence of issues relating to textuality and
representation in anglophone anthropology during the 1980s and early
1990s. One of the first indications of anthropology's 'literary turn' (Scholte
1987) was the publication of Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986), an
edited collection subtitled 'The Poetics and Politics of Anthropology'. As
many critics have since argued, however, the essays contained in this
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volume tended to devote considerably more attention to textual or literary
questions than to the subject of politics as such (Scholte 1987; Spencer 1989;
Mascia-Lees et al 1989). In particular, most of the contributors approached
issues of power and domination in terms of the construction of the textual
authority of the ethnographer rather than through an examination of, for
example, the material basis of ethnographic production or the politics of
knowledge.17 Escobar claims that this led to a focus in subsequent debates on
the politics of representation. While not denying the importance of this
development, he contends that it has produced a rather narrow definition of
'the political arena' which has directed attention away from issues such as
collective political practice and the relationship of contemporary social
movements to political processes (Escobar 1992a: 398,401).
An inadequate conceptualisation of practice is, Escobar maintains, a second
factor contributing to the absence of social anthropologists from current
debates on social movements. He accepts Sherry Ortner's (1984) assertion
that the concept of practice has become increasingly important in
anthropology since the 1960s. One aspect of this is a greater awareness of the
need to examine the role of everyday as well as ritualistic practices in the
construction and reproduction of social and cultural formations (a point
which had, of course, already been emphasised by Malinowski (1922: 24) in
his comments on 'the imponderabilia of everyday life1). Escobar claims,
however, that social anthropology as a discipline has few theoretical or
conceptual resources with which to study collective political action and its
part in creating the world(s) in which we live. The collective production of
social life by social actors, he argues, has been rendered invisible in
anthropology by the prevalence of 'an individual-oriented notion of practice'
(Escobar 1992a: 401). A more satisfactory conceptualisation of practice which
recognises its collective dimension can, he proposes, be derived from the
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work of de Certeau and theorists of popular culture such as John Fiske (see
Escobar 1992a: 409; 1992b: 74-76).18
Thirdly, Escobar states that 'divisions of labour within the academy1 (1992a:
401) have also prevented a recognition of social movements as a topic of
anthropological inquiry. There is no further elaboration of this comment,
however, and its precise meaning is unclear. Nevertheless, a possible
indication is provided by Escobar's argument later in the article that social
movements are 'relevant' to anthropology because they involve conflict over
cultural meanings as well as social and economic resources (1992a: 412). This
implies that in the past anthropologists have regarded social movements for
the most part as socio-economic struggles and, as a result, of interest
primarily to sociologists and political scientists. Although it must be
emphasised that Escobar does not develop the point explicitly, his view
appears to be that a distinction (or 'division of labour') between
anthropology as the study of 'culture' and sociology as the study of 'society'
may previously have functioned to inhibit anthropological research on social
movements.19
A fourth factor contributing to the paucity of anthropological research on
social movements is, in Escobar's view, academic anthropology's detachment
from the interests and concerns of the wider society. Escobar argues that the
discipline operates within an epistemology ('a western will to knowledge')
which renders it 'abstract, disembodied and disembedded from popular
social contexts, [and] accountable primarily to the academy' (1992a: 419). In
other words, anthropology's ways of constituting and knowing social reality
are the product of a particular historical process (Western modernity) which
has characteristically involved the separation of academic from other social
practices. These 'modes of knowledge' have defined anthropology as an
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academic or scientific discipline, Escobar acknowledges, but they have also
'[made] unlikely certain styles of research' (Escobar 1992a: 401).20
The marginal place occupied by action research within the social sciences is a
good illustration of this last point. As Gerrit Huizer has indicated, the
adherence of many researchers to a conception of objectivity understood as
'non-involvement' has frequently led to an eschewal of action research as
well as a more widespread reluctance to study social conflict at all. Many
social scientists have perceived action research as necessitating a personal
commitment or partisan involvement which would undermine the scientific
or objective status of their work (Huizer 1979: 396-406; Lopate 1979). The
implication of Escobar's argument is that similar concerns may also have
prevented anthropologists from studying social movements.21
The final factor adduced by Escobar to explain the scarcity of
anthropological research on social movements is 'the decline of collective
action' (1992a: 401) in society - in this case the United States - during the
1980s. To be fair, Escobar is cautious about asserting too direct a
correspondence between waves of social movement activity and the degree
of academic interest in the phenomenon. Nevertheless, given that social
movements research has 'flourished' (Escobar 1992a: 396) in Latin America,
Western Europe and North America over the past twenty years, as I have
already indicated, it is still necessary to ask why social anthropologists in
these places have been so reluctant to enter the debates. In other words, even
if current levels of collective action are comparatively low (which is in fact
debatable, see Tarrow 1994), this does not explain the specific absence of
social anthropologists from social movements research and analysis.
To my knowledge, Escobar's work represents the first sustained attempt to
identify the underlying causes of the invisibility of social movements in
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contemporary anthropology. Although not all of the five 'factors' which he
discusses are entirely convincing (for the reasons suggested above), there is
no doubt that he raises fundamental questions about the current state of the
discipline and, in particular, the adequacy of its concepts of politics and
practice. It is disappointing, therefore, that the line of argument which he
develops (Escobar 1992a and b; Escobar and Alvarez 1992b; Alvarez and
Escobar 1992) has subsequently attracted little (if any) critical comment from
other anthropologists.22 Escobar's programmatic discussion of the relevance
of social movements theory and research for anthropology (Escobar 1992a:
402-412) has not prompted a significant debate within the discipline.
Similarly, the key conceptual and theoretical issues which he highlights have
not been addressed further, even by those anthropologists who have recently
turned their attention to the empirical investigation of social movements.
The theoretical and methodological foundations for an anthropology of
social movements thus remain to be established. The present thesis is
intended as a contribution to such an enterprise, following to a large extent
the intellectual agenda set out by Escobar in the articles already mentioned.
Rather than pursue an assessment of the five factors in terms of which
Escobar himself explains the absence of social movements in anthropology,
however, I would like to approach the question from a slightly different
angle. As noted earlier, certain aspects of Escobar's analysis appear to apply
more to anthropology as it has developed in the United States than to its
European branches. This suggests that it may be instructive to 'localise' the
problem by considering the possible reasons for the failure of
anthropologists based in Britain to study social movements. It is to this issue
which I want now to turn.
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Re-Orienting the AnthropologicalStudy ofPolitics
The importance of examining social movements research (or the lack of it) in
a national context has been emphasised by the sociologist Paul Bagguley in a
recent article (Bagguley 1997). The initial point which he makes is that there
is no sociology of social movements in Britain equivalent to that which has
emerged in the US and in other European countries such as France, Germany
and Italy. While interest in the topic currently appears to be growing in this
country, Bagguley maintains that:
In the early 1990s the area [of social movements] was neither
established as a topic of theoretical work, funded empirical research
nor teaching within Britain. There is no clearly identifiable 'school' of
British social movement research and analysis [...]. (Bagguley 1997:
149)23
As Bagguley acknowledges, the absence of a sociology of social movements
in Britain is surprising for a number of reasons. In the first place, comparable
'sub-disciplinary areas' such as women's studies have developed within
British sociology in conjunction with the other social sciences. Secondly, the
tradition of sociological theory in Britain is 'exceptionally vigorous' as a
result of its exposure to both North American and European currents of
thought. Thirdly, levels of social movement activity in this country were
high compared to the US, West Germany and Italy in the 1960s and 1970s,
the period when the social movement field began to flourish elsewhere
(Bagguley 1997:151-2).
According to Bagguley, the limited contribution of British sociologists to
social movements analysis is related to the dominance of a 'class-theoretical
paradigm' in political sociology during the late 1960s and 1970s. He claims
that the emergence of a sociology of social movements in Britain was
effectively 'blocked' by the ascendancy of a theoretical model which
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interpreted such phenomena primarily as the expression of diverse class
interests. The social movements which arose during the 1960s, for example,
tended to be regarded simply as 'middle class movements'. Bagguley
suggests that this 'class-reductionist political sociology' prevented British
sociologists from asking 'the right questions'. The complex meaning of
contemporary forms of collective action was obscured and social movements
analysis remained marginal to the development of the discipline as a whole.
As a result, the theoretical schools and research centres which provided an
intellectual and institutional space for the study of social movements in the
US and Europe were never established in Britain (Bagguley 1997:149-151).
The argument developed by Bagguley, therefore, is that the class-theoretical
approach of political sociology in Britain from the 1960s onwards became a
major obstacle to the expansion of social movements research. This is an
important thesis, which in itself would merit more detailed examination.
However, the particular question which interests me here is whether a
similar line of reasoning can help to explain the absence of an anthropology
(as opposed to a sociology) of social movements in Britain. As I have already
indicated, Bagguley's suggestion is that the class paradigm which once
dominated British political sociology had the effect of marginalising the
sociology of social movements. In a parallel fashion, I want now to consider
the possibility that the failure of anthropologists in this country to make a
significant contribution to social movements analysis is attributable, at least
in part, to the shortcomings of post-war political anthropology. Recent
critiques of the subdiscipline of political anthropology, I will argue, echo
many of the points raised by Escobar with respect to social movements
research and offer a way out of the current impasse.
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For the purposes of the present discussion, one of the most useful
commentaries on the development of political anthropology in Britain since
the 1940s is to be found in an essay by Jonathan Spencer on 'Post-
Colonialism and the Political Imagination' (1997). As Spencer explains, the
thirty years which followed the publication of African Political Systems
(Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940) can be viewed, in retrospect, as the
'heyday' of political anthropology in this country. Since the 1970s, in
contrast, the subdiscipline has 'remained obstinately out of fashion' (Spencer
1997: 1), in spite of growing wider interest in such topics as power, post-
colonialism and nationalism. In order to explain the continuing unpopularity
of political anthropology, Spencer maintains that it is necessary to re¬
examine the ways in which anthropologists have traditionally
conceptualised the political. He suggests that anthropological approaches to
politics have tended to be underpinned by a number of problematic
assumptions. These have ultimately contributed to the decline of political
anthropology (Spencer 1997: 3).24
The account of 'anthropology's problems with politics' presented by Spencer
(1997: 3) is an important attempt to prepare the ground for the task of
reorienting the anthropological study of politics generally in more
productive directions. However, his argument can also be used to throw
light on the more specific question of the absence of social movements in
anthropology. In other words, the critique of political anthropology which
he outlines can help to explain why the analysis of social movements has not
figured prominently on the discipline's agenda. Spencer makes two points
which are particularly relevant in this regard. Firstly, he shows how political
anthropology, from Fortes and Evans-Pritchard to Leach and Bailey, was
constructed on the basis of a radical distinction between the political and the
cultural. The functionalist comparison of political structures developed by
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Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, for example, required these to be 'stripped of
their cultural idiom' (quoted in Spencer 1997: 4). The subsequent emergence
of structuralism did not significantly alter this emphasis on the complete
separation of the two categories. As Spencer notes, the end result was an
extremely narrow understanding of politics itself:
Where others spoke of cosmologies and modes of thought, ritual and
symbol, unconscious structures and implicit meanings, political
anthropology became determinedly unexotic, anti-cultural and dull.
By 1970 all the richness and complexity of actually existing politics
had been reduced by anthropologists to the micro-study of
instrumental behaviour ... Political anthropology, so conceived, was
the subdiscipline that died of boredom. (Spencer 1997: 5)
Writing in 1967, the French anthropologist Georges Balandier had already
drawn attention to the limitations of both functionalist and structuralist
approaches within political anthropology. Although not referring explicitly
to the importance of culture, he nevertheless criticised formalist models for
denying the dynamism, instability and antagonistic nature of political
systems. Presaging the turn of events later discussed by Spencer, he warned
that the dominant types of analysis then employed by political
anthropologists would lead only to intellectual 'dead ends (voies sans issue)'
(Balandier 1995: 224).
Returning to the main theme of this subsection, I would suggest that classic
political anthropology's adherence to a rigid distinction between the political
and the cultural may have produced an inability to comprehend the nature
of post-war social movements. As Escobar has emphasised, there is a
widespread view among theorists in the other social sciences that 'social
movements cannot be understood independently of culture' (Escobar 1992a:
405). The sociologist Alberto Melucci, for example, argues that today's social
movements are engaged in conflict over 'symbolic resources' (1985; 1989: 20),
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while Touraine maintains that actors are struggling to (re-)define society's
'great cultural orientations' (Touraine 1978: 42). Such writers have thus
drawn attention to the fact that the movements which emerged during the
1960s (civil rights, feminism, ecology, gay liberation) were concerned not
only with social and economic transformation but also with culture and
identity.25 This frequently involved a redrawing of the boundaries of politics
itself and the creation of new forms of political practice (Offe 1985). With its
tendency to abstract politics from culture, however, contemporary
anthropology would have been ill-equipped to appreciate the significance of
these developments.
The second point I want to consider from Spencer's article is his contention
that anthropological studies of politics have typically excluded the empirical
investigation of large-scale institutions such as the state and political parties.
According to Spencer, there has been an 'unspoken assumption that modern
political institutions are either pre-eminently rational and transparent, or
anthropologically irrelevant and intellectually unchallenging' (1997: 3).
Using one of Geertz's essays in comparative politics (Geertz 1973) as an
example, he argues that anthropologists have tended implicitly to regard 'the
state' and 'civil society' as relatively unproblematic phenomena which do not
require investigation in their own right.26 Spencer suggests that surprisingly
little attention has, as a result, been devoted to the structure and workings of
the post-colonial nation-state, even in more recent work on nationalism (see
Spencer 1997: 6-7; Gupta 1995: 376).
In a passage which echoes Escobar's critique of the literary turn, Spencer
continues that a concern with the state or political institutions more
generally has also been missing in the post- Writing Culture literature on
'power'. Associating this with the 'theoretical looseness' with which the
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terms 'politics' and 'power' have been used in recent debates, he poses the
following question:
...if everything is 'political', what word can we use to mark out that
special area of life which people themselves refer to as 'politics' (...)?
The problem is real enough because, for whatever reason, mass
politics - parties, elections, the state [and social movements?] - has
been more often than not absent from this literature. (Spencer 1997:
13, one reference omitted)
The upsurge of interest in 'power' within anthropology over the past decade
has not, in other words, led to a greater emphasis on the examination of
what Spencer refers to as 'the institutional context of modern politics' (1997:
3). If anything, there is a danger that the inflation of the meaning of the
political will hinder the future development of this type of analysis.
The key point to emerge from the above comments is that the
anthropological study of mass politics, and particularly its institutional
aspects, is still at an embryonic stage. As noted earlier, the argument
advanced by Spencer is that anthropologists have tended to treat the
ritualistic or symbolic dimensions of post-colonial politics as their primary
concern; apparently more 'rational' elements, such as the state itself, have
attracted considerably less attention. While this is undoubtedly one factor, I
suspect that another may simply have been a perception (in my opinion,
erroneous) that traditional anthropological methods were inappropriate for
the investigation of these phenomena.27 Whatever the precise reasons for the
discipline's failure to address issues of mass politics, I would suggest that the
invisibility of social movements in anthropology can be viewed as an
example of this wider problem. Although social movements are not strictly
speaking part of the formal political system, they nevertheless interact in
complex ways with the state and political parties, and play a crucial role in
shaping and mobilising public opinion (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995;
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Neveu 1996:17-20). Given that anthropologists have devoted relatively little
attention to the state, parties and elections, as Spencer has indicated, it is
then perhaps not entirely surprising that they have also rarely investigated
social movements.28
In this subsection I have suggested that the absence of an anthropology of
social movements can be attributed, at least in part, to the way in which
post-war political anthropologists in Britain have constructed their object. As
Spencer has argued, classical political anthropology tended both to define
politics in opposition to culture, and to ignore the institutional or
organisational aspects of mass politics. My contention is that one effect of
this narrow conception of politics was to deflect anthropologists' attention
away from social movements, at a time when interest in the topic was
increasing within other social science subjects. Although issues of power and
resistance subsequently came to occupy a central place in anthropological
debate during the 1980s, I would argue (with Escobar and Spencer) that
definitions of the political sphere remained problematic, and served
indirectly to perpetuate the marginalisation of social movements research
within the discipline.
The implication of the preceding argument is that the future development of
an anthropology of social movements in this country (and elsewhere) will
depend on a more general transformation of the subdiscipline of political
anthropology. One way forward would be for anthropologists to display
greater sensitivity to what Spencer has termed 'the empirical
unpredictability' (1997: 9) of the political, by which he means the diverse and
sometimes unexpected (to the anthropologist) types of behaviour which
people themselves understand as 'politics'.29 These may well include
participation in a social movement organisation, as the material discussed in
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Part III reveals. A political anthropology seriously committed to
understanding the full range of action which people describe as 'political'
will not, therefore, be able to ignore social movements and their relationship
with political parties and the state.
However, it is also the case that anthropologists involved in researching
social movements or collective action more generally can no longer adopt an
attitude of 'naivety' (Devons and Gluckman 1964) with respect to the multi-
disciplinary body of theoretical and empirical work which now exists on the
subject. I would argue that there are several reasons why anthropologists
must begin to engage critically with the social movements literature. In the
first place, anthropologists have a crucial role to play in challenging the
Eurocentrism (Escobar 1992a; Giri 1992) or even Francocentrism (Duyvendak
1994: 37) of much existing work. Secondly, the recent 'cultural turn' in social
movements analysis has raised important questions about the
conceptualisation of culture which anthropologists are well-qualified to
address.30 Thirdly, I believe - and seek to demonstrate in this thesis - that the
anthropological study of politics could gain considerably from a critical
appropriation (and if necessary reformulation) of concepts originally
developed within social movement studies such as those I introduced in the
first section. Through an examination of the relationship between subjective
and objective dimensions of political opportunity structures, for example,
anthropologists could begin address in a more systematic way the role of
institutional factors (including the nature of the state) in shaping political
action. Finally, anthropologists have an important contribution to make to
ongoing debates about methodological issues in social movements research,
as I will show in the next chapter.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have brought together concepts from several different
theoretical traditions in social movements research in order to construct a
framework for the analysis of SOS-Racisme as part of the anti-racist
movement in contemporary France. I have argued, firstly, that a clear
analytical distinction needs to be maintained between the concepts of social
movement and social movement organisation (SMO). SOS-Racisme is not
itself a social movement, I have suggested, but rather an SMO within a
broader network of anti-racist organisations, groups and individuals.
Secondly, I have outlined Melucci's processual and constructionist approach
to collective action, and introduced the related concepts of collective identity
and political opportunity structure. These concepts will be used in the thesis
to analyse how members of SOS-Racisme developed a sense of common
purpose and identity which enabled them to act collectively and how they
defined the political and institutional context for their action in 1993-94.
The second half of the chapter highlighted the fact that anthropologists have
rarely contributed to theoretical and conceptual debates within the field of
social movements research and sought to provide an explanation of this state
of affairs. Firstly, I examined the five different factors identified by Escobar
as responsible for the 'invisibility' of social movements in anthropology.
Although many of Escobar's arguments are persuasive, at least with respect
to anthropology in the United States, I went on to suggest that the failure of
British social anthropologists to play a more significant role in social
movements research has been due to the problematic nature of concepts of
politics and practice in post-war political anthropology in this country. This
thesis attempts, in a modest way, to show that an engagement on the part of
anthropologists with social movements theory and research can not only
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help to re-orient the anthropological study of politics in a more productive
direction, it can also contribute to a better social scientific understanding of
social movements and other forms of collective action.
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1 See, for example, della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht (1999), Jenkins and
Klandermans (1995), Johnston and Klandermans (1995a), Maheu (1995),
Melucci (1996), Staggenborg (1998), Tarrow (1994), Wignaraja (1993) and
Zirakzadeh (1997). More general overviews of the social movements
literature since the 1960s can be found in Morris and Herring (1987),
Neidhardt and Rucht (1991), and della Porta and Diani (1999).
2 It is common in the literature for Resource Mobilisation and New Social
Movements Theories to be referred to simply as the 'American' and
'European' approaches respectively (e.g. Klandermans 1991).
3 See, for example, Escobar and Alvarez (1992a), Fillieule and Pechu (1993),
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996a), and Munck (1995).
4 Melucci (1995a: 53), Tarrow (1994: 22) and Duyvendak (1994: 50-1) have
also insisted that social movements are networks and not a particular type of
organisation, a point which Fillieule's (1997: 37) definition fails to recognise.
5 This argument has been developed in more detail by Koopmans (1996).
6 It is true that della Porta and Diani claim that 'movements are by definition
fluid phenomena' (1999: 17), but the context makes clear that they are
referring here to the shifting nature of collective identities rather than to
network structures.
7 A further problem with della Porta's and Diani's definition of social
movements as 'informal' networks is that it appears based on what Jordan
and Maloney have referred to as 'an extreme sort of stereotypical
interpretation' of interest groups and other organisations as 'more formally
organised than social movements' (1997: 55).
8 In fairness, it should be noted that McCarthy and Zald themselves
appeared not entirely convinced of the adequacy of their own formulation
(see McCarthy and Zald 1977:1218, note 8).
9 See, for example, Touraine (1988b), Wieviorka (1993e: 129) ,Waters (1998a:
181-2), and Appleton (1999: 73).
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10 Here I follow Duyvendak (1994: 83) in regarding SOS-Racisme as an
example of a social movement organisation. Where he discusses SOS-
Racisme in relation to 'the solidarity movement' in France (1994: 224-239),
however, I focus more narrowly on the association's position and role within
the anti-racist movement. This is closer to members' own conceptions of the
wider context of their action (see, for example, Chapter 9), but is not
equivalent to the idea of an 'anti-Front national countermovement' proposed
by Mayer (1994, 1995). Combatting the Front national has undoubtedly,
although to varying degrees over time, been one of SOS-Racisme's goals, but
the association has always sought to promote a wider agenda (.integration
policies, for example).
11 The distinction between 'old' and 'new' social movements has been the
subject of considerable discussion in the literature: see Faulks (1999: 87-103)
for an overview of the debate as a whole, and Melucci (1994,1995b), Calhoun
(1993), Dalton, Kuechler and Biirklin (1990), Inglehart (1990), Klandermans
(1990), Koopmans (1996) and Rucht (1990) for more detailed statements of
the views of the main protagonists. To my mind, Calhoun has convincingly
demonstrated that 'the historical claim implicit in the idea of new social
movements ... is specious', since the supposedly novel features of 1960s
movements can equally be said to characterise movements in earlier
centuries (1993: 386, emphasis in original). For this reason, I avoid using the
'New Social Movement' label to describe the anti-racist movement in
contemporary France, in contrast to commentators such as Waters (1998a
and b). Neverthless, it should be clear from the argument developed in this
chapter that I also share Calhoun's view that NSM theory has raised
extremely valuable questions for social movements research in general to
address (see Calhoun 1993: 388). These include the issues of culture, identity
and meaning which feature prominently in my discussion of SOS-Racisme.
12 Melucci himself appears to acknowledge this possibility when he writes in
the passage quoted earlier that a collective identity is 'produced by several
individuals {or groups at a more complex level)' (1995a: 44, my emphases).
This distinction between different levels of complexity could easily be
equated with that between an SMO and a social movement.
13 '...ces mouvements feraient partie des organisations parrainees par le
gouvernement et dont les revendications pourraient meme faire force de loi.'
14 One of the few anthropologists to refer consistently to social movements
theory in their work is Pnina Werbner. In a series of fascinating publications,
she has brought insights from Melucci to bear on the study of 'ethnic
leadership' and 'diasporic communities' (see Werbner 1991a and b, 1996,
1998).
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15 An important collection of essays on Social Movements and Culture
(Johnston and Klandermans 1995a), for example, does not contain a single
contribution by an anthropologist nor is 'anthropology' even listed in the
volume's Subject Index.
16 Escobar's argument here echoes Kathleen Gough's earlier discussion of the
factors lying behind the failure of anthropologists to examine imperialism as
a world system (see Gough 1968).
17 Paul Rabinow alone proposed, in a very limited way, a politicisation of the
university with his call for a study of 'the micro-practices of the academy'
(Rabinow 1986: 253).
18 It should be pointed out here that Marxist anthropologists (e.g. Terray
1972; Godelier 1977; Bloch 1983, 1984) have also developed notions of
collective practice. That Escobar ignores this important body of work is
perhaps a reflection of its limited influence in the US as compared with
Europe (see Melhuus 1993).
19 See Kuper (1999: 68ff.) for a discussion of the separation of the study of
culture from that of social structure or organisation in post-war American
(not British) anthropology.
20 The production of knowledge in anthropology may indeed depend, as
Escobar claims, on 'dominant modern modes of knowing and possessing the
world' (Escobar 1992a: 419), but this is surely also the case for the other social
sciences. Such a factor does not in itself explain the low involvement of
anthropologists (as opposed to social scientists as a whole) in social
movements research. The underlying problem here is of distinguishing the
factors contributing to the invisibility of social movements in anthropology
from those bearing on the social sciences more generally.
21 For a discussion of the similarities between action research and the study
of social movements see Melucci (1989: 238-9) and Kemmis (1993).
22 Notable exceptions are Gledhill (1994:187-8) and Upadhya (1996: 3148).
23 The 'fragmentation and particularism' of social movements research in
Britain has also been noted by Riidig et al (1991:121).
24 As both Vincent (1990: 390) and Collier (1997) have indicated, however, the
recent decline of political anthropology must also be situated in the wider
context of a general 'waning' of the discipline's subfields.
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25 However, it is important to note Judith Butler's recent comments on 'the
tendency to relegate new social movements to the sphere of the cultural,
indeed, to dismiss them as being preoccupied with what is called the
"merely" cultural, and then to construe this cultural politics as factionalizing,
identitarian, and particularistic' (Butler 1998: 33. Cf. Fraser 1998). One of the
key stakes here is how the distinction between the material and the cultural
is constructed.
26 While this is a plausible explanation, rather different reasons for the
paucity of anthropological research on the state have also been proposed.
Marc Abeles (1995: 68), for example, has argued that political anthropology
privileged the analysis of 'the non-State (le non-Etaif at least partly in order
to assert its distinctiveness as a (sub-)discipline from political science and
sociology with their (perceived) preoccupation with the state. Balandier
(1995: 220) had previously maintained that political anthropology had
'broken the fascination which the State had long exerted over political
theorists' and thus effected a ' decentrement of political analysis. This does
not necessarily imply that anthropologists believed that the study of the state
was 'irrelevant' or 'unchallenging'.
27 This is an issue which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
28 It is clear, however, that relating the absence of anthropological research
on social movements to a lack of interest in mass politics more generally only
shifts the problem rather than resolving it. We still need to ask, with Spencer,
why anthropologists have rarely investigated forms of mass and institutional
politics.
29 See Abeles and Jeudy (1997:13) for a similar argument.
30 This is a point I have developed further in a paper The Cultural Analysis of
Social Movements, presented at 'For Sociology', BSA Annual Conference,
University of Glasgow, 6-9 April 1999.
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Chapter 4
Researching Collective Action: From
Sociological Intervention to
Ethnography
It should be clear from the previous chapter that the study of social
movements and other forms of collective action has, since the 1960s, become
an increasingly important field of social scientific activity, particularly in
Europe and in North America.1 Although debates about core concepts and
theoretical frameworks have undoubtedly been the most conspicuous aspect
of this development, some discussion of methodological issues has also
occurred. The aim of the present chapter is to add an anthropological
perspective to these reflections on the question of method in social
movements research. The first section reviews the pioneering attempt by the
French sociologist Alain Touraine and his colleagues to devise a research
method appropriate to the study of social movements in a 'post-industrial'
society. I begin by outlining the main characteristics of this approach, which
Touraine refers to as 'sociological intervention (intervention sociologique)\
and then discuss some of the criticisms which have been levelled against it
by both movement activists and other researchers. After considering its
strengths and weaknesses, I go on in the second main section to suggest that
many of the problems associated with sociological intervention can be
avoided by attaching greater importance to participant observation as a key
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part of a more general ethnographic approach to social movements and their
constituent organisations. Studying a social movement organisation
ethnographically, however, is not without its own problems-particularly in
an urban setting-and I conclude the section by reflecting briefly on issues
raised by my own research on SOS-Racisme in Paris.
Touraine's Method of Sociological Intervention
The French sociologist Alain Touraine has unquestionably played a crucial
role in the emergence of a specific field of social scientific activity concerned
with the study of social movements and collective action. In a series of
publications (Touraine 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988a) he has proposed a theory of
social movements which has come to be regarded as one of the most
influential versions of the 'identity-oriented paradigm1 outlined in the last
chapter (see Cohen 1985: 690-705). However, the importance of Touraine's
contribution to the development of theory should not lead us to marginalise
or downplay the significance of his discussion of research methodology in
this area. Unfortunately, overviews of the social movements literature (e.g.
Neveu 1996; della Porta and Diani 1999) tend to focus almost exclusively on
Touraine's theoretical work, with relatively little—if any-consideration given
to the nature of his research methods. Even the introduction to an important
collection of essays entitled Studying Collective Action devotes just a short
paragraph to Touraine's method (Diani and Eyerman 1992b: 11). This is
surprising since, as Melucci has emphasised, Touraine is 'the only author
who has proposed a method of research intervention in the field of social
movements' (Melucci 1989: 236). The originality of Touraine's contribution to
this field is not restricted to the level of theory, therefore, but also derives
from his elaboration of an innovative research methodology. In the first part
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of this section, I will be concerned to show how the elaboration of theory and
the development of new research methods are closely related aspects of
Touraine's sociology of collective action.
The Nature of the Method
The method of 'sociological intervention (intervention socio/ogique)' was
originally developed by Touraine in the mid-1970s and has subsequently
been employed by his team of researchers in a broad range of studies (see
Wieviorka 1992: 354-5). It was intended to be the first method specifically
adapted to the investigation of social movements and collective action and as
such it represents an 'obligatory' (Melucci 1989: 236) starting-point for the
discussion of methodology I wish to pursue in this chapter. In what follows,
I provide a general account of the various stages which Touraine identifies in
a sociological intervention as well as an evaluation of the method's strengths
and weaknesses. Touraine insists, however, that the choice of a research
method cannot be treated as a simple 'technical' matter but rather is bound
up with the researcher's conception of the social reality to be investigated
(see Touraine 1978: 184-5, 1980a: 321-323). In order to understand fully the
method of sociological intervention, therefore, it is first necessary to examine
briefly the general theoretical orientation of Touraine's sociology.
Since the late 1960s Touraine has attempted to reformulate sociological
analysis in order to counter what he perceives as strong tendencies within
post-war French sociology to portray social life as a static and abstract
'order'. He argued that in a period of dramatic social transformation (the
1960s and 1970s), it was indefensible for sociologists to retain a structural-
functionalist model of society and systemic reproduction which rendered
human agency invisible. This rejection of the dominant forms of sociological
analysis in France led Touraine in turn to propose an alternative approach-
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'the sociology of action'-which he has developed in a series of major works
(Touraine 1973, 1978, 1988a). Running through Touraine's sociological
project is a concern to refocus attention on human agency and on the role of
social actors in producing social reality. The conception of society which is
the point of departure for his sociology reflects this clearly: 'a society is a
hierarchised set of action systems, i.e. of social relations between actors who
may have conflicting interests but who belong to the same social sphere and
therefore share certain cultural orientations' (Touraine 1978: 42, emphases in
original).2 The sociology of action, as defined by Touraine, thus places actors
at the centre of sociological analysis by emphasising that society produces
itself through conflict over cultural and social resources in concrete
situations.
The importance which Touraine attaches to social movements-and,
consequently, to the method of sociological intervention-can be viewed as a
corollary of this model of society or, to be more precise, social relations. As
has just been indicated, Touraine's sociology of action represents society as a
hierarchy of fields of social relations within which social actors are engaged
in various forms of social and cultural conflict. Touraine argues, however,
that within these 'action systems' it is social movements which are the
primary actors in the struggle for control of 'historicity', a term which he
uses to refer to the dominant cultural patterns which structure social practice
(Touraine 1978: 42, 103-134). Touraine provides a striking statement of his
general position in the opening sentence of La Voix et le Regard : 'Human
beings make their history; cultural creation and social conflicts produce
social life and at the heart of society burns the fire of social movements'
(Touraine 1978: ll).3 In other words, social movements play a crucial role in
conflicts over the organising principles of a society. The analysis of the
nature and meaning of such forms of collective action is, consequently, an
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essential component of the sociological investigation of the production of
social life.
In the light of the above argument, Touraine's decision to base his whole
sociological project over the past thirty years on research into social
movements becomes readily understandable. Social movements are
fundamental to the theoretical model of social reality centred on human
agency which he proposes as an alternative to structural-functionalism. This
recognition of the theoretical importance of social movements led Touraine
in the early 1970s to consider the nature of the research methodology which
would be required to study such phenomena empirically. He argued that
sociologists had tended to focus on revolutions when addressing the
question of agency and 'historical action', and thus to employ an historical
rather than a sociological method. Touraine proposed that sociologists were,
as a result, 'practically without a method' (Touraine 1980a: 322) when it came
to the investigation of collective agents such as social movements, which do
not necessarily imply a 'volcanic eruption' of society.
Sociological intervention was, therefore, developed by Touraine in order to
provide a research method applicable to the study of social movements
within the general theoretical framework of the sociology of action.
However, the method was also designed to play a crucial and more specific
role in relation to the analysis of contemporary social movements. This
becomes clear in the light of the two key propositions which framed much of
the empirical research conducted by Touraine in the 1970s and 1980s. The
first of these is that the dominant social movement of industrial society, the
workers' movement, has become institutionalised as a party and
incorporated within the political system (see Touraine 1984). The second is
the argument, which Touraine was one of the first sociologists to advance,
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that a profound societal change is taking place in advanced capitalist
countries equivalent to the transition to a post-industrial society (see
Touraine 1969. Cf. Bell 1973; Kumar 1986).
The issue raised by the combination of these developments, according to
Touraine, is of identifying the social movement in contemporary society
which occupies 'the central role' (Touraine 1980a: 332) played by the
workers' movement in industrial society. The method of sociological
intervention is designed to identify those actors in the emergent post-
industrial society who are engaged in conflict over general cultural
orientations and who thus belong to this new social movement. In short,
sociological intervention represents nothing less than a method of observing
the processes involved in Lire formation of the key collective actors of post-
industrial society.
Thus far, I have been concerned to situate the method of sociological
intervention in the context of Touraine's wider sociological project and
theoretical interest in social movements. In this way I have tried to avoid
presenting sociological intervention as a simple 'technique' which can be
isolated from the intellectual project in which it originated. It is now possible
to examine the various aspects of the method and the nature of the role
which it accords to the researcher. Touraine has provided a general overview
of the method in a number of places and I will refer here to the account
contained in article published in the Revue suisse de sociologie in 1980
(Touraine 1980a. Cf. Touraine 1978,1982b, 1988a).
Touraine divides a sociological intervention into six stages. First, the
researchers assemble 'intervention groups' which are composed of roughly a
dozen activists from a range of sectors of a social movement. These people
are invited to participate in the research through attending a series of
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meetings. The second stage of the intervention consists in observing these
groups, at such meetings, in confrontation with other social actors, in
particular the Others (or 'adversaries') against whom their action is directed
outside the research context. On the basis of their observation of these
meetings the researchers formulate an interpretation of the issues at stake in
the conflict and present the group members with a view of 'the most
profound meaning ([le]sens leplusprofond)' of their action (Touraine 1980a:
326). In the fourth stage of the intervention the group members discuss the
previous meetings as part of a process of 'self-analysis'. The aim of this is for
the groups to reflect on their practice and to produce general interpretations
of their activity, referred to by Touraine as 'an ideological analysis' (1980a:
327).
The fifth stage is of crucial importance and brings into sharp focus the key
role accorded to the researcher in the intervention. Touraine describes this
phase of the research as the group's 'conversion' from a self-analysis in terms
of its practice to one in terms of the social movement which may be implicit
in its modes of action. The researcher acts as a catalyst in this progression by
presenting the group with an image of the social movement which it may
represent and in relation to which its action derives 'its highest meaning (son
sens leplus eleve)' (1980a: 327), that is, as conflict over fundamental cultural
orientations. If the participants reject the researcher's hypothesis outright or
fail to use it to clarify their interpretation of their practice they have,
according to Touraine, shown it to be invalid. If, on the other hand, the
actors use the researcher's hypothesis to further their self-understanding
then it has been validated for that group. The final stage of the intervention,
which Touraine describes as 'permanent sociology', consists of the testing of
hypotheses derived from one group of a social movement by comparing
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them with other groups from the same and differing movements (see
Touraine 1980a: 327).
This overview highlights the extent to which the method requires the
researcher to intervene actively at various stages of the research process. As
Touraine himself states, the 'most important1 problem associated with the
sociological intervention method is that of satisfactorily defining the role of
the researcher (Touraine 1980a: 329). He acknowledges that in such research
there is a danger of over-identification on the part of the researcher with the
group she is investigating. The success of the intervention, however,
depends on the researcher participating alongside the activists in the
'intervention groups' while also retaining the critical distance required for
the formulation of interpretive hypotheses at the 'conversion' stage of the
research. The researcher is, therefore, called upon to play a twofold role in
the intervention process. On the one hand, she must facilitate the analysis
which the group undertakes of its own activity at stage four of the
intervention ('self-analysis'), interacting closely with actors. On the other, she
must present the movement with hypotheses concerning the meaning of its
action at stage five ('conversion'), and this necessitates a degree of
detachment from the preoccupations and aims of the actors themselves. In
order to prevent any confusion between these two roles during the research
process, Touraine proceeds to divide them between separate researchers,
whom he refers to as 'interpreter' and 'analyst' respectively (see Touraine
1980a: 329).
Touraine and his team of researchers initially conducted sociological
interventions in research on the 1976 student strike in France, the anti-
nuclear movement, the regionalist movement, trade-unionism and the
women's movement. This series of studies comprised the 'first phase'
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(Touraine 1980a: 331) in the development of sociological intervention. Since
then, the method's field of application has been extended to encompass
various other groups and movements (see, for example, the work of Francois
Dubet on 'marginalised' young people [Dubet 1987]). Although sociological
intervention has not to date been used to investigate anti-racism, Michel
Wieviorka has recently adopted it as a method in order to examine 'the
discourse of popular racism' (see Wieviorka 1992).
The preceding account of sociological intervention has attempted to re-
situate the method in the wider context of Touraine's sociological project,
providing an overview of its main characteristics, as well indicating the
range of empirical phenomena to which it has been applied. In the second
part of this section I turn to consider the strengths and weaknesses of
sociological intervention as a research method for the investigation of social
movements and collective action.
A Critique of the Method
As I have already mentioned, there has been a tendency in the social science
literature for discussions of Touraine's sociology to focus almost exclusively
on his theoretical output and to marginalise (or even ignore) his contribution
to the development of innovative research methods. While the strengths and
weaknesses of Touraine's sociology of action and theory of social movements
have been extensively debated (see, for example, Arnason 1986; Neveu 1996),
few commentators have attempted a systematic evaluation of his method.4
The aim of the following discussion is to redress the balance slightly by
reviewing the main objections which have been levelled against sociological
intervention since the late 1970s.
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In analysing the shortcomings of sociological intervention as a method,
however, we should not lose sight of its importance and originality within
the field of social movements research. As Melucci has stated, there are
aspects of the method which have 'enormous value1 (Melucci 1989: 237). In
the first place, sociological intervention remains the only method 'designed
specifically for examining social movements' and, as such, has influenced
even those (including Melucci) who have voiced reservations about its
validity. Secondly, as the research method corresponding to the sociology of
action, sociological intervention draws attention to social movements as
'systems of relations' (Melucci 1989: 237) between actors. More specifically,
the method highlights the extent to which movement identities are formed
and collective actions initiated in the context of ongoing social relationships
and interaction. Thirdly, the method of sociological intervention has the
undoubted merit of focusing attention on the actor-researcher relationship
and the specific role of the researcher in the study of collective action. To his
credit, Touraine has devised a method which aims to distinguish clearly the
position and role of the researcher/sociologist from that of the
actors/activists (see Melucci 1989: 237).
For these reasons, sociological intervention is an important addition to the
pool of research methods available for the study of contemporary forms of
collective action. Nevertheless, there are aspects of the method which have
been heavily criticised by other researchers in the field as well as by
movement activists themselves. In particular, critics of sociological
intervention have tended to concentrate their attention on the following
three areas: (1) the researcher's interventionist role; (2) the dynamics and
composition of the intervention groups; (3) the forms of collective action
investigated by the method. Each of these will now be discussed in turn.
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The key role played by the researcher in a sociological intervention has
undoubtedly proved to be the most controversial aspect of the method. The
main focus of concern has been the researcher's active part in presenting
actors with an interpretation of the meaning of their action at the
'conversion' stage. Pace Touraine, a number of other sociologists have
suggested that this kind of direct intervention in the research process may
not in fact be an effective means of revealing the presence (or absence) of a
social movement in a given field. Michel Amiot (1980), for example, has
argued that the researcher's intervention will inevitably produce reactivity
effects and that these could ultimately invalidate the research findings. If
actors accept the researcher's interpretation of their action, he contends, this
may not reflect an underlying social process occurring in the group (i.e. the
formation of a collective actor), as Touraine holds, but simply represent an
attempt to conform to the perceived expectations of the researcher. Amiot
concludes that in the absence of any explicit mechanism to control for such a
possibility the conclusions of a sociological intervention will continue to
have 'an ambiguous status' (1980: 422. Cf. Touraine 1980b).
In a similar way, the problem of reactivity has been underlined by Melucci
(1989) in his critique of sociological intervention. As I have already
explained, in Touraine's method the researcher seeks to establish the
existence (or not) of a social movement by presenting actors with a
hypothesis about their action's 'highest' meaning. In Melucci's view, the
weakness of this procedure is that it introduces a 'stimulus'-the researcher's
interpretation of the meaning of the movement-which cannot subsequently
be distinguished from its 'effects':
The terms of the experiment are turned on their heads-the stimulus
becomes simultaneously both cause and effect. The observed behaviour
and the interpretation of the meanings of the movement cannot be
interpreted properly as products of group action. At best they may be
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seen as the result of the interaction with the researcher's interpretative
hypothesis. (Melucci 1989: 252)
In other words, the product of the intervention (the 'conversion') may not
necessarily correspond to the actual meaning of the group's action but may
instead reflect the content introduced by the researcher in her hypothesis.
Again, the issue is the apparent inability of sociological intervention to
control its own effects. According to Melucci, this lack of 'methodological
rigour1 leaves Touraine open to the charge of 'confusing research with
political agitation'. He asserts that the researcher's 'missionary-teacher role'
constantly threatens to undermine the method's capacity to reveal the
underlying meaning of the action investigated (Melucci 1989: 239. Cf.
Gosselin 1982:178-9).
Criticism of the interventionist nature of Touraine's method has, however,
emanated not only from other sociologists, such as Amiot and Melucci, but
also from movement activists themselves. At a conference on social
movements which Touraine organised in 1979, for example, activists
repeatedly questioned both the legitimacy of sociological intervention and its
potential to increase their capacity for action. As one participant explained,
women involved in the feminist movement would have difficulty in
accepting that Touraine, a man, perform the task of identifying the
underlying meaning of their struggle (Jeanne Fagnani, in Touraine 1982a:
39). This point was further developed by a representative of the occitan
regionalist movement who stated that:
Women are uncomfortable with the fact that Alain Touraine is a man;
we are just as uncomfortable with the fact that he is a Parisian. [...]
What gives someone the right to intervene in a debate, as an outsider,
in order to 'give you a helping hand' and increase your capacity for
action? (Yves Rouquette, quoted in Touraine 1982a: 39)5
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As the above comments make clear, a key question for activists has been the
extent to which it is legitimate for an outside researcher like Touraine-who,
in other circumstances, might even be regarded as a political opponent-to
'intervene' in their movements. Although Touraine has dismissed such
arguments, somewhat disingenuously perhaps, as merely a gate-keeping
strategy on the part of 'organic intellectuals' (Touraine 1982a: 40), I believe
that important issues are being raised here which researchers need to
address. In particular, I would suggest that both Fagnani and Rouquette
highlight the way in which a researcher's power, status and identity (real or
perceived) can affect their relationships with actors and, consequently,
influence the outcome of the research process as a whole.
A further illustration of this last point is provided by Touraine's attempted
sociological intervention in the French student movement of the 1970s. In a
striking contribution to the 1979 conference mentioned above, a former
activist, Didier Lapeyronnie6 analyses the reasons why many in the student
movement rejected Touraine's research and its conclusions. As Lapeyronnie
explains, the intervention was carried out in 1976 against the background of
an ongoing conflict between students and teaching staff over the control and
transmission of knowledge. The students consequently viewed Touraine and
his colleagues with some suspicion, regarding them as belonging to the
group of 'mandarins' whose very power and authority was being contested.
According to Lapeyronnie, the students' repudiation of Touraine's
intervention thus partly reflected one of the movement's aims: the refusal of
a 'situation of dependency' with respect to those in the possession of
knowledge. In more general terms, student activists looked upon the
researchers' interpretation of their action as a political intervention, by an
interested party, in an ongoing conflict. As Lapeyronnie concludes, this
perception of Touraine's team as political adversaries effectively rendered
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any 'conversion' to the researchers' hypothesis on the part of the students
impossible (Lapeyronnie 1982: 27) 7
A first set of criticisms of Touraine's method of sociological intervention has
focused, therefore, on the researcher's role of presenting actors with an
interpretation of their action's 'highest' meaning. For sociologists such as
Amiot and Melucci, this procedure is problematic because it risks producing
reactivity effects which could undermine the validity of the research
findings. Movement activists, for their part, have drawn attention to the
more general issue of power in researcher-actor relationships and have
questioned the legitimacy of the researcher's intervention in their struggles.
The underlying problem identified here by both groups of critics is
Touraine's failure to reflect fully on the nature and implications of the
relationship between researcher(s) and movement actors.
A second series of objections to Touraine's method has centred on the
dynamics and composition of the 'intervention groups' which are formed at
the start of the research process. As I have already indicated, the members of
these groups are drawn from the different organisations and sectors of the
movement to be investigated. Under Touraine's direction, and with the
assistance of his research team, the groups participate in a series of meetings
(including some with their adversaries) and undertake an intensive analysis
of their own action. According to Touraine, the use of such groups and the
'quasi-experimental' nature of sociological intervention more generally are
necessary in order to reveal a particular action's 'highest' meaning, i.e. the
extent to which it reflects a struggle for the control of historicity and the
underlying existence of a social movement (see Touraine 1980a: 325).
The method's reliance on purpose-built research groups has, however, been
criticised on a number of grounds. Melucci, for example, has argued that
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artificially bringing together activists from different sectors of a social
movement for lengthy periods of interaction is likely to produce a set of
inter-personal dynamics rooted in the specific conditions of the research
situation itself rather than reflecting patterns of behaviour occurring in
'natural' groups. In particular, he suggests that the formation of ad hoc
intervention groups (whose members may not even know each other
beforehand) may result in the emergence of collective identities based more
on the 'affective relations' operating within these groups than on wider social
processes (1989: 243).
Similarly, Melucci highlights the artificial nature of the confrontations
between movement actors and their 'interlocutors' which form part of the
second stage of a sociological intervention. Such encounters are designed to
re-create, in an experimental setting, the network of social relationships
linking movement actors not only to allies and supporters but also to
adversaries (see Touraine 1980a: 326). This is consistent with Touraine's
emphasis on action systems but ignores the fact that it is relatively rare for
political opponents in contemporary Western democracies (as elsewhere) to
meet each other 'face to face'. Rather, their relationships are mediated in a
variety of different ways-by institutions, and broadcast and other media. By
instigating direct contacts between these parties and thereby potentially
creating a range of affective reactions, sociological intervention again runs
the risk of a 'distortion' of the very processes it seeks to investigate (Melucci
1989: 255).8
These problems are compounded by the highly selective composition of the
intervention groups. By assembling groups composed entirely of 'activists
(militants)', Touraine fails fully to take into account the plural nature of
social movement membership. Although he insists that the intervention
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groups should be characterised by 'the greatest possible diversity (la plus
grande diversity, this is intended only in the sense of ensuring that all
sectors and organisations within a social movement are adequately
represented. Touraine makes it clear that the groups are to be 'formed of
actors or more strictly of activistsf, a procedure which focuses attention
narrowly on the movement's most active participants (1980a: 326, my
emphases).9
Melucci's argument (1989: 17-37) that collective action is a social
construction, however, highlights the fact that social movements contain a
range of actors, with varying levels of commitment, experience and
orientations to action. Investigation of the 'unity' or identity of a social
movement must, therefore, recognise the heterogeneous combination of
elements (including the actual members) of which it is composed. Touraine's
decision to concentrate on the single category of activists masks this
diversity and perhaps reflects the tendency among social scientists more
generally to treat social movements as relatively homogeneous entities or
unified subjects (see Melucci 1989: 202). One of the obvious dangers of such
an approach is the implicit assumption that it is possible to generalise from
the characteristics of core activists to those of social movement members as a
whole. This has been a problem with much of the social movements
literature in the past (Jordan and Maloney 1997: 49), and is an issue which
Touraine has not addressed satisfactorily in his contributions to the
debates.10
While most of the objections to sociological intervention have centred on the
role played by the researcher and the dynamics and composition of the
intervention groups, other features of the method have also been questioned.
As Melucci again has highlighted, these include a failure to examine the
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importance of non-verbal aspects of communication and the form as well as
the content of collective action. The method concentrates on the 'verbal
output' of the groups involved in the research, without considering how this
might be affected by modes of interaction and non-linguistic cues (Melucci
1989: 238). Taken together with the main criticisms discussed above, this
final point must raise serious doubts about the extent to which sociological
intervention is able to generate insights into the complex process of
collective identity construction.
Toward an Ethnographic Approach to Social Movements
An important task for current researchers is to identify ways of studying
social movements and other forms of collective action which avoid the
problems associated with Touraine's interventionist method.11 In this section,
I discuss the strengths and the weaknesses of the ethnographic approach
which I adopted in my own research on SOS-Racisme. I argue that fieldwork,
involving long-term participant observation, semi-structured interviewing
and archival work, enabled me to investigate processes of collective identity
construction at local and national levels of the association more effectively
than if I had attempted a sociological intervention (see Appendix 1 for a 'list
of archives and dossiers consulted' and Appendix 2 for a 'list of individuals
and organisations interviewed'). In so doing, I use the terms 'ethnography'
and 'fieldwork' interchangeably to refer to research conducted though
participant observation in combination with other methods such as
interviewing and textual analysis (Briand and Chapoulie 1991: 450).
Ethnography is not, in other words, reducible to participant observation
alone (see Fortier 1998: 48; Back 1996: 22). This is a crucial point to clarify at
the outset, for my argument will be that there are certain limitations to the
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use of participant observation to study social movements which only a more
general ethnographic approach including other methods can overcome.
Challenging Touraine's Rejection ofObservationalMethods
A central argument of this thesis is that participant observation is one of the
most appropriate methods for examining the processual and constructionist
nature of collective action. This is in direct contrast to Touraine, who rejects
observational techniques outright as a valid source of insight into the
formation of a collective actor. It is interesting to examine Touraine's reasons
for doing so, as they reflect the lack of importance traditionally attached to
observation in French sociology more widely (see Briand and Chapoulie
1991). As I explained earlier, Touraine's sociology of action starts from the
proposition that society is a hierarchy of fields of social relations within
which actors are involved in various forms of conflict over key resources.
Touraine maintains, however, that neither these social relations nor the
fundamental cultural stakes over which actors are competing can be
observed directly; they are instead hidden or concealed behind another
'level' of social reality (1980a: 325).
According to Touraine, a distinction can be drawn between, on the one hand,
behaviour which responds or adapts to a given situation (conduites de
reponse) and, on the other, behaviour which seeks to question or transform
the nature of that situation (conduites de mise en question). These can be
related in turn to representations of society as, in the first case, a stable and
coherent 'social order1 and, in the second, a product of social conflict over the
definition of fundamental cultural orientations with actors as producers of
their own history. For Touraine, the purpose of a sociological intervention is
to reveal the existence of the second, 'deeper' level of action (reality) which is
normally buried under 'the weight of everyday situations (le poids des
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situations quotidiennes)' and the adaptive responses the latter typically call
forth. He argues that it is the sociologist's role to 'pull (tirer)' members of the
intervention groups towards an understanding of their own action in these
terms, and to 'shatter the illusion (briser 1'illusiony that society is an
established order and not constantly produced and reproduced through
conflictual social relations (1980a: 325; 1978:183-6; 1982c: 20-1).
It is this crucial distinction between two levels (or representations) of social
reality which leads Touraine to reject observation as a research method in
favour of sociological intervention. He claims that what is accessible to
observation is only the level of pragmatic action and 'ideological
declarations' (1982c: 20). This conceals a more profound level of social
relations, cultural conflicts and 'historic' action which is not directly
observable but instead requires the active intervention of the sociologist to
bring it to light. Touraine argues, therefore, that 'it is necessary to go further
than observation (ii faut aller plus loin que J'observation)' (1980a: 325) in
order to investigate sociologically the 'highest' or 'deepest' meaning of any
particular example of collective action.
In my view, this relegation of observational techniques to the margins of
Touraine's sociology is indicative of a wider trend in French sociology since
its establishment as a separate university discipline in the early 1960s. At the
time when Touraine was beginning his career, in the late 1950s and early
1960s, the emergent discipline in France was strongly influenced by the type
of sociology developed at Columbia University in the United States which
typically confined observation to the preparatory stages of a research project.
As Briand and Chapoulie have shown, this resulted in a marked tendency
among French sociologists, from the 1960s until relatively recently, to
assume that 'observation [could] only picture obvious or trivial aspects of
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social reality rather than bring significant contributions to theoretical
analyses' (1991: 456). Touraine's rejection of observational research on social
movements is clearly motivated by precisely this assumption.
But is Touraine correct effectively to dismiss observation in natural settings
as a useful method in research on social movements? I would argue that his
argument is open to at least three main objections. Firstly, he implies that
actors are, in normal circumstances (i.e. when they are not participating in a
sociological intervention), operating with a type of false consciousness which
prevents them from appreciating the 'real' meaning of their action. It is only
through the intervention of the sociologist, Touraine insists, that actors can
move or 'rise (s'elever)' (1980a: 325) from this level of reality (the dominant
ideology) to an understanding of the transformative potential of human
action and the conflictual nature of social relations (the sociology of action).
In this regard, he explicitly compares sociological intervention to the process
of psychoanalysis in which the analyst assists the patient in exploring their
unconscious. Somewhat ironically perhaps, given the sociology of action's
emphasis on the importance of agency, the passage from 'false' to 'true'
consciousness is presented here as the result of an intervention by the
sociologist (albeit with the involvement of actors): it cannot occur
'spontaneously', i.e. independently and in the context of actors' collective
struggles (1980a: 325).
What these comments serve to highlight is the extent to which Touraine's
rejection of observational techniques is based on an assumption that the
observable conduct and ordinary statements of collective actors provide little
insight into the 'real' meaning of their action and are therefore not worthy of
sociological investigation. I would argue, however, that such a position
significantly under-estimates the capacity of social movement activists
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themselves to analyse and reflect upon the nature of the struggles in which
they are involved. As I showed in Chapter 2, the members of SOS-Racisme
among whom I conducted my research situated their action in relation to
wider projects of social transformation which they were able clearly to
articulate. These played a key role in framing and orienting individuals'
participation in collective action and cannot simply be dismissed as, in
Touraine's phrase, 'ideological declarations'.
Secondly, Touraine mistakenly assumes that an observational method is
incapable of producing an analysis of action which transcends the often
contextual and partial character of actors' own accounts. As I have already
noted, he emphasises the need to 'go further' than observation and actors'
views of themselves as responding to an 'established order', and presents
sociological intervention as the way to achieve this. In so doing, he reduces
observational research to a simple description of observed action and an
acceptance at face value of actors' interpretations of its meaning. The
potential contribution of observation is, however, much greater than
Touraine appears willing to acknowledge. For example, anthropological
fieldwork-which is, admittedly, based on participant observation-involves
'constructing the world of others in ways which go beyond or indeed belie
the subjects' statements about their world [and] is a total bodily experience,
not one merely dependent on verbal accounts' (Okely 1994: 61). Touraine's
wholesale rejection of 'observation' (treated as a homogeneous set of
methods) prevents him from appreciating the role which participant
observation, thus conceived, could play in social movements research.
Thirdly, Touraine's failure even to consider the possibility of using an
observational method to study the formation of collective actors sits uneasily
with some of his more general methodological comments. In particular, an a
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priori dismissal of observation appears inconsistent with statements such as
the following: 'Sociologists must study collective behaviour as directly as
possible [and] in the most varied situations' (Touraine 1978: 190, my
emphases).12 This implies a commitment not only to examining the full range
of forms in which collective action is expressed but surely also to observing
such action in the context of its occurrence, at least in part. Sociological
intervention, however, assumes that collective action has a 'highest meaning'
which it is necessary to uncover by stripping away and effectively
disregarding the 'lower' level of pragmatic elements which are the most
visible in everyday life. The result is an extremely narrow focus on one
particular kind of conduct, defined as 'historic', and a lack of attention to the
relationship between pragmatic and potentially transformatory (or, in terms
which Touraine does not use, 'reformist' and 'revolutionary') dimensions of
concrete social movement action. The complex and multifaceted nature of
much observable collective action is, in short, abandoned as a topic for
sociological analysis.
The Importance ofParticipant Observation
The three points which I have just considered highlight the need for a more
careful discussion of the place of observation-and particularly participant
observation-in social movements research than is to be found in Touraine's
work. One issue which immediately arises is the extent to which an approach
based on participant observation avoids the problems associated with
sociological intervention outlined in the last section. As I noted there, a first
set of criticisms has focused on the interventionist nature of Touraine's
method, with academic commentators pointing to the danger of 'reactivity
effects' and activists questioning the legitimacy of the sociologist's
intervention in their movements. Now there is no doubt that research
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involving participant observation also constitutes an 'intervention' of sorts in
people's everyday lives (Burawoy 1991b: 295). Although most
anthropologists have usually followed Malinowski in regarding this
primarily as a way of grasping 'the native's point of view' (Malinowski 1922:
25) rather than, as in the case of sociological intervention for Touraine, a
means of increasing a group's 'capacity for action', it is undeniable that by
their very presence the participant observer does affect the 'reality' which
they are attempting to investigate. However, instead of constituting a source
of 'bias' which must be 'neutralised' (in the terms of positivist social science),
the researcher's participation and interaction with subjects is essential to the
process of knowledge production. It is precisely through 'dialogue' and a
sharing of experience that the researcher comes to understand the daily lives
of the people with whom they are working (Burawoy 1991a).
Nevertheless, the 'interventionist' nature of participant observation as a
method does mean that its use in social movements research raises issues
similar to those identified by critics of sociological intervention. On the one
hand, participant observers in general also confront the problem of
'reactivity' in the sense that subjects' perceptions of the researcher's identity
and aims can play an important role 'in constraining or creating the
possibility of effective access to particular situations or groups' (Jenkins 1984:
152). Moreover, subjects' views of the participant observer and the research
situation can have significant implications for the way they present
themselves to and interact with the researcher (see Mauger 1991; Okely and
Callaway 1992). In the case of my own research on SOS-Racisme, it was a
(well-founded) perception of my lack of fluency in the French language
which most obviously determined both my initial reception by members of
the local committee I joined and the subsequent role I was invited to play
within it (see Chapter 2).
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On the other hand, research based on participant observation rather than
sociological intervention is still likely to encounter the opposition of social
movement actors. In particular, the latter may question the reasons for the
participant observer's presence, and compare it to espionage and infiltration
by the police and other state agencies (cf. Delamont 1995: 10-11).13 My
research on SOS-Racisme was criticised in precisely these terms by one
activist in the local committee of which I was a member. It was the only time
that a member of the association challenged the legitimacy of my research in
a situation where I was present. The circumstances were the following:
One evening near the end of my fieldwork I interviewed 'Didier' in a
bar close to where we both lived in Paris. The interview had gone
well, I believed. The next day I met him by chance in the street and we
went for a coffee together in a nearby cafe. As we sat down, he started
to ask me again about the purpose of my research. I repeated some of
what I had explained during earlier conversations as well as
immediately prior to conducting the interview the previous evening.
We then talked about another student (known to both of us
personally) who was working on a thesis about an immigrant
association based in Paris. At this point Didier commented that he
wondered whether the kind of research the other student and myself
were conducting did not in fact enable the 'powers that be (les
pouvoirs en place)* to de-stabilise oppositional movements by
revealing points of internal fracture or tension. He claimed that we
drew attention to divisions within such movements and that the
authorities could subsequently play on these in order to undermine
the development of united opposition to their policies. With a wry
smile, he added finally that in order to prevent this happening he had
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'falsified everything (tout fausse)' during the interview the previous
evening.14
A possible response to this would be that state agencies collect their own
information on social movement and other political organisations and do not
depend on social researchers to perform this function for them. SOS-Racisme
received ministerial confirmation in 1990, for example, that its Parisian
headquarters had been burgled several years earlier by the RG
(Renseignements Generaux, the French equivalent of Special Branch) and
two plastic bags filled with documents removed (L'Humanite; 26 October
1990). Moreover, I talked to other members of SOS-Racisme who thought it
highly probable that members of the RG had infiltrated the association in the
past, and the latter were certainly present during public demonstrations
which it organised during my fieldwork. At least one activist, a prominent
member of the Revolutionary Communist League, also had his phoned
tapped, first by the Chirac government in 1986 and then again in 1988 when
the Socialists were re-elected (Filoche 1998: 284-6).
Nevertheless, Didier's comments do raise important questions about the
politics of social scientific research on social movements, a subject which is
rarely addressed in the literature (an exception is Eyerman and Jamison
1991: 2. Cf. Fuchs and Plass 1999). One way of answering his concerns would
be to point out that social scientific analysis of a movement's internal
divisions is potentially as useful to movement activists as it is to their
political opponents. However, this is only likely to be the case if a theoretical
emphasis on the heterogeneous and pluralistic nature of social movements-
their fragmentation, in other words-is accompanied by an equal concern
with the process of collective identity formation-the search for unity and
consensus which is so important for activists (see Epstein 1990: 46-52). In the
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chapters which follow, I attempt to produce an analysis which could be for
as well as about activists in SOS-Racisme by focusing on this relationship
between unity and diversity.
In addition to these political issues, however, the conversation with Didier
summarised above draws attention to a key methodological point. His
admission that he had deliberately given false or at least misleading answers
to my interview questions highlights the importance of a triangulation of
techniques in social research and the danger of relying on a single method
such as interviewing or indeed participant observation. One of the
advantages of the pluri-method ethnographic approach used in this study of
SOS-Racisme was precisely that I could assess the reliability of the
information which Didier provided during the interview by cross-checking it
with archival sources and material gathered through participant observation.
This kind of triangulation is an essential part of the validation process in
qualitative research (see Mucchielli 1991:113-4; Hannerz 1980: 310).
Participant observation is, therefore, as likely as sociological intervention to
give rise to problems of 'reactivity' and legitimacy.15 In other respects,
however, I would argue that it has a number of distinct advantages over
Touraine's method as far as the investigation of social movements is
concerned. As I noted in the last section, sociological intervention's reliance
on purpose-built research groups to recreate the processes involved in the
formation of a collective actor in a 'quasi-experimental' setting has numerous
drawbacks. In contrast, the great strength of participant observation, as
Melucci has recognised, is that it allows pre-existing groups of movement
actors to be studied in their 'natural environment' (1989: 247). The method
permits, in other words, an observation of collective action in the actual
context of its occurrence, rather than under artificial or 'laboratory'
141
conditions, as is the case with sociological intervention. This has several
advantages, which can be illustrated using examples from my own
fieldwork.
Firstly, participant observation as a member of a local committee of SOS-
Racisme enabled me to trace the networks of social relationships which
linked members of the association not only with each other but also with
actors in the wider anti-racist movement and beyond.16 Most importantly, I
was in a position to note relationships and observe interaction between
members of SOS-Racisme in a range of different contexts: the association's
Parisian headquarters, local committee and National Council meetings, a
'summer school (universite d'ete)' which it organised, demonstrations,
concerts, public debates as well as more informal or social settings. In a
similar way, I was able to gain an insight into the networks which connected
activists from different anti-racist organisations and other groups. This was
possible through attending the co-ordination meetings which were held to
plan demonstrations and other 'unitary (unitaires)' initiatives and by
personally participating in such events themselves.
A second advantage of participant observation is that it allows exchanges
between movement actors and their various 'interlocutors' to be observed
directly, thereby avoiding the need for the staged confrontations which are
such a problematic feature of sociological intervention. In my research on
SOS-Racisme I was thus able to witness the reaction and hear the comments
of members of the public as I distributed the association's leaflets at metro
stations with members of the local committee or other activists, or as I took
part in a public meeting organised by the local committee. At the national
level, face to face exchanges between the association's spokespeople,
politicians and representatives of other organisations could be observed at
142
debates or meetings and more mediated forms studied through newspaper
articles and television broadcasts (see Chapter 9). In situations where I was
perceived as one of SOS-Racisme's activists (rather than a researcher), such
as a visit to an immigrant workers' hostel to publicise a local committee
initiative or a distribution of leaflets at the traditional May-day rally, I also
was able to register the hostility felt by certain 'interlocutors' towards the
association by becoming the object of it myself.17
Thirdly, participant observation in 'natural' groups provides a way of
exploring the different levels of commitment, experience and orientations to
action which are present among actors in a social movements and their
constituent organisations (cf. Melucci 1989: 242). A weakness of sociological
intervention is its failure to recognise this diversity: the ad hoc 'intervention
groups' which Touraine forms for his research are composed entirely of
activists. In contrast, participant observation in one of SOS-Racisme's local
committees over an eighteen-month period allowed me to observe
interaction between committed activists, on the one hand, and members
whose involvement was more intermittent, on the other, as well as their joint
attempts to recruit and retain new members. It also provided me with
valuable insights into the ways in which disagreements about strategy or the
association's position on particular issues influenced the committee's action
and the involvement of specific individuals over time.
Finally, unlike sociological intervention, which focuses exclusively on the
movement actors' verbal utterances, participant observation enables the
researcher to study 'behaviour which people do not readily verbalise about'
(Hannerz 1980: 309) as well as the relationship between verbal and non¬
verbal aspects of communication. Facial expressions and gestures acted as an
important commentary on the verbal exchanges which took place at local
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committee and National Council meetings which I attended in the course of
my fieldwork on SOS-Racisme, as did seating arrangements and the use of
space more generally. At other times, it was the absence of spoken utterances
which was significant: for example, silence after a particular intervention in a
debate was often an indication that the speaker's view was not shared by
those present. Only long-term participant observation provides the type of
'grounded knowledge' (Okely 1994: 62) which is required in order first to
contextualise and then to interpret such phenomena satisfactorily.
Over the last fifteen years, the limitations of 'experimental' approaches and
the importance of participant observation in 'natural' settings have
increasingly come to be appreciated by scholars within the field of social
movements research. One of the first was Melucci, who wrote in the late
1980s that 'the organisational characteristics of the natural group [could not]
emerge satisfactorily in an experimental situation', and that 'laboratory work'
with such groups should, as a result, to be 'supplemented' with direct
observation of actual meetings and public mobilisations (Melucci 1989: 247).
Other scholars, however, have gone much further than Melucci and
suggested that participant observation cannot be confined to an ancillary
role in social movements research in the way he implies. Indeed Paul
Lichterman has even argued, in his study of US environmental activists, that:
participant-observation is the only method for deriving some kinds of
'social facts'. Practices of commitment and everyday enactments of
social identity are just such social facts. Social and political identities
are not simply given; people must construct themselves as political
actors-in interaction with others-to organise social movements. Only
through participant-observation can we find out how people
construct these identities in everyday milieux and create bonds of
political community. (Lichterman 1996: 240)
In Lichterman's view, then, the ways in which members of social movements
construct identities in the course of their daily lives through interaction with
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other people can only be studied through participant observation. Although
interviews can provide an insight into how people think about political
solidarity and the types of idiom they use to interpret their own conduct, he
insists that 'we need to understand speech in the context of everyday action
and interaction if we want to see how commitments translate into group
solidarities' (1996: 240). Participant observation is thus required in order to
contextualise people's use of language and to investigate how it both
sustains and is produced by collective action.
Given the advantages of participant observation discussed earlier and those
which Lichterman identifies here, I would argue (contra Touraine and
Melucci) that it is in fact the most appropriate single method for studying
processes of identity construction in social movements and their constituent
organisations. Compared to the more 'experimental' methods devised by
both Touraine and Melucci, in particular, it has the enormous advantage of
enabling the researcher to examine such processes in their 'natural' settings.
As the chapters in Part III of the present thesis will demonstrate, this
includes the possibility of exploring the crucial interplay between, in
Melucci's terms, the 'latent' and 'visible' phases of social movement activity.
Problems and Limitations
An assessment of the potential contribution of participant observation to
social movements research would not be complete, however, without a
discussion of problems associated with the method which would be likely to
limit its usefulness in the study of such phenomena. In my view, there are in
fact three main issues which need to be addressed, and I propose to clarify
them by again using examples from my own Paris-based research on SOS-
Racisme. The first is the extent to which crucial decisions or processes
affecting social movements and their constituent organisations are capable of
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being directly observed. The second is the difficulty of carrying out
continuous participant observation in an urban environment, and
particularly in a 'world' (Hannerz 1993) or 'soft global' (Body-Gendrot 1996)
city such as Paris. The third is the question of the representativity and
generalisability of participant observation studies of relatively small,
localised groups. Although participant observation research on social
movements undoubtedly also raises other issues, several of which I have
discussed earlier, I would argue that the following three points highlight the
method's limitations in a particularly clear way.
Firstly, for all its advantages, participant observation depends on 'a certain
openness, or public accessibility' (Grillo 1985: 16) of the phenomena being
investigated. In a complex network of organisations, institutions and
individuals such as the modern state (or a social movement, for that matter),
decision-making and other key processes may be hidden from the view of a
participant observer, as a researcher's access to important meetings or
influential people is usually severely restricted, if it exists at all. As Jenkins
has stated:
The higher one researches within the organisational hierarchies of the
modern state or industry, the less likely it is that one will be allowed
to do participant observation; even more rarely are enough decisions
made in public to allow for the construction of an adequate account of
what is going on through observation alone. (Jenkins 1984:160)
The implication which Jenkins draws from this is that although participant
observation may be 'necessary', it is not 'sufficient' in studies of complex
organisations in modern, urban societies (1984:162). The opacity of decision¬
making processes, in particular, means that data which is acquired through
participant observation must often be supplemented with information from
other sources collected using non-observational methods. In order to
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reconstruct the order of events described in Chapter 8, for example, I had to
rely on newspaper reports and interview material as well as participant
observation. The meetings between the president of SOS-Racisme and a
prominent politician which triggered these events occurred in private and
only became known to grassroots members of the association several weeks
later, in many cases through the national press. Participant observation in a
local committee enabled me to study the reaction of its members as the news
came out, but I did not have access to the actual meetings between the
association's president and the politician, Bernard Tapie. Only subsequent
conversations and interviews with activists and a review of press reports
allowed me to piece together a fuller account of the whole affair, although
even then certain elements remained unclear.
The importance of the telephone as a means of communication in modern,
urban societies further reduces the extent to which the transmission of
information is open to direct observation on the part of the researcher. As
Gutwirth has noted, it is often the telephone, rather than the cafe or the
public square, which plays the key role in the maintenance of social
networks in the United States and Europe (1982: 14). Indeed, Delaporte
(1986) found in his study of Parisian entomologists and their associations
that it was primarily through telephone conversations that information was
exchanged. He explains (1986: 166n8) that it was in fact the number of
telephone calls which he received at his home which enabled him to
'quantify' his gradual integration into their network, a process which took
three years and required the capture of some important insects!
Members of the local committee of SOS-Racisme which I joined also
telephoned each other regularly in the days and weeks between meetings to
pass on information about demonstrations and other events organised by the
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association at a national level as well as about the activities of the committee
itself. In a similar way, National Bureau members telephoned members of
the association's local committees throughout France in order to invite them
to National Council meetings or to keep them informed about developments
more generally (although the [in-]frequency with which this occurred was a
point of contention between provincial activists and the Parisian leadership
during my fieldwork). It took me at least six months to become integrated
into these local and national telephone networks, after which time members
of the local committee would contact me both to provide and to request
information about current events and I would receive calls from the Parisian
headquarters about national initiatives. This highlights the importance of
direct participation and personal involvement rather than simple
observation for the study of movement networks.
A second general problem is that continuous or 'around-the-clock' (Hannerz
1980: 310) participant observation-traditionally regarded as the hallmark of
anthropological fieldwork-is often impossible in the urban settings where
many social movements and SMOs, at least in Western European societies,
are active. Most of the members of SOS-Racisme's local committees in Paris,
for example, worked during the day in different companies or organisations
scattered across the city and to which I had either no or very restricted
access. This meant that opportunities for meeting them were limited to
evenings (which was when meetings were held, usually on a fortnightly
basis in the case of the committee I joined) and weekends.
Even at these times, however, what Grillo has referred to as 'the privatisation
of behaviour and relationships' (1985: 16) made it extremely difficult for me,
at least in the first six months of fieldwork, to establish and maintain more
informal contacts with committee members in the periods between meetings.
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In common with other anthropologists working in urban France, I found that
access to the private sphere of people's lives was to a large extent closed and
opportunities for direct observation were rare (see Le Wita 1982: 198;
Delaporte 1986:165). Although I regularly visited the homes of two activists
in the local committee with which I was involved, it was only in the final few
months of my fieldwork, and for the specific purpose of conducting an
interview, that I was invited into the domestic space of other members.
(Even then, most still suggested that we conduct the interview in a cafe or
during a lunch-break at their place of employment.) This was due in large
part to the fact that many lived a considerable distance away, in the 'suburbs
(banlieues)' to the east and west of the central Parisian arrondissement after
which the 'local' committee was named and where its meetings were held, or
else in very small studio flats.18
In short, I tended to meet most members only at local committee, National
Council and public meetings, distributions of leaflets and billpostings,
demonstrations, and the visits to cafes or restaurants which frequently
preceded or followed such events. Continuous participant observation was
impossible because of the 'part-time' nature of each member's involvement in
the local committee and their limited availability and accessibility at other
times. Supplementary interviews conducted in the last two months of
fieldwork were thus an important way of exploring particular key themes in
more detail: these included the person's past and present experiences of
activism, conceptions of politics, and positions in current debates on
immigration and racism.19
The final issue which I want to consider here is the representativity and
generalisability of participant observation studies of small, localised sections
of a social movement or, even more narrowly, social movement organisation.
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The present thesis involved long-term participant observation in a Paris-
based committee of SOS-Racisme which numbered, at the most, only a dozen
regular activists: to what extent was this committee representative of others
within the association, and under what conditions can the thesis's findings
be generalised to other anti-racist associations and to the movement as a
whole?
The question of representativity arises in relation to both the composition
and the activities of the local committee. In terms of its composition, the local
committee with which I was involved was representative of SOS-Racisme's
membership more widely in two key respects. Firstly, it included members
associated with all three of the main political 'tendencies' which existed
within the association nationally: the Socialist Left current of the Socialist
Party, a current of the Revolutionary Communist League, and a residual
category of people without a declared party political affiliation (see Chapter
2). Secondly, the fact that most committee members were in their late 20s and
early 30s was consistent with the results of a survey carried out by another
researcher during the period of my fieldwork which found the average age
of SOS-Racisme's members to be 32 years (see Juhem 1998).
In order to assess the extent to which the local committee's activities reflected
those of not only other Parisian but also provincial committees I adopted a
number of different procedures. Firstly, I conducted semi-structured
interviews with activists from three other Parisian committees, as well as
with members of the committee who had previously been involved either in
provincial committees or in different ones within the Paris region. Secondly,
I attended the association's National Council meetings, where delegates
reported on their committees' activities (sometimes circulating a written
summary to those present), thereby gaining an insight into differences
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between the Parisian committees and those based in other major French
cities (such as Marseilles, Toulouse and Lyon) and elsewhere. More informal
conversations with members of other committees from across France at these
meetings and at the association's residential 'summer school' in July 1994
also allowed me to place the local committee's action in a wider context (see
Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion).
The present thesis was conceived as an investigation of a specific social
movement organisation rather than as a study of the anti-racist movement as
a whole, and the research design was not intended to support
generalisations at this second level. Although I argue at several points (see,
for example, Chapters 7 and 8) that its findings have wider implications, I
remain cautious about generalising from this examination of a single
association at a particular stage in its development to a movement which is a
network of heterogeneous organisations, more informal groups and
individuals. Nevertheless, it is in fact possible, under certain circumstances,
for more general conclusions eventually to be drawn from participant
observation research of relatively small, localised groups. As the French
political anthropologist Marc Abeles has suggested:
A localised analysis constitutes the best point of departure for any
subsequent generalisation, but on two conditions: 1. that it does not
confine itself to restrictive choices of scale, [and] 2. that it does not
claim to go beyond its limits and bypass a comparative approach.
(Abeles 1993: 62. See also 1992:19.)20
In his own research, Abeles has responded to the first of these requirements
by a form of 'ethnological nomadism (nomadisme ethnologique)' (1989: 21)
which has involved a constant to-ing and fro-ing between the various levels
of the French political system (commune, canton, region and departemeni).
He argues that it is only through such 'successive decentrings
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(decentrements successes)' (1988b: 816) or changes in scale that the
interconnections between the micro- and macro-levels of power can be
understood. The need for such 'multiple scale analyses {analyses a echelles
multiples)1 using a range of methods has also been noted by other
anthropologists working in both urban and rural France (see Bromberger
1995: 290; Zonabend 1984: ix).
In a similar way, my investigation of SOS-Racisme as part of the anti-racist
movement and in relation to national political processes required a constant
shifting of scales or levels. On the one hand, an analysis of the significance of
SOS-Racisme's current position on an issue was frequently impossible
without an examination of previous debates within the association and its
development in the intervening period (see, for example, Chapter 10). On the
other, limiting the study to the micro-level of the local committee would, in
Bromberger's words, have been equivalent to 'a confinement which
engenders short-sightedness (une claustration qui engendre la myopiey
(1997: 304). Instead, it was necessary to move back and forth between this
level, the Parisian committees more generally, and finally the association as a
whole viewed in a wider political context. This required a combination of
participant observation at different levels of the association, interviewing
and archival work.
However, if the analysis of SOS-Racisme presented in this thesis is not
limited to the micro-level, it only partially fulfils Abeles' second condition of
generalisability, which is the inclusion of a comparative dimension.
Conceived primarily as a detailed study of one of the most prominent anti-
racist organisations in contemporary France, the research was in fact never
intended to provide this wider perspective itself (although that does not, of
course, preclude its eventual use as one element of a more general
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comparison at some later stage). Nevertheless, the research design did
attempt to include a degree of comparison with other anti-racist
organisations. Participant observation was also carried out over a period of
fifteen months as a member of a local committee of the MRAP (Mouvement
contre le racisme et pour l'amitie entre les peuples [Movement Against
Racism and for Friendship between Peoples]) which is currently one of the
other main anti-racist associations in France (see House 1997 and Lloyd
1998). In addition, interviews were conducted with two members of the
MRAP, as well as with representatives of several immigrant and human
rights organisations (see Appendix 2B). Although this work generated
valuable insights and provided me with an external perspective on SOS-
Racisme, it was not sufficient to support generalisations at the level of the
anti-racist movement as a whole.
The limitations of participant observation which I have reviewed in the final
part of this section highlight the fact that while use of the method may be
necessary in social movements research (for the reasons which I have also
outlined), it is rarely, if ever, sufficient to provide a full account of events or
processes. This is why the present thesis relied on a wider ethnographic
approach in which long-term participant observation was 'supplemented' by
semi-structured interviewing and archival research (cf. Sanjek 1990: 174).
One of the central aims of the thesis is indeed to show that using these
methods in combination, but with an emphasis on participant observation
nonetheless, is a highly effective way of studying processes of collective
identity formation in social movements and their constituent organisations.
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Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to address a range of methodological issues
in social movements research and to reflect on the strengths and the
limitations of the approach which I myself adopted in order to investigate
SOS-Racisme. The first section outlined and then provided a critique of the
French sociologist Alain Touraine's method of sociological intervention,
which he devised specifically as a way of researching social movements.
Although sociological intervention is undoubtedly an original and important
addition to the pool of methods available to researchers, I followed several
other critics in concluding that it has a number of significant weaknesses.
In the second section I began by examining the reasons for Touraine's
explicit rejection of observational methods in social movements research. I
then suggested, contrary to Touraine, that observation-and particularly
participant observation-avoids many of the problems associated with
sociological intervention. Nevertheless, participant observation alone is
inadequate, especially in urban settings, and I went on finally to argue for
the importance of a broader ethnographic approach in social movement
research, using examples from my own Paris-based study of SOS-Racisme.
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Notes
1 Over the past fifteen years, however, an important debate has also
developed among scholars working in Latin America (see, for example,
Assies and Salman 2000; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998a; Eckstein 1989;
Escobar and Alvarez 1992a; Jelin 1987; Mainwaring and Viola 1984; Moises et
al 1985; Wignaraja 1993).
2 '[...] une societe est un ensemble hierarchise de systemes d'action, c'est-a-
dire de rapports sociaux entre des acteurs dont les interets sont opposes mais
qui appartiennent au meme champ social, done partagent certaines
orientations culturelles.'
3 'Les hommes font leur histoire; creation culturelle et conflits sociaux
produisent la vie sociale et au coeur de la societe brule le feu des
mouvements sociaux.'
4 For brief critical discussions of Touraine's method see Ansart (1990: 263-8),
Gosselin (1982), Melucci (1989: 235-9), North (1998: 565-70), Papadakis (1993:
84-89) and Touraine (1982a).
5 'Pour les femmes Alain Touraine est un homme et e'est genant, pour nous il
est Parisien et qa l'est autant. [...] De quel droit quelqu'un intervient-il dans
un debat auquel il est exterieur pour «vous donner un coup de main» et
augmenter votre capacite d'action?'
6 After participating in Touraine's research, Lapeyronnie (along with a
number of fellow activists) withdrew from his previous course of study in
order to register for a degree in sociology (Lapeyronnie 1982: 28). He was
subsequently to join Touraine's research centre CADIS (Centre d'analyse et
d'intervention sociologiques) at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales in Paris (see, for example, Dubet and Lapeyronnie 1992;
Lapeyronnie 1987,1993).
7 '[I]f the researcher is regarded as a teacher and not as a producer of
knowledge, the stakes of a possible student social movement-the social uses
of knowledge-cannot be accepted as such, since their identification comes
from the opposing side. ([SJi le chercheur est considere comme le professeur
et non comme le producteur de cormaissances, l'enjeu d'un mouvement
social etudiant possible-utilisation sociale de la connaissance-ne peut etre
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reconnu, puisque sa reconnaissance vicnt de 1'adversaire.y (Lapeyronnie
1982:27)
8 Touraine does note in his response to Amiot's (1980) critique of sociological
intervention that members of the intervention groups are confronted with
'interlocutors most often out of their reach (interlocuteurs le plus souvent
hors de leurported) (Touraine 1980b: 427). However, he fails to consider the
implications of this for his method.
9 'Le point de depart de l'intervention sociologique consiste a constituer de
tels groupes, formes d'acteurs ou plus strictement de militants ...'
10 The issue of the representativity of the intervention group members is, for
example, raised by Amiot (1980). However, Touraine does not deal with this
particular point in his response (1980b).
11 See Diani and Eyerman (1992a) for a collection of essays on methodological
issues by leading scholars in the social movements field.
12 'Les sociologues doivent etudier le plus directement possible des conduites
collectives dans les situations les plus diverses.1
13 Members of social movements may, however, view all social research
(rather than the use of particular methods such as participant observation or
sociological intervention) with some suspicion. The following two incidents
which I observed during my fieldwork suggest that interview- and
questionnaire-based research on social movements may be regarded as
equally problematic by some actors. On one occasion I heard a French
sociologist who was conducting mostly interview-based research on SOS-
Racisme asked, with a laugh, by a member of the association's National
Committee: 'Are you still doing your job for Special Branch? (Tu fais toujours
ton travailpour les RG [Renseignements generaux]?f On another occasion, I
was present at SOS-Racisme's Parisian headquarters when the same
researcher attempted to distribute a questionnaire to members of the
association. A number of those with whom I was standing at the time
refused to take the questionnaire on the grounds that it was equivalent to
x flica, a slang term for police surveillance.
14 Similar types of objection have long been levelled at social science by left-
wing critics (on many occasions, it has to be said, with some justification [see
Asad 1973; Hymes 1999]). Thus Stavenhagen could note in the early 1970s
that: 'We often hear it said amongst radicals that social scientific produce is
really only of use to repressive governments, the exploiting classes or the
self-seeking imperialists' (Stavenhagen 1993: 57).
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15 It could be argued with some justification, I think, that these are issues in
all social research.
16 This contrasts with Diani's and Eyerman's assertion that 1 [t]he use of
participant observation ... has permitted detailed accounting of the life
within particular social movement organizations, but has contributed little or
nothing to the reconstruction of patterns of interaction between the totality
of actors involved in the networks that make up the movement as a whole'
(Diani and Eyerman 1992b: 2-3). In my view, long-term participant
observation does have the potential to generate valuable and detailed
insights into movement networks, even if researchers have not yet used it to
do so. I would also suggest that it is highly debatable whether other methods
have in fact been able to reconstruct interaction patterns between 'the totality
of actors' involved in a movement network rather than specific sections of it.
17 There is a direct parallel here with Okely's experience of participant
observation among 'traveller-gypsies'. She writes: 'Housedwellers,
shopkeepers and soon the police took me for a Gypsy. I learnt the Gorgios'
[i.e. non-Gypsises'] responses to Gypsies by becoming the object of their fear
of fantasy' (Okely 1983: 45). In my case, however, I became an object of anger
or hostility, as the representative of an association perceived to be linked to
the Socialist Party, rather than 'fear or fantasy'.
18 The problems posed for continuous participant observation by the
scattered nature of the people studied has also been noted by Simon-Barouh
(1983:157).
19 The timing of the interviews was important as I was in position after fifteen
months of participant observation to choose interviewees from different
'currents' within the association as well as from both local and national
levels. As I knew most of the interviewees very well by this point, our
discussions were more conversational and relaxed than they might have
been under other circumstances (see Olivier de Sardan 1995: 90).
20 'L'analyse localisee constitue le meilleur point de depart pour toute
generalisation ulterieure, mais a deux conditions: 1° qu'elle ne s'enferme pas
dans des choix d'echelles limitatifs, 2° qu'elle ne pretende pas outrepasser ses





Political Myths and the History of SOS-
Racisme
One morning in 1994, during my fieldwork in Paris, an activist in the local
committee of SOS-Racisme of which I was a member phoned me at home to
say that he had spent the previous night in a police cell. He had been talking
with members of several immigrant associations when the police had raided
the cafe in which they were sitting. As his identity papers were being
checked, he had entered into an argument with one of the police officers and
been arrested along with an activist from one of the immigrant associations.
He informed me that they were both considering lodging a complaint, and
suggested that it might be a case which our committee could follow.
In due course, the committee produced a leaflet about the incident and we
distributed it at a number of metro stations. However, the leaflet contained a
(relatively minor) factual error and when, as the committee's representative,
I attended a meeting with the other activist who had been arrested, he
complained to me that this would significantly weaken their case should
they decide to bring an action against the officers concerned. Brandishing a
copy of the leaflet and shaking with anger, he said that it was typical of SOS-
Racisme, they always '[made] a bloody mess of things (foutent la merde)!1
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Over two years later, in July 1996, I returned to Paris to give a paper (an
early version of Chapter 8) at an academic conference. My paper was
included in a stream on 'Immigration and the Politics of Belonging1 and
focused on a debate which had taken place at a meeting of SOS-Racisme's
National Council in 1994. The questions and comments which I received
after delivering the paper, however, tended not to address the specific events
which I had discussed but rather the nature of the circumstances
surrounding the association's creation a decade earlier. Thus, a sociologist
based in a French university remarked, for example, that it was 'Mitterrand
and the Socialists, of course' who had been behind the launch of SOS-
Racisme. This led to a brief discussion among several of the French
academics present about the association's origins.
These two incidents highlight the main themes which I intend to explore in
the following chapter. The first raises the issue of the relationship between
SOS-Racisme and other anti-racist or immigrant organisations. How is SOS-
Racisme regarded by activists in these organisations and what tensions are
there between different sections of the anti-racist movement? The second
draws attention to the existence of a debate about the origins of SOS-Racisme
and the involvement of influential members of the Socialist Party in its
launch. To what extent did Mitterrand and his advisers play a role in the
creation and development of SOS-Racisme? This chapter will be concerned,
therefore, with the contested history of SOS-Racisme and its controversial
place within the broader anti-racist movement.
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Origin Myths
Political myths are an important aspect of the political imagination in most,
if not all, human societies. This has been particularly true historically in
France, where 'political upheavals have constantly been accompanied by an
amazing mythological effervescence1 in the period since the 1789 Revolution
(Girardet 1986: ll).1 Conspiracy myths and ideas of a Golden Age, for
example, have emerged at regular intervals and offered ways of making
sense of complex events and processes such as revolutions or
industrialisation (see Girardet 1986). At a much more mundane level, but no
less significantly, a number of radically different 'mythological' narratives
about SOS-Racisme's origins and function have developed in the years since
its creation in 1984. These accounts provide competing explanations of the
association's early success and popularity, and remain important reference
points in current debates. In the following sections, I examine the contested
history of SOS-Racisme and show how ongoing discussion of this subject
framed my own research in 1993-94.
Myths and rituals fulfil important functions for political (and other)
organisations. As the political anthropologist David Kertzer has explained:
In order to have members, or even adherents, an organisation must
have some way of representing itself, and it carves out a distinct
identity through both mythic and ritual means. Organisations
propagate myths regarding their origin and purpose, while members
engage in symbolic practices that serve to mark them off from
nonmembers. These myths often assert the group's superiority.
(Kertzer 1988:17-18)
Ritual practices and symbolic representations, in other words, play a key role
in both creating and maintaining distinctive organisational identities.
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The production of myths about SOS-Racisme's origins and the definition of
its identity were crucial tasks for the association's founders, especially in the
first few months of its existence. In a series of interviews with journalists,
Harlem Desir and Julien Dray (the association's first president and vice-
president) repeatedly emphasised the new association's originality and
distinctiveness with respect to existing anti-racist and immigrant
organisations, and provided accounts of its creation. Both men subsequently
published books in which they developed these 'myths' in more detail. I
intend to focus here on Desir's and Dray's books and to show how they
present a particular construction of SOS-Racisme's history and identity.
The first to be published was Touchepas a monpoteby Harlem Desir (1985).
The book covers the initial twelve months of SOS-Racisme's existence and
also contains a brief autobiographical portrait. (It was later translated into
several other European languages.) In the second chapter, a series of events
is described which Desir himself refers to, without further elaboration, as
'the foundation myth of the association {le mythe foundateur de
Vassociation) (1985: 148). One evening in October 1984, Desir recounts, he
and a group of student friends had arranged to meet together for a pizza. A
member of the group, a Senegalese man called Diego, arrived late and
visibly upset. Diego then explained that on his way to join them a woman in
the same metro carriage had cried out that her purse had been stolen. He
had been the only black person in the carriage and all the other passengers
had turned and looked suspiciously in his direction. Although the woman
had subsequently found her purse, Diego had been so angered by this
example of 'everyday racism (racisme ordinaire)' that he had resolved to
return to Senegal. Desir claims that Diego's experience convinced the other
members of the group that they had to 'react (reagir)', and that the decision
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to create a new association called SOS-Racisme was made in the days which
followed (see Desir 1985: 23-5).
The other chapters of Touche pas a mon pote outline the ways in which the
association's founders secured the support of celebrity 'sponsors (parrains)\
succeeded in attracting media attention, and organised a series of
demonstrations, concerts and other initiatives. Desir is concerned
throughout to highlight SOS-Racisme's originality and distinctiveness with
regard not only to established anti-racist and immigrant associations but also
to political parties. Anti-racist and human rights organisations such as the
LDH, LICRA and MRAP (see Glossary), for example, are criticised for their
failure to prevent the rise of racism and are dismissed as 'too official, too
unwieldy, too bureaucratic (trop officiel, trop lourd, trop bureaucratique)'
(1985: 26). SOS-Racisme, on the other hand, is presented as a dynamic,
youthful rejection of racism and intolerance (1985: 145). The various
associations which participated in the 1983 and 1984 marches against racism
and for equality (the so-called Beur movement) are portrayed, for their part,
as 'the expression of the particular demands of a specific community
(1'expression des revendications particulieres d'une communaute
specifique)\ i.e. North Africans in France. According to Desir, the founders
of SOS-Racisme deliberately set out, in contrast, 'to ignore the traditional
divisions between communities (ignorer les clivages traditionnels entre
communautes)' and to build 'intercommunity solidarity (une solidarity
intercommunautaire)' (1985:103, 33).
In addition, Desir emphasises the non-partisan and moral nature of SOS-
Racisme's approach, as well as its difference from traditional political
organisations. The association's spokespeople made the first of these points
frequently over the course of 1985, in response to allegations that SOS-
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Racisme was closely linked to the Socialist Party. Thus, in a newspaper
interview before the June 1985 concert in Paris, Desir stated: 'First of all, our
orientation is a moral orientation. Our positions are based on a certain
number of principles, which are neither partisan nor political' (quoted in
Liberation, 13 June 1985. See also Desir 1985: 145-6).2 The second point is
developed in Touche pas a mon pote, where Desir insists that SOS-Racisme
has nothing in common with the 'quiet, dusty respectability {pignon
poussiereux sur rue tranquilly of traditional organisations which do little
more, he implies, than turn out for the annual May Day demonstration (1985:
145). Desir argues that the association's media-oriented strategy (with its
reliance on concerts and badges) is more appealing to young people than
conventional forms of political activism involving regular committee
meetings and the distribution of leaflets (1985: 145. See also Desir's
comments quoted in Liberation, 25 March 1985.)
In most respects, the section of Julien Dray's book SOS Generation (1987)
devoted to SOS-Racisme is very similar to Desir's earlier account in its
presentation of the association's history and identity. Dray writes, for
example, that SOS-Racisme was created by a 'group of friends (bande de
copains)[ in response to the emergence of the National Front and a rise in
racist attacks (Dray 1987: 204). He too emphasises that 'SOS-Racisme is
independent. Totally.' (1987: 216)3 Like Desir, he argues that SOS-Racisme
differs from 'Beur' associations in being 'a generational movement {un
mouvement de generatioriy rather than one based on a specific ethnic or
religious identity (1987: 214). Dray is also concerned, finally, to highlight the
originality and effectiveness of SOS-Racisme's use of concerts and other
media-oriented events to involve young people in the fight against racism
(1987: 208-9).
164
An important difference, however, is that the 'foundation myth1 involving
the Senegalese student 'Diego' does not appear in Dray's book. It is replaced
by an origin 'myth' or narrative of a more explicitly political nature. Whereas
Desir had included relatively little on the previous activist experiences of the
founder members, Dray situates the creation of SOS-Racisme in relation to
his and other members' break with 'leftism (gauchisme)' and the 'minority
action (action minoritairey of Trotskyist groups such as the Revolutionary
Communist League (Dray 1987: 193, 185). He states that: 'At the start, we
thought: let's take the opposite approach to the tiny [leftist] splinter groups
and play the media card, completely and unashamedly' (1987: 205).4 The
origins of SOS-Racisme are thus traced back by Dray to his and others'
dissatisfaction with the sectarian and marginal nature of far-left politics,
regarded as completely divorced from the interests and preoccupations of
the mass of the population (1987:183).
A review of these two books, along with the numerous interviews with Dray
and Desir which were published in newspapers and magazines in 1985 and
1986, provides valuable insights into the ways in which the founders of SOS-
Racisme sought to construct not only a distinctive identity for the new
association but also a particular view (or views) of its origins. Nevertheless,
as Melucci has argued, the process of collective identity formation involves
an interaction and negotiation between the various levels of an organisation
or movement; an analysis of 'leaders' discourse1 and the 'top' of collective
action alone is not sufficient (Melucci 1995a: 52). It is for this reason that the
present thesis combines an examination of the public statements of the
association's leaders with an investigation of the local level of action and the
perspectives of ordinary members.
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As I have shown here, Desir and Dray actively sought, both in interviews
and in their own books, to promote particular myths about the origins of
SOS-Racisme as well as to identify the association's distinctiveness and assert
its superiority over other anti-racist or immigrant organisations. The image
of SOS-Racisme which emerged from these accounts was, however, rejected
by many activists in the anti-racist and human rights movements as well as
by external commentators. Almost immediately, a number of alternative
narratives - or myths - about the circumstances surrounding the
association's creation and about its political function began to circulate in
activist circles and in the national press. These included several types of
conspiracy theory.
Conspiracy Theories
For at least the past two centuries, conspiracy theories have occupied a
central place in the political imagination of European countries such as
France (and elsewhere). As Girardet has noted, the 'spectre' of Jewish, Jesuit
and Masonic plots to seize political power and achieve global domination
has continuously 'haunted' French society over this period (Girardet 1986:
32). In his study of anti-Jesuit conspiracy theories in nineteenth century
France, Geoffrey Cubitt has sought to explain the appeal of such forms of
political analysis. Fie suggests that:
conspiracy theories do three things: explain what happens as the
intended product of conscious human volition; establish the division
of humanity into two opposed camps; and affirm a discrepancy
between the surface appearance and the hidden reality of human
affairs. For convenience, these may be called the 'intentionalist', the
'dualist', and the 'occultist' functions of conspiracy theory. (Cubitt
1993: 296-7.)
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In other words, a conspiracy theory is a way of 'imagining' politics which
asserts that a given event or series of events is the direct result of the
deliberate action of a particular conspiratorial group; that there is a sharp
contrast between this minority and the vast majority of the society's
population; and that a radical difference exists between the outward
appearance of the world and its true nature or reality (see also Cubitt 1989:
13-18.).
According to Cubitt, an analytical distinction can be drawn between two
'rhetorical styles' found in conspiracy theories. The first, which he describes
as the 'conspirator-centred' style, is mainly concerned to identify the
particular individuals involved in a conspiracy and to trace the links
between them. As Cubitt notes, this style of conspiracy theory tends to be
characterised by '[t]he strong odour of card-index' (1989: 20). The 'plan-
centred' style, on the other hand, focuses less on cataloguing individuals
than on revealing 'a sinister pattern1 between apparently unconnected
events. Cubitt argues that both of these styles are present in most conspiracy
theories, although one or the other may predominate (1993: 296).
Over the past fifteen years, a number of 'conspiracy theories' involving
allegations of political manipulation have been put forward to account for
the creation and early success of SOS-Racisme (see, for example, Pfister 1988:
71-2; Closets 1990: 254-288). Perhaps the most well-known and controversial
of these is contained in Serge Malik's Histoire secrete de SOS-Racisme (1990).
An active member of SOS-Racisme from February 1985 until April 1986,
Malik contests the 'official' versions of the association's origins and purpose
provided by Desir and Dray. He sets out to expose the 'secret history' which,
he claims, the leadership has concealed both from ordinary members of SOS-
Racisme and from the general public. Describing the creation of the
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association as 'a manipulation carried out by professionals (/u]ne manip de
pros)', he challenges in turn the leadership's depiction of SOS-Racisme's
nature, function and achievements (Malik 1990: 40).
Firstly, Malik alleges that SOS-Racisme was not the politically neutral or
independent association which its founders pretended. He suggests, on the
contrary, that there was a very close, even organic, relationship between
SOS-Racisme (or at least its leadership) and the Socialist Party. On the one
hand, he emphasises repeatedly that Dray and other leading figures were all
members of the Socialist Party, and that many had been active previously in
student or far left politics. On the other, he claims that two members of
Mitterrand's presidential staff, Jean-Louis Bianco and Jacques Attali, were
heavily involved, with Desir and Dray, in both the launch of the association
and its subsequent development.5 The political neutrality of SOS-Racisme, he
concludes, was more 'apparent' than 'real' (1990: 79-82).
Secondly, Malik implies that the primary motivation of those who founded
SOS-Racisme - Julien Dray in particular - was to further their own political
careers and ambitions, and that the creation of a movement against racism
and the rise of the National Front (FN) was simply a means to this end rather
than a reflection of a more deep-seated commitment to the anti-racist
struggle. He suggests again that appearances are deceptive, and that 'SOS-
Racisme is in reality only a phantom movement. Its real function is to be the
public relations office and personal pressure group of Julien Dray' (1990:
174).6 In Malik's view, Dray deliberately used SOS-Racisme to build up a
network of influential contacts and increase his individual standing within
the Socialist Party, with the aim of eventually becoming a deputy. The
ordinary people who joined SOS-Racisme to combat racism, he states
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bluntly, were 'used, abused, manipulated in the exclusive service of Dray's
career and the political line of the PS ' (1990:159).7
According to Malik, Dray's calculation at the outset was that the launch of an
anti-racist youth movement was likely to be the most effective means of
assuring his own promotion within the Socialist Party. The PS had not been
able to forge lasting links with the Franco-Maghrebian associations involved
in the 1983-84 marches, and was relatively absent from the field of anti-
racism. Having identified this 'opening (creneau)' (1990: 39), Dray then
proceeded to develop the idea of SOS-Racisme and to enlist the support of
key figures in the Socialist Party. As far as the Socialists were concerned,
Malik asserts, the creation of SOS-Racisme appeared to offer a welcome way
of capitalising on the 'Beur' movement and mobilising young potential
voters in the run-up to the forthcoming legislative and presidential elections.
Malik continues that SOS-Racisme's subsequent success and the role it was
perceived to have played in securing Mitterrand's re-election in 1988 ensured
that Dray was rewarded with a nomination as the PS candidate for a
relatively safe seat in the Essonne departement to the south of Paris in the
legislative elections a few months later (1990:158).
Finally, Malik provides an assessment of SOS-Racisme's achievements which
differs significantly from that of the association's leadership. He states that
'SOS has certainly succeeded in pushing back the rising tide of Beur
demands, but definitely not that of racism, nor the influence of Le Pen' (1990:
154).8 In his view, the local-level, grassroots action and the concrete policy
proposals developed by Franco-Maghrebian associations in the early 1980s
were effectively 'destroyed (annihilee)' by the emergence of SOS-Racisme
and its emphasis on a media-oriented form of anti-racism (1990: 154). He
criticises SOS-Racisme for its reliance on slogans and concerts, and its
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resulting invisibility 'on the ground (sur le terrairi)\ in housing estates and
workplaces where acts of racism and discrimination occur on a daily basis
(1990: 175). Indeed, Malik even claims that SOS-Racisme's leaders have
contributed to a 'trivialisation (banalisation)1 of racism by their frequent
(ab)use of the term 'racist' as a way of stigmatising their opponents or for
other, purely polemical reasons (1990: 167). Rather than preventing the
expansion of Le Pen's National Front, he concludes, SOS-Racisme has in fact
been 'the red carpet used by the far right in France to emerge from the
shadows into the light' (1990:175).9
The publication of Malik's Histoire secrete de SOS-Racisme in the summer of
1990 attracted a significant amount of press coverage, although this was
heavily determined by the general political orientation of the newspapers
concerned. The right-wing daily press, for example, seized on the book as
convincing proof of the association's links with and support for Mitterrand
and the Socialist Party (Le Quotidien de Paris, 1 June 1990; Le Figaro, 2 June
1990). The weekly paper of the National Front, on the other hand, carried
long extracts from the book, claiming that it showed that the association had
been controlled by 'Zionists' from the Jewish students' organisation UEJF
(National Hebdo, 14-20 June 1990. See also Aspects de la France, 12 July
1990). The left-leaning weekly magazine Le Nouvel Observateur, however,
chose to publish an interview with Harlem Desir in which he dismissed
Malik's account as 'pseudo-revelations' and 'a falsified re-writing of history
(une reecriture falsifiee de Ihistoire)' (Le Nouvel Observateur, 7-13 June
1990). Other centre-left daily and weekly publications played down the
importance of the book, describing it as a fairly predictable 'settling of scores
(reglement de comptes)' on the part of a former member of SOS-Racisme
with his erstwhile fellow activists and its allegations as 'not really new (pas
vraiment nou veau)' (Politis, 7-13 June 1990; Le Monde, 15-16 June 1990).
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It is not my intention here to assess the truth or falsity of the various
assertions which Malik makes in the course of his book. As I indicate in the
next part of this chapter, the exact nature of the circumstances surrounding
SOS-Racisme's creation continued to be the subject of claim and counter¬
claim throughout the period of my fieldwork and it remains difficult to draw
firm conclusions even today. The point I want to emphasise is, rather, that
Malik's account can be analysed as a type of conspiracy theory in which the
'conspirator-centred' style predominates. As an 'explanation' of the
emergence of SOS-Racisme, I would argue, it performs the three functions
(intentionalist, dualist, and occultist) which Cubitt suggests are characteristic
of conspiracy theories.
Firstly, the association's rise is presented as the result of a deliberate strategy
on the part of Dray and influential figures in the Socialist Party. Secondly,
the small 'conspiratorial group' around Dray is sharply distinguished from
the majority of activists and members of the public who, the implication is,
are unaware of the 'manipulation' which is taking place. Finally, the 'official'
image of SOS-Racisme - as an apolitical, spontaneous response to racism and
the National Front, is contrasted with the underlying 'reality' - the
association was created in order to further Dray's political ambitions by
serving as an electoral tool for the Socialist Party. The emphasis throughout
is on identifying the connections between, on the one hand, Dray and (to a
lesser extent) Desir, and, on the other, senior figures in the Socialist Party,
including Mitterrand himself. In this sense, the book adopts a 'conspirator-
centred' rather than a 'plan-centred' style of argument.
An interpretation of SOS-Racisme's history in terms of political manipulation
or conspiracy, however, is problematic for several reasons. As Cubitt has
pointed out, one of the weaknesses of conspiracy theories is that they deny
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'the improvisational element in human affairs and the intentional openness
of historical outcomes' (Cubitt 1993: 314) by presenting everything as the
intended outcome of conscious human action. Malik implies, for example,
that SOS-Racisme's success was inevitable, after the decision had been made
to launch the association. Although it is true that SOS-Racisme had the
considerable advantage of massive state funding (for its first concert and
similar initiatives) and relatively easy access to the media, there was no
guarantee that the association would attract widespread public support. This
is a point which a member of SOS-Racisme made to me in an interview.
While acknowledging that the association's creation was 'a genuine political
decision (tine vraie decision politiquey on the part of a group around Dray,
he added that:
What was spontaneous was people's reaction. [...] It wasn't written in
stone though, even though there had been a decision to [launch the
association]. People have decided to create other movements in the
past but ... [The success of SOS-Racisme] even exceeded, I think, at a
certain point, initial expectations .... (Tape-recorded interview with
Luc, 3 October 1994)10
The association's popularity, in other words, could not simply be planned or
'decided' in advance by Dray and the other founder members. It is a
recognition of this element of historical unpredictability which is absent from
Malik's account. Instead, the rise of SOS-Racisme is treated as an inevitable,
continuous process, consciously planned and realised from beginning to end
by a small group of 'conspirators'.
The distinction which Malik draws between a 'conspiratorial' minority and a
'non-conspiratorial' majority raises a second problem. As Cubitt has shown,
this kind of dualism is a characteristic feature of conspiracy theories. In the
case of Malik's analysis of SOS-Racisme, however, it leads to a depiction of
the association's grassroots activists and supporters as mere pawns in the
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political games of Dray (to advance his career) and the Socialist Party
hierarchy (to ensure Mitterrand's re-election in 1988). Represented as an
undifferentiated mass, '[t]he activists' (1990: 159) are viewed by Malik only
as the unwitting victims of a political manipulation, and not as actors and
strategists in their own right. Malik completely ignores the fact that the
existence of a range of sources of information combined with a relatively
high level of general education means that citizens in contemporary Western
democracies such as France are not easily manipulated by political or other
elites (see Chariot 1994:131).
Thus, there is no attempt in the book to explore the reasons for the
continuing involvement of many people - including Malik himself (see
Politis, 7-13 June 1990) - even after allegations that the Socialist Party was
attempting a 'take-over (.recuperation)' of SOS-Racisme had appeared in the
national press during the spring of 1985 (Le Figaro, 28 March 1985; Le
Quotidien de Paris, 28 March 1985). This is an omission which the present
thesis aims to address. I have already shown, in Chapter 2, that grassroots
members of associations such as SOS-Racisme frequently have highly
developed political perspectives and strategies of their own, and are not just
puppets of their leaders. In a similar way, Chapter 8 discusses an incident in
which pressure from grassroots activists forced the association's leadership
to abandon plans for an electoral agreement with a prominent politician.
These chapters provide a very different view of SOS-Racisme's ordinary
members to the one which emerges from Malik's 'analysis'.
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An Ongoing Controversy
The circumstances surrounding the creation of SOS-Racisme in 1984
continued to be the subject of controversy at the time of my fieldwork ten
years later. In the final part of this chapter I consider a number of further
accounts of the association's history published in 1993 and 1994 which
appeared to confirm earlier versions of events. I also discuss material taken
from interviews which I conducted during this same period with
representatives of other anti-racist or immigrant organisations. It highlights
the extent to which the events and debates described in subsequent chapters
of this thesis occurred against the background of tensions or even open
hostility between SOS-Racisme and other sections of the anti-racist
movement which date back to the mid-1980s.
In 1993, the former special adviser to President Mitterrand, Jacques Attali,
published the first volume of his political memoirs. It contained the
following entry, dated 'Monday 1 April 1985': 'Harlem Desir launches "SOS
Racisme". The original idea came from Jean-Loup Salzmann and Julien Dray,
and Jean-Louis Bianco [the General Secretary of Mitterrand's Elysee staff]
organised everything else' (Attali 1993: 793).11 There is no elaboration of this
comment, however, and the actual steps supposedly taken by Bianco to set
up SOS-Racisme are left unspecified. Nevertheless, Bianco himself was
interviewed on this subject in April 1994 by three journalists undertaking an
investigation of Mitterrand's links with members of the far right. When the
book (Faux et al 1994) was published six months later it contained a long
extract from this interview. In response to a direct question about the role he
played in the creation of SOS-Racisme, Bianco states: 'Personally, I tried to
help them [the association's founders] to obtain funding from government
ministries' (quoted in Faux et al 1994: 30).12 He also admits to putting Dray
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and the others in contact with Mitterrand's communications and marketing
advisers.
On the basis of this and other material, the authors of the book suggest that
the promotion of SOS-Racisme was in fact the second prong of a twofold
electoral strategy pursued by Mitterrand in the early 1980s. The first was to
facilitate the emergence of Le Pen and the National Front, in order to foster
divisions within the mainstream right and split the right-wing vote.
'[OJperation SOS-Racisme', on the other hand, was intended to remobilise a
left-wing electorate (and the Socialist Party) around anti-racism in the
context of falling opinion poll ratings. This argument is, however, rejected by
Julien Dray, who is also quoted in the book. Dray denies that SOS-Racisme
was the result of a 'Machiavellian calculation (calcul machiavelique) on the
part of Mitterrand and insists that 'the PS saw [the arrival] of SOS as a divine
surprise as it did not know how to respond to the FN' (quoted in Faux et al
1994: 31).13
During my fieldwork in 1993 and 1994, therefore, the history of SOS-Racisme
remained the subject of claim and counter-claim among high-ranking
politicians, journalists and members of the association. Within the broader
anti-racist movement at this time, the origins and role of SOS-Racisme also
continued to generate heated debate. Many argued that the development of
SOS-Racisme had been encouraged by the Socialist administration in the
mid-1980s in a deliberate attempt to depoliticise the anti-racist struggle and
to undermine the 'Beur' movement. One of the organisers of the 1983 March,
who later joined SOS-Racisme for a short period, stated in an interview
published in December 1993:
I think that the Beur movement failed because of political
manipulation. The Socialist Party wanted a moral type of anti-racist
movement: with 'Touche pas a mon pote' it was no longer a question
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of the struggle for equality. I, personally, allowed myself to be taken
in. (Titouss 1993: 45)14
A similar argument was put forward by Albert Levy, a former General
Secretary of the anti-racist association MRAP, when I interviewed him in
1994:
Everything was done in order to get this mass of young people with
them [i.e. SOS-Racisme], but on a vague basis. That is: by definition, a
festival [such as the massive free concert SOS-Racisme organised in
June 1985] is the vaguest type of political event there can be. There's
no analysis, it's more emotional. The slogan 'Touche pas a mon pote',
too, is an emotional and not a political slogan. Thus, a political
analysis of what racism is, what its causes are, and how to combat it
was removed. It was replaced by this idea of what was called 'the
moral generation'. So that forms part of the operation as well: to
depoliticise the anti-racist movement and create an apolitical anti-
racist movement. (Tape-recorded interview with Albert Levy, MRAP,
17 November 1994)15
The suggestion here is that the 'moral' type of anti-racism promoted by SOS-
Racisme was attractive to the incumbent Socialist administration because it
turned attention away not only from the specific demands for equal rights
formulated by 'Beur' activists but also from a socio-economic analysis of the
underlying causes of racism.
The related idea that SOS-Racisme had been launched by the authorities to
prevent the further development of an autonomous Franco-Maghrebian
movement was also current in activist circles during the period of my
fieldwork. When I myself interviewed several activists who had participated
in the 'Beur' movement and then founded another association, one of them
stated:
As we see it, the authorities tried to set up those associations - such as
SOS-Racisme or France-Plus - because they saw that they were going
to face a movement of young Arabs. It was inconceivable, as far as
they were concerned, that there could be a movement originating
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from immigrants. (In this case, here [in 1983-84], it was Maghrebians
who were on the move.) For the government, that couldn't be
tolerated; it was out of the question. (Tape-recorded interview with
Nordine Iznasni and two other activists, CNCDP, 8 December 1994)16
Adding that he himself 'hated' SOS-Racisme, the same activist went on to
provide the following assessment of SOS-Racisme's achievements:
What I find the most serious aspect ... is that, at a certain point, there
was a movement of young people who were protesting against all the
inequalities and all the discrimination they were facing. What is the
most serious aspect is that [SOS-Racisme] has set back the movements
associated with immigrants and their descendants immeasurably, by
creating a cloud of smoke. They have set people back, and they have
discredited the movements associated with immigrants and their
descendants. And I resent them a lot for that. They have done a lot of
damage politically... ,17
For this activist, then, the emergence of SOS-Racisme undermined the action
initiated by Franco-Maghrebian activists in the early 1980s against racism
and in favour of equal rights, thereby arresting the development of an
autonomous Franco-Maghrebian section of the wider anti-racist movement.
A negative assessment of SOS-Racisme's contribution to the struggle against
racism was also provided by a representative of an immigrant organisation
whom I interviewed at this time:
After a dozen years of the existence of SOS-Racisme, nothing has
changed. The simple reason for this is that SOS-Racisme has
remained... The committees, if you look at SOS-Racisme's committees,
where do you find them? You find them in the universities, in the big
cities, in Paris for example. You are not going to find a committee in,
for example, Mantes-la-Jolie [a town in the Paris suburbs], where
there's trouble. You don't find a committee of SOS-Racisme there.
(Yet, racism exists there on a day-to-day basis, segregation on a day-
to-day basis.) Why? Because young people there do not believe in
[SOS-Racisme]. [...] They think that those people [involved in SOS-
Racisme] ...are not people who are close to them: they are people who
are in it for something else. (Tape-recorded interview with member of
CAIF, 5 December 1994)18
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According to this activist, SOS-Racisme had failed to establish itself in the
housing estates around cities such as Paris and was thus unable effectively to
address the racism and discrimination experienced by the people living there
on a daily basis. The association lacked credibility in the eyes of young
people on these estates, who suspected its involvement in the anti-racist
struggle to be merely a means to other political ends.
A further issue, for the then Assistant General Secretary of the anti-racist
association MRAP, Alain Calles, was the way in which SOS-Racisme (and
particularly its leadership) approached joint action with other organisations.
When I interviewed him in December 1994, he voiced the following criticism
of leading members of the association:
They have a background in the PCI - the Internationalist Communist
Party [the French section of the Fourth International] - which means
(and this can be found all through the history of SOS-Racisme, it is not
only in relation to the MRAP) that they have methods which can be
characterised as 'fearing neither God nor man1 in their relations with
other organisations. That is: the objective of their own organisation
takes precedence over everything, regardless of engagements
[previously entered into with other organisations] ...which can be
broken immediately or modified, etc. (Tape-recorded interview with
Alain Calles, MRAP, 5 December 1994)19
Such a procedure led, he added, to serious problems within the co¬
ordination committees (collectifs) which were formed to organise national
anti-racist demonstrations and similar events.
Conclusion
The books, newspaper articles and interview material discussed in this
chapter highlight some of the tensions concerning SOS-Racisme and its place
within the anti-racist movement which existed during the period of my
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fieldwork. To a large extent, these date back to the association's emergence in
1984 and its controversial history. In this chapter, I have sought to provide
an insight into different accounts of SOS-Racisme's creation. These continued
to circulate at the time of my research and had a direct impact on how the
association was viewed by other sections of the anti-racist movement. In the
next chapter, I turn from the perspectives of activists to examine criticisms of




1 '...c'est d'une etonnante effervescence mythologique que n'ont cesse d'etre
accompagnes les bouleversements politiques.1
2 'Avant toute chose, notre orientation est une orientation morale. Nos prises
de position partent d'un certain nombre de principes, ni partisans ni
politiques.1
3 'SOS-Racisme est independent. Totalement.1
4 'Au depart, nous pensons : prenons le contre-pied des groupuscules pour
jouer a fond a carte des medias, sans honte.'
5 Bianco was was General Secretary of the Elysee staff (1982-92), Minister of
Social Affairs and then Transport Minister, whereas Attali was Mitterrand's
special adviser (1981-92), before becoming the President of the European
Regional Development Bank.
6 'SOS-Racisme n'est en realite qu'un mouvement fantome. Sa veritable
fonction est d'etre le bureau de relations publiques et le groupe de pression
personnel de Julien Dray.'
7 'lis ont ete utilises, abuses, manipules au service exclusif de la carriere de
Dray et de la ligne politique du PS.'
8 'SOS a certes reussi a faire reculer le front brulant de la revendication beur,
mais pas celui du racisme, et certainement pas non plus l'influence de Le
Pen.'
9 'SOS n'est que le tapis rouge emprunte par l'extreme droite frangaise pour
passer de l'ombre a la lumiere.'
10 'Ce qui a ete spontane, c'est la reaction des gens. [...] C'etait pas inscrit
quand meme, meme si la decision a ete de le faire. II y a eu d'autres
mouvements qu'ont ete decide d'etre faits mais ... Ca a meme depasse, je
pense, a un moment donne, les esperances de depart....'
11 'Harlem Desir lance «SOS Racisme». Jean-Louis Bianco a tout organise a
1'initiative de Jean-Loup Salzmann et Julien Dray.'
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12 'Moi, j'essaie de les aider a trouver des financements des ministeres.'
13. le PS voit SOS comme une divine surprise car il ne sait pas repondre au
FN.'
14 'Je pense que le Mouvement beur a echoue du fait des manipulations
politiques. Le Parti socialiste voulait un mouvement antiraciste qui soit
moral: 'Touche pas a mon pote, ce n'etait plus le combat pour l'egalite.
Personnellemenb je me suis laissee prendre au bluff.'
15 'Tout etait fait pour avoir avec eux cette masse de jeunes, mais sur une base
floue. C'est a dire, par definition la fete c'est ce qu'il peut y avoir de plus flou
comme manifestation politique. II n'y a pas d'analyse, c'est plutot
sentimental. Le mot d'ordre 'Touche pas a mon pote' aussi est un mot d'ordre
affectif et pas politique. Done, on a evacue l'analyse politique de ce que c'est
que le racisme, qu'en sont les causes, du racisme, comment le combattre. On
l'a remplace par cette idee de ce qu'on appelait 'la generation morale'. Done
ga fait partie aussi de l'operation: de depoliticiser le mouvement antiraciste et
creer un mouvement antiraciste apolitique.'
16 'Pour nous, ces associations-la - comme SOS-Racisme ou France-Plus - le
pouvoir a essaye de les mettre en place parce qu'il a vu qu'en face il allait y
avoir un mouvement de jeunes arabes. Pour eux, e'etait inconcevable qu'il y
ait un mouvement originaire des immigres. (En l'occurrence, la, e'etait des
maghrebins, qui bougeiaent.) Pour eux, il fallait pas ga, e'etait pas possible.'
17 'Le plus grave, a mon sens (moi, je deteste SOS-Racisme) ...c'est qu'a un
moment donne, face a toutes ces inegalites, face a toutes ces discriminations,
il y avait eu un mouvement de jeunesse, qui se revoltait contre ga. Le plus
grave, c'est qu'ils ont fait prendre un retard incalculable aux mouvements
issus de l'immigration, en faisant un nuage de fumee. lis ont fait prendre du
retard aux gens, et ils ont discredites les mouvements issus de l'immigration.
Et pour ga je leur en veux beaucoup. Ils ont fait beaucoup de mal
politiquement....'
18 'Apres une dizaine d'annees d'existence de SOS-Racisme, rien n'a change
[...] C'est pour la simple raison que SOS-Racisme, c'est reste ... Les comites,
si tu regardes les comites de SOS-Racisme, tu les trouves ou? Tu les trouves a
l'universite, dans les grandes villes, par exemple a Paris. Tu ne vas pas
trouver, par exemple, un comite a Mantes-la-Jolie, la ou ga chauffe, tu ne
trouves pas de comite de SOS-Racisme. (Pourtant le racisme y est au
quotidien, la segregation au quotidien.) Pourquoi? Parce que les jeunes, ils
n'y croient pas. [...] Ils considerent que ces gens-la ... c'est pas des gens qui
sont proches d'eux. Ce sont des gens qui font ga pour autre chose.'
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19 'lis ont une formation du PCI - Parti communiste internationaliste - ce qui
fait que (ga va se retrouver tout au long de l'histoire de SOS, il ne sera pas
que vis-a-vis du MRAP) ils ont des methodes totalement 'sans foi ni loi' dans
les rapports entre organisations. C'est a dire que le but de son organisation
prime avant tout, et quelque soient les engagements ... qu'on peut rompre
immediatement ou modifier, etc.'
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Chapter 6
SOS-Racisme and the 'Crisis' of Anti-
Racism
On 25 April 1996, a short article, entitled simply 'The Crisis of Anti-Racism
{La crise de I'antiradsme)' and written by the president of SOS-Racisme,
Fode Sylla, was published in the French daily newspaper Le Monde. In this
article, Sylla highlighted the divided nature of the anti-racist movement in
France, its failure to mobilise significant numbers of the population and the
damage to its credibility which resulted (Sylla 1996b). In a similar way, an
increasing number of academic commentators have argued over the past
twenty years that anti-racism is currently in a state of crisis, not only in
France but also in other countries. The sociologist Paul Gilroy, for example,
suggested in the late 1980s that the anti-racist movement in Britain was
suffering from a crisis both of 'organisational forms' and 'political language'
(1990: 192), and his more recent work has continued to emphasise a need to
address 'anti-racism's tarnished vocabulary' (2000: 6). Social anthropologists
such as Pnina Werbner (1991a), on the other hand, have discussed problems
of political leadership among anti-racists in this country. In France, as Cathie
Lloyd (1994) has explained, 'the crisis of anti-racism' has also been the subject
of considerable debate. In particular, the inability of the anti-racist
movement to prevent the rise of Le Pen and the National Front (FN) during
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the 1980s and early 1990s has led to a questioning of anti-racist strategies and
representations of racism (Lloyd 1994: 232).
One of the most influential writers on anti-racism in France since the mid-
1980s has been the political philosopher Pierre-Andre Taguieff. His work has
been described by a recent commentator as 'possessing a depth unequalled
in the English-language literature1 (Bonnett 2000: 12). In La Force du prejuge
(1990a) and Les Fin de Fantiracisme (1995), Taguieff has sought to provide a
'genealogy' of the diverse forms of racism and anti-racism which have
emerged in modern France, and also to identify their contradictions and
inter-connections. Any study of anti-racism in contemporary France requires
an engagement with Taguieff's writing, I would argue, and in this chapter I
intend to provide a necessarily selective account of the main points of his
critique of anti-racist action in that country since the 1970s. A discussion of
Taguieff's analysis of the current 'crisis' of anti-racism in France is, in fact,
particularly relevant in the context of the present study, as much of his
argument takes the form of a critique of SOS-Racisme. In the following
chapter, I outline Taguieff's criticisms of SOS-Racisme and consider the
extent to which they are justified (see also Chapter 7).
Taguieff's Critique of Anti-Racism
In Les Fins de Fantiracisme (1995), Taguieff argues that four different forms
of anti-racism can be distinguished in contemporary France. The first is
associated with traditional anti-racist or human rights organisations such as
the MRAP, the LICRA and the LDH, and is primarily 'juridical (juridique)' in
nature (1995: 233). The activity of these organisations, in other words, centres
on bringing legal actions against parties alleged to have committed
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discriminatory acts (see also Costa-Lascoux 1994a). The second type
identified by Taguieff is 'political anti-racism (antiracisme politique)'. This
refers to the development of public policies to combat racism and also to the
'discourse' of political parties on the subject (the French term politique can
mean both politics and policy). Taguieff claims that in spite of being
traditionally 'monopolised (monopolise)' by the Left, political anti-racism has
recently become the focus of competition between the main political parties,
as the Right has attempted to appropriate anti-racist 'discourse'.
According to Taguieff, a third form emerged during the 1980s which can be
described as 'media-oriented anti-racism (antiracisme mediatique)' (1995:
233). He argues that this type of approach was associated with prominent
show-biz personalities and, more specifically, with SOS-Racisme and its first
president Harlem Desir. In his view, it was replaced in the 1990s by 'exotic'
or 'neo-Christian' forms of humanitarianism promoted by figures such as
Bernard Kouchner, of Medecins du monde, or the Abbe Pierre, a prominent
campaigner on homelessness and other issues since the 1950s (see Smith
1997). Finally, Taguieff distinguishes a 'scientific (savant)' form of anti-
racism. He links this in particular to the role of prominent geneticists and
other French scientists such as Albert Jacquard in challenging the idea of
'race' (Taguieff 1995: 233-4)
In Taguieff's view, the second and third of these - political and media-
oriented anti-racism respectively - are the dominant forms in contemporary
France (he is referring to the period of the early 1990s). Since the 1980s, he
claims, anti-racism in France has been characterised by, on the one hand, an
'excessive popularisation through the mass media (hypermediatisation)' and,
on the other, a process of 'political manipulation (instrumentalisation
politique)'. He argues, firstly, that anti-racist action during the 1980s was
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'essentially a mobilisation from the top down {pour l'essentiel une
mobilisation par le hautf (1993: 384), centred on high-profile public rallies
and staged media events, which served to undermine grassroots activism.
SOS-Racisme is singled out for criticism in this connection. Taguieff asserts
that the association's strategy of finding celebrity sponsors gave it 'an elitist
and apolitical flavour {un parfum a la fois elitiste et apolitique)', and
effectively reduced it to an anti-racist 'fan-club'.
In addition, he maintains that SOS-Racisme's attempt to re-launch anti-
racism 'as a fashion {comme une mode)' which would appeal to young
people was misguided in that the inevitable result was that anti-racism
subsequently became unfashionable (a development which he dates from
1989) as media and popular attention turned elsewhere. The suggestion here,
in short, is that SOS-Racisme was part of a process in which anti-racism was
marketed like a consumer product, with a brand (the association's badge and
slogan), publicity (the massive free concerts) and a telegenic and charismatic
spokesperson (Harlem Desir). This was accompanied by an increased use of
purportedly 'anti-racist' images in advertising and an emphasis on show
business or media events as a way of combating racism (1993: 384)
The second process which Taguieff identifies is the use of anti-racism as a
political tool or instrument during the 1980s. He argues that this period
witnessed the transformation of anti-racism into 'a substitute political
ideology {une ideologie politique de substitution)' for various political
currents in France (1993: 378). In particular, he suggests that the governing
Socialist Party turned to anti-racism, after its 1983 economic U-turn and
abandonment of Keynesian reflationary polices, as a way of distinguishing
itself from the mainstream Right. Whereas the Socialists had previously
campaigned on the slogan of a 'break with capitalism {rupture avec le
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capitalisme)', its 'conversion' to monetarism at this time resulted in an
effective political consensus over economic policy (see Cole 1998: 214-5 for
further details). The incumbent Socialist administration, Taguieff maintains,
then sought to re-create the division between Left and Right around the
issue of racism and anti-racism. Its strategy was to reduce anti-racism to a
mobilisation against Le Pen and the National Front. By focusing on the
extreme-Right, the Socialists hoped to further weaken the mainstream Right,
which was already internally divided on the subject of electoral alliances or
co-operation with the National Front (Taguieff 1993: 378-9).
According to Taguieff, the result was a damaging politicisation of anti-
racism which saw each of the main parties claim that only its own approach
represented 'authentic' anti-racist action. He criticises this type of political
anti-racism as 'an ideological corruption {une corruption ideologique)' of the
essentially ethical and non-partisan nature of anti-racist principles.
Underlying all anti-racist action, he argues, is the fundamental moral
principle of 'unconditional respect for a person's human dignity {respect
inconditionnel de la dignite humaine en chaque personne)', regardless of
their ethnic background or cultural and religious beliefs. The attempt to
associate this ethical principle (which transcends the Left-Right divide) with
one particular political camp, he concludes, had the effect of discrediting
anti-racism and weakening its symbolic value. In other words, anti-racism
appeared 'compromised' as a result of its appropriation for party political
ends during this period (1995: 243-4).
Against this background, Taguieff claims that there is an urgent need to
clarify the 'state of crisis {etat de crisey in which anti-racism finds itself in
contemporary France. He presents such a task as an 'authentic' anti-racist act
in itself, its underlying aim being to increase the effectiveness of anti-racism
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in the future. His work therefore presents what he describes as 'a reformist
critique (une critique reformiste)' of anti-racism. This has two distinct
dimensions: firstly, an 'internal' critique of the ideological contradictions and
inconsistencies of anti-racist discourse and 'reasoning (argumentation)' in
general; and secondly, an 'external' critique of the particular weaknesses and
limitations of anti-racist action as this has developed in France (1993: 357).
Taguieff's analysis of the crisis of anti-racism and the main elements of his
critique will now be discussed (see Figure 6 for a summary of his argument
in tabular form).
For Taguieff, the crisis of anti-racism in contemporary France is not simply
the result of a superficial media-oriented approach and a manipulation by
political elites; its causes are much more deep-seated. He claims that anti-
racism's current difficulties can, in fact, be traced back to an inadequate
conceptualisation of racism and to a series of ideological contradictions and
mutually incompatible orientations which undermine the effectiveness of its
action. These are the focus of his 'internal' critique of anti-racism. He
suggests, firstly, that anti-racists have failed to appreciate the changing
nature of racism since the 1970s. In his view, a distinction can be drawn
between two (ideal) types of racism.1 The first, which he describes variously
as 'discriminatory', 'heterophobic', 'assimilationist' or 'universalist', is based
on a naturalisation or 'biologisation' of difference and the idea of the
superiority and inferiority of particular 'races' according to a universal scale
of values. The second, which he refers to as 'differentialist', 'heterophilic', or
as 'new' or 'cultural' racism, essentialises not phenotypical but cultural
differences (i.e. it involves a 'culturalisation of difference'), and seeks to
promote or defend cultural identities portrayed as absolute. Such neo-racism





















































































































































































































































































































































they cannot be assimilated by virtue of their radical cultural difference (see
Taguieff 1990a: 11-19; 1990b: 117; 1991a). Since the 1970s, Taguieff argues, the
second - differentialist - type of racism (or 'neo-racism') has come to
predominate in France and elsewhere. A crucial shift in racist ideology has
occurred, he emphasises, from an emphasis on 'biological inequality towards
a conception of cultural difference as absolute (deplacement de 1'rnegalite
biologique vers l'absolutisation de la difference culturelle)' (Taguieff 1991b:
15). According to Taguieff, contemporary neo-racism can be characterised in
terms of the following four features: (1) a shift away from a concern with
'race' and racial purity to culture and the preservation of 'authentic' cultural
identities; (2) instead of an emphasis on inequality and the inferiority or
superiority of different 'races', a focus on difference and the importance of
maintaining the integrity of a culture by avoiding contact and any mixing
with others; (3) use of heterophilic rather than heterophobic language, i.e.
(cultural) difference is viewed positively rather than negatively; and (4) a
reliance on 'symbolic' or 'indirect' (implication, inference) rather than
'blatant' or explicit means of expression (Taguieff 1991b: 43).
Now, Taguieff's argument is that the anti-racist movement has failed to take
account of the recent emergence of forms of neo-racism postulating the
existence of radical cultural differences between groups. He suggests that
there is a 'gulf (decalage)' (1991b: 19) between anti-racist representations of
(biological or 'discriminatory') racism inherited from the period of struggle
against Nazism, on the one hand, and contemporary reconfigurations of
racist ideology which essentialise cultural differences. (This is an argument
which has also been developed by Gilroy [1987,1990].) For Taguieff, the anti-
racist movement is essentially operating with an out-dated or anachronistic
definition of racism. In addition, however, he maintains that anti-racists have
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failed to appreciate the way in which their own terms and strategies have
been taken up and used against them by racists. He shows that the anti-racist
idea of 'the right to be different (le droit a la difference)' and respect for
cultural identities, which emerged in the 1950s as a challenge to
assimilationism, came, in the course of the 1970s, to be appropriated by the
New Right. Groups such as the Club de l'Horloge, for example, began to
insist on the right to be different of 'the French', and the consequent need for
'French' culture and identity to be protected from 'foreign' influences. The
logic of the right to be different, in short, was used in order to argue for
racist exclusion and the inability of migrants and their descendants to
assimilate (see Taguieff 1991b: 41). Taguieff argues that anti-racists have been
slow to evaluate the implications of this evolution of racist ideology for their
own action.
The identification of an inadequate conceptualisation of racism is, however,
only one aspect of Taguieff's 'internal' critique of racism. He also highlights a
series of inconsistencies and contradictions in 'anti-racist discourse (flje
discours antiraciste)' (1993: 358). In this short section I cannot do justice to
the range and depth of his analysis, and I propose to limit my discussion to
the three 'contradictions' or 'dilemmas' outlined by Taguieff which are most
relevant to a study of SOS-Racisme. The first is the one which Taguieff refers
to as 'the "pluricultural" contradiction (la contradiction du «pluriculturel»y
(1993: 359). Taguieff argues that underlying the terms 'pluricultural' and
'multicultural', as used by anti-racists, is a tension between two opposing
normative orientations: on the one hand, a commitment to 'the right to be
different' or the need to respect specific cultural and ethnic identities
'unconditionally (inconditionnellemeni)'; and, on the other, a belief in the
importance of the idea of 'hybridity (metissagdy and the gradual elimination
of differences through a process of fusion. These perspectives do not attach
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the same importance or legitimacy to ethnic and cultural difference, he
insists, but they often co-exist in anti-racist discourse.
A second problem identified by Taguieff is 'the contradiction of the
mixophile position (fl]a contradiction de la position mixophiley (1993: 363).
Whereas racist ideologies have tended to regard cultural or 'racial' mixing in
a highly negative way ('mixophobia [mixophobie]'), Taguieff argues, anti-
racists have often celebrated forms of hybridity ('mixophilia [mixophilie]').
Again, however, Taguieff claims that a contradiction between two
incompatible orientations underlies this position. The first can be described
as an 'egalitarian' mixophilia in that it stresses that everyone is, genetically
speaking, a hybrid. It asserts that the 'mixophobia' of racism is absurd (un
non-sens) in scientific terms. The second is an 'elitist' conception of hybridity
in the sense that it is viewed as superior, either aesthetically or culturally.
Taguieff argues that this second orientation presupposes that there are
'pure', i.e. non-mixed 'races' or cultures, and thus involves a form of racism
itself. Anti-racists have tended, he suggests, to advance these two opposing
conceptions of hybridity.
A third tension is the one which Taguieff labels 'the dilemma of
differentialist hypertolerance and the assimilationist conception of
citizenship ([IJe dilemme de 1'hypertolerance differentialiste et de la
conception assimilationiste de la citoyennete)' (1993: 365). He states that anti-
racists have tended to appeal to two different visions of a future society in
order to legitimate their action, and that these perspectives involve opposing
conceptions of citizenship. On the one hand, he argues, anti-racists claim to
work towards 'a pluricultural society1 in which cultural differences are
tolerated or valued (he describes this as 'a heterophile pole [un pole
heterophile]')-, on the other, they promote the idea of republican citizenship
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based on the assimilation of minority groups into the majority culture ( 'a
heterophobic pole [unpole heterophobe]'). These imply different definitions
of the political community, and of the relationship between minority and
majority populations. Taguieff argues that anti-racism during the 1980s (and
he appears to be thinking particularly of France) attempted to achieve a
synthesis or combination of these two contradictory perspectives. The
development of anti-racism in this period, he concludes, was characterised
by a 'perpetual movement between [these] two poles {mouvementperpetuel
entreles deuxpoles)* (1993: 366).
The 'external' critique of anti-racism developed by Taguieff focuses on the
types of action undertaken by the contemporary French anti-racist
movement, rather on than the internal contradictions or inconsistencies of
anti-racist discourse in general. Taguieff is particularly concerned to show
the difference between the French movement's stated objectives and the
effects or results produced by its action. Again, it is not my intention to
provide a comprehensive summary of Taguieff's argument (which can be
found in Taguieff [1993: 371-387]). As before, I will simply highlight those
points which are most relevant to the present discussion.
Firstly, Taguieff argues that the media-oriented anti-racism which emerged
in France during the 1980s failed to achieve its main objective. He claims that
anti-racism in this period was 'essentially an anti-Le Pen movement {pour
l'essentiel un mouvement antilepeniste)' (1993: 371), but that it proved
incapable of preventing the National Front from steadily increasing its share
of the vote at various elections over the course of the decade. The anti-racist
movement was unable to stop the National Front from becoming a feature of
the French political landscape. Secondly, Taguieff accuses 'media-oriented'
anti-racism of 'a dogmatic anti-nationalism {un antinationalisme
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dogmatique)[ (1993: 386). He claims that the 'cosmopolitan' anti-racism of
French elites has tended to equate nationalism with racism, and to stigmatise
and 'criminalise (criminaliser)' an attachment to the nation-state. In his view,
this has allowed the National Front to exploit the themes of national identity
and republican citizenship unchallenged.
Finally, Taguieff maintains that the anti-racist movement in France has
resorted to out-dated or inappropriate forms of action to achieve its goals. A
juridical form of anti-racism - reliance on anti-discrimination legislation to
sanction racist writings or utterances - was effective in the 1970s, he
acknowledges, when its target was small neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist groupings
existing on the fringes of French society. However, it was 'powerless
(impuissanty a decade later to combat the National Front, a mass party
regularly able to attract 10-15% of the vote at national elections. Taguieff is
also critical of 'the mental tools (l'outillage mental)' which anti-racists use to
analyse contemporary forms of racism. He argues that these were forged
during the struggle against Nazism and biological racism, and are not
adequate for understanding more recent forms of neo-racism discussed
earlier (1993: 373).
How, then, does Taguieff propose that anti-racism should be 'reformed'?
Firstly, he emphasises that the anti-racist movement should learn from its
recent mistakes. In particular, it should avoid 'the differentialist dead-end
(/'impasse differentialiste)' represented, in his view, by a commitment to 'the
right to be different' (1993: 387). Secondly, he suggests that effective anti-
racist action requires engaging 'racists' in a rational debate in which the
inconsistencies, false logic, lies and stereotypical thinking of their arguments
can be revealed. Rather than indignation or the vilification of 'racists', he
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contends, the way forward lies in 'critical reason (la raison critique)' (1993:
388).
Thirdly, and most importantly, Taguieff argues that anti-racists must begin
to address the underlying causes of racism in a more direct and systematic
way. Indeed, he insists that there is a need to 'shift the emphasis of the
struggle against racism from an instrumental rhetorical confrontation to a
transformation of the conditions or factors governing its appearance1 (1993:
391, emphases in original).2 A 'realistic' anti-racism, he maintains, requires
the replacement of a purely 'defensive' approach, designed to contain or
isolate the National Front, with an 'offensive' strategy based on 'a logic of
prevention (une logique de la prevention)'. This involves a greater emphasis
on 'civic education (education civique)', that is, discussion in schools about
the nature of civic life and about the politico-legal framework which defines
French citizenship. According to Taguieff, this needs to be accompanied by
social policies designed to counter processes of socio-economic and ethnic
segregation which can prepare the ground for the development of racism.
He argues that anti-racism should be broadened (or 'de-specified') so as to
represent the fight against all forms of discrimination and segregation. Only
then, he concludes, will anti-racism be able to tackle the root causes of
racism, and in so doing begin to emerge from its current 'crisis' (1993: 389-
92).
The Limits of Taguieff's Critique of SOS-Racisme
The pioneering nature of Taguieff's work on anti-racism is undeniable. He
has provided the most comprehensive and systematic treatment of the topic
in French, and there are as yet no studies of comparable depth and historical
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scope written in English. In the last section, it is worth repeating, I
highlighted only those aspects of his analysis which are pertinent to the
discussion of SOS-Racisme developed in this thesis; a less selective summary
of his arguments would have required several chapters. In a similar way, the
aim of the present section is not to produce an exhaustive assessment of
Taguieff's work, but simply to reflect critically on the particular points which
I have just outlined. While recognising the importance of his contribution, I
want in fact to draw attention to a number of problems with Taguieff's
analysis of the crisis of anti-racism in contemporary France. More
specifically, I want to suggest that many of his criticisms of SOS-Racisme are
misplaced. An examination of his critique of SOS-Racisme is, nevertheless,
extremely valuable as it helps to clarify the nature of the association's
development and the challenges which faced it in the early 1990s.
A first issue is Taguieff's portrayal of anti-racism in France during the 1980s
as 'essentially' a media-oriented movement aimed at preventing the rise of
Le Pen and the National Front (Taguieff 1996b: 293). In my view, this
presents an unjustifiably narrow and partial characterisation of the anti-
racist movement at the time. It completely ignores, for example, the action of
young Franco-Maghrebians against racism and for equal rights in the 1983
and 1984 Marches and subsequently in a host of local associations
(Bouamama 1994; Abdallah 2000). Similarly, it marginalises the contribution
of more established but less visible anti-racist organisations such as the
MRAP and the LDH (House 1997; Lloyd 1998).
In effect, Taguieff reduces the anti-racist movement to one particular
organisation, SOS-Racisme, whose action he defines as primarily media-
based and directed against the National Front. Although, as I noted in
Chapter 3, the tendency to equate SOS-Racisme with the anti-racist
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movement as a whole is fairly widespread in the literature, it does lead to
analytical confusion. In the case of Taguieff here, the result is a misleading
and one-dimensional representation of anti-racist action in France during the
1980s. Moreover, it could be argued that Taguieff also presents a caricatured,
even stereotypical view of SOS-Racisme. Now, it is undeniable that the
association has attached - and continues to attach - great importance to
building an effective media strategy (see Chapter 5 and also Ossman-Dorent
1988; Hanine 1992; Juhem 1999). However, this is by no means the only way
in which it has attempted to combat racism. As the brief historical sketch of
SOS-Racisme provided in Chapter 1 showed, from an early stage the
association was involved in debates about citizenship, nationality law and
'integration' policies. It has also attempted to promote grassroots action in
suburban housing estates through the Maison des Potes and OBU initiatives,
as well as in other areas through its network of local committees (see
Chapter 2). The extent to which these strategies have been effective is open
to question, but this does not alter the fundamental point that the association
has not simply relied on media events nor focused exclusively on the
struggle against the National Front.
Secondly, it is undoubtedly the case that Taguieff's distinction between four
different forms of anti-racism - media-oriented, political, juridical and
scientific - is an important attempt to clarify the diverse nature of
contemporary anti-racist discourses and practices (1995: 261). However,
when he comes to analyse the 'crisis' of anti-racism, he does not always make
clear whether he is referring to one or all of these. There is frequently a
slippage from a specific type of anti-racism to anti-racism more generally,
even within the same paragraph (see, for example, 1993: 386). Moreover,
despite being the main focus of Taguieff's critique, 'media-oriented anti-
racism' is never satisfactorily defined. To what does it refer? Taguieff writes
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that it is 'illustrated (illustre)' by SOS-Racisme (1995: 233), and on occasion he
uses the phrase interchangeably with 'rhetorical anti-racism (antiracisme
rhetorique)' (1993: 371). However, the precise nature and limits of a 'media-
oriented' form of anti-racism are not specified. Instead, it is simply
denounced. This raises the possibility that the idea of a 'media-oriented' anti-
racism is intended to function more as a rhetorical device for polemical
purposes than as an analytical tool.
Thirdly, Taguieff discusses the 'political manipulation' of anti-racism in
France during the 1980s only in general terms, without exploring fully the
mechanisms by which it was supposedly accomplished. He argues that anti-
racism was used by 'certain currents and [...] certain formations - and not
only on the Left (certains courants et [...] certaines formations - et pas
seulement a gauche)' as a means of forging a distinct identity in a period of
ideological convergence between the main parties on matters of economic
policy. It is clear, nevertheless, that Taguieff's main target is the Left and
'essentially the Socialists in power {pour 1'essentief les socialistes au
pouvoif) (1996a: 16-7). What is missing, however, is a detailed analysis of
the links between left-wing parties and the anti-racist movement. 'Anti-
racism', 'the Left' and 'the Socialists' are not homogeneous entities, nor is
there a straightforward relationship between them. On the contrary, a range
of different perspectives on the anti-racist struggle exist on the Left, and
even within the Socialist Party itself opposing currents or factions have
historically approached anti-racism in different ways (see Geisser 1997).
Conversely, anti-racist activists do not necessarily share the same conception
of how their action relates to a broader political project, as I showed in
Chapter 2. The complex relationships between sections of the anti-racist
movement, on the one hand, and the political party system, on the other, are
simply not addressed in Taguieff's work.
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Important aspects of Taguieff's characterisation of the anti-racist movement
in France during the 1980s are, therefore, open to question. His 'internal'
critique of anti-racism's representations of racism and ideological
contradictions can also be criticised on a number of grounds. The first of
these relates to the concept of the 'new racism1 or 'neo-racism'. This notion
has been the focus of considerable debate for almost two decades now and it
not my intention to review the extensive literature on the subject here.3
However, it is perhaps worth noting that there are several reasons for
treating the notion with some caution.
In my view, firstly, the 'new-ness' of cultural forms of racism remains to be
established. Taguieff himself states at one point that differentialist racism
emerged in Western Europe in the 1970s (1991b: 39), although elsewhere he
claims that biological racism has been 'almost a rarity1 since the Nazi period,
citing the example of the apartheid regime in South Africa and its use of the
notion of cultural differences to legitimate the idea of 'separate development'
(1991b: 34). Silverman (1992) has suggested that an essentialised notion of
culture can be traced back even further, to the formation of the modern
French nation-state and definitions of republican citizenship. A second issue
is whether it is correct to speak, as Taguieff does, of two different types of
racism - discriminatory and differentialist. The French sociologist Michel
Wieviorka has argued strongly that there are not two 'types' but rather two
different 'logics' of racism which can be related in complex ways in any
concrete manifestation of the phenomenon (see Wieviorka 1993b, 1994,
1997b). To be fair, Taguieff is himself aware of this possibility, although he
continues to refer to two (ideal) 'types' of racism (1995: 260).
In the last section, I outlined three of the ideological contradictions which
Taguieff claims can be detected in 'anti-racist discourse'. A detailed analysis
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of SOS-Racisme's public statements, I would argue, does not always support
Taguieff's conclusions. The first contradiction described above was between
on the one hand, a commitment to the preservation of cultural differences
and, on the other, an emphasis on hybridity and cultural or 'racial' mixing.
Although Taguieff's argument about this 'pluricultural contradiction' may be
valid for other sections of the anti-racist movement in France, it does not
appear to apply to SOS-Racisme. As the next chapter shows, SOS-Racisme
has fairly consistently adhered to the second of these positions, in spite of a
widespread perception (which Taguieff appears to share) that it has
oscillated between 'multiculturalism' and 'integration'.
SOS-Racisme's evolution over the course of the 1980s did not, I suggest in
Chapter 7, involve an alternation between 'heterophobic' and 'heterophilic'
perspectives on difference. There was instead a fundamental continuity in
the association's vision of 'the ideal society'. Although it moved from the
language of multiculturalism and hybridity (metissage) in the mid-1980s to a
stress on integration by the end of the decade, I claim that a republican
assimilationist model of social cohesion was present throughout. On the
other hand, as I show in the same chapter, the way in which SOS-Racisme's
spokespeople have appealed to hybridity in their campaigns does reveal a
slippage between an egalitarian and an elitist conception of this notion.
In a similar way, I would argue that aspects of Taguieff's 'external' critique of
anti-racist action in contemporary France are unconvincing. In the first place,
his conclusion that anti-racism in France during the 1980s failed 'according to
its own norms (selon ses propres normes)' (1993: 371) assumes that it was
indeed 'essentially' a movement against the rise of Le Pen and the National
Front. Now, as I have suggested above, this is a simplistic and partial
characterisation of the anti-racist movement - as opposed to specific
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organisations - during this period. Even accepting, for the sake of argument,
a depiction of the anti-racist movement in these terms, is it legitimate to
imply, as Taguieff does in places (e.g. 1996a: 14), that anti-racist activists bear
the brunt of the responsibility for failing to prevent the continued expansion
of the far-Right? As Fode Sylla, then president of SOS-Racisme, argued in the
newspaper article mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter:
Our role is to lead public debate, to influence people's opinions, but it
is not up to us to make [political] decisions. If the National Front still
exists today, it is above all because integration policies have not been
carried through. (Sylla 1996b)4
Whether or not one shares the specific conclusion drawn by Sylla, it is
certainly the case that politicians bear a significant, if not the primary
responsibility, for either actively promoting or failing to impede the
progression of the National Front.5 While this is not to deny that anti-racists
in France may have committed significant errors, some of which Taguieff has
undoubtedly correctly identified, it is too simplistic to imply that the
increasing influence of the far-Right during the 1980s was due in large part
to a 'crisis' of the anti-racist movement.
Nevertheless, Taguieff is surely correct to draw attention to the limited
effectiveness of a recourse to legal sanctions (a 'juridical' form of anti-racism)
in the face of the emergence of the National Front as a mass political party.
The idea that the National Front should or even could simply be banned, one
which has resurfaced periodically over the past fifteen years (e.g. Amard et
al 1997), is deeply problematic for the reasons which he outlines. Similarly, it
is true that the anti-racist movement has not always accurately analysed
changing configurations of racist ideologies in the recent period. However,
Taguieff's suggestion (1993: 386-7) that anti-racists simply abandoned the
idea of national identity and the nation-state as a framework for the
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elaboration of political identities is, I would argue, simply wrong. On the
contrary, anti-racist organisations such as SOS-Racisme played a key role in
debates over national identity throughout the 1980s. In particular, they
actively contributed to the development towards the end of the decade of a
form of republican nationalism centred around the idea of a specifically
republican model of integration (see Chapter 7). Whereas for Taguieff (1996c:
65) such an integrationist (or assimilationist) approach forms part of the
solution to the 'crisis' of anti-racism, I will argue instead that it is deeply
problematic as the basis for an effective anti-racist strategy.
This leads, finally, to Taguieff's recommendations for the 'reform' of anti-
racism in France. As noted above, one of his main proposals is for a re¬
orientation of anti-racism so that it is defined more broadly as the fight
against all forms of discrimination. He calls in particular for social policies to
tackle socio-economic and ethnic segregation, as an 'indirect' way of
preventing the emergence of racism, as well as greater attention to civic
education (1996c: 12). Here again, however, I would argue that Taguieff's
criticism is misplaced, for the simple reason that anti-racist associations such
as SOS-Racisme had already re-oriented their action in this direction by the
late 1980s.
SOS-Racisme, for example explicitly sought, from 1987 onwards (and in a
more limited way before that), to promote anti-racism through the activity of
a network of neighbourhood committees as well as through high-profile,
national media events (Desir and SOS-Racisme 1987). Similarly, the
association repeatedly called on successive Socialist governments of the late
1980s and early 1990s to introduce 'integration' policies and to improve the
living conditions and economic prospects of people living in suburban
housing estates (see, for example, Le Monde, 5 April 1988; Le Quotidien de
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Paris, 11 September 1989; Le Monde, 28 April 1990). It was also actively
involved in the annual 'Week of education against racism (Semaine
d'education contre le racisme)' in schools (see Rollot 1991), part of what
Taguieff would consider civic education. In these ways, I would argue,
sections of the anti-racist movement in France, including SOS-Racisme, had
already moved to an 'indirect' approach to the struggle against racism
(through socio-economic and other policies) some years before Taguieff
published his critique.
The problems which I have identified with Taguieff's analysis of the crisis of
anti-racism, and with his critique of SOS-Racisme in particular, draw
attention to the main weakness of his approach. This is its lack of grounding
in a sociological understanding of the heterogeneous nature and evolution of
the anti-racist movement and its action in contemporary France. He presents
a highly selective account of anti-racism, which ignores whole sections of the
anti-racist movement and shows little appreciation of developments after
(around) 1985. Although he claims to develop an 'external' critique of anti-
racist action 'as it is conducted (telle qu'elle est conduitey (1993: 357), he
provides little empirical analysis of what it is anti-racists actually do. Indeed,
as Alastair Bonnett has recently noted: 'Taguieff's illustrations of anti-racist
activity are suspiciously sketchy and abstract' (Bonnett 2000: 167). To a
certain extent this is inevitable, given the dearth of sociological research on
anti-racism which I acknowledged in the introductory chapter.
Nevertheless, Taguieff tends to rely almost exclusively on newspaper and
magazine interviews with the spokespeople of leading anti-racist
organisations such as SOS-Racisme. These are useful, but only up to a point.
In particular, they rarely give an insight into the perspectives and 'discourse'
of grassroots activists (or sympathisers) as opposed to those of the leaders;
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nor do they provide an adequate account of the range and complexity of
actual anti-racist practice. For these reasons, I would argue, Taguieff's
reliance on such sources as the basis for an 'external' critique of anti-racist
action (as opposed to an analysis of anti-racist 'discourse') is problematic. In
this thesis, in contrast, I attempt to evaluate the 'discourse' and practice of
SOS-Racisme through a detailed, ethnographic study of the association's
actual activity at both a national and a local level. As later chapters will
reveal, this approach produced material which suggested very different
conclusions to those of Taguieff on the 'crisis' of anti-racism in contemporary
France.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have focused on the contribution of the political philosopher
Pierre-Andre Taguieff to debates about the 'crisis' of anti-racism in
contemporary France. Taguieff's analysis of the contradictions of anti-racist
'discourse' and the weaknesses of current forms of anti-racist action is the
most comprehensive and systematic discussion of the subject in French
(there is no work of comparable historical and philosophical depth to date in
English). As I have argued in this chapter, however, the critique of anti-
racism in France during the 1980s and early 1990s which Taguieff presents is,
to a significant extent, based on a one-dimensional and now out-dated
characterisation of the anti-racist movement in that country. Many of his
criticisms of SOS-Racisme, in particular, ignore the ways in which the
association has developed since the mid-1980s. In the light of this, one of the
central aims of the present thesis is to examine the strengths and the
limitations of the association's contribution to the struggle against racism in
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the mid-1990s on the basis of an in-depth sociological study of its
development over an eighteen-month period.
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Notes
1 The anthropologist Verena Stolcke has made a similar distinction between
'traditional racism' and 'cultural fundamentalism' (Stolcke 1995: 7-8).
2 \. deplacer la lutte contre le racisme de l'affrontement rhetorique
instrumental a la transformation des conditions ou des facteurs presidant a
son surgissement.'
3 In Britain, Martin Barker was one of the first commentators to formulate the
concept of 'the new racism' (Barker 1981, 1983; Barker and Beezer 1984. Cf.
Ben-Tovim 1978). Both the usefulness and the limitations of Barker's analysis
have been discussed at length in the literature (see, for example Gilroy 1987:
43-71; Miles 1989: 62-66, 1993: 71-78; Brah 1996: 165-170; Solomos and Back
1996:16-22). Apart from Taguieff, and to a lesser extent Wieviorka, the other
French theorist to have made an important contribution to the development
of the concept of neo-racism is Colette Guillaumin (Guillaumin 1995). For a
critical overview of the French debates, see Silverman 1999: 40-65). Of course,
the idea of 'cultural racism' had been used by Frantz Fanon as early as the
1950s (Fanon 1970).
4 'Notre role est de mener le debat public, d'agir sur les consciences, mais les
decisions ne nous appartiennent pas. Si le Front national existe encore
aujourd'hui, c'est avant tout parce que les politiques d'integration n'ont pas
ete menees.'
5 For an analysis of the factors underlying the emergence and development
of the National Front, including the role played by mainstream political




National Identity, Multiculturalism and
Integration
This chapter examines SOS-Racisme's contribution to public debates about
national identity and immigration in France during the 1980s, focusing on its
interpretation of the concepts of multiculturalism and integration. As will
become apparent in the discussion of the 'headscarf affair' presented in
Chapter 10, the promotion of integration remained a central objective of the
association during the period of my fieldwork (1993-4), informing both its
policy proposals and public pronouncements. The aim of the present chapter
is to explore the often subtle shifts in the terminology employed by SOS-
Racisme in the period from its creation in 1984 to the publication, in 1990, of
its 'Manifesto for Integration (Manifeste pour 1'integration)* (SOS-Racisme
1990). Certain commentators have viewed the association's development
during these years in terms of a rupture, a move away from multiculturalism
towards a commitment to a Republican model of integration. However, the
account which I present below highlights the fact that, beneath the shifts in
vocabulary which undoubtedly occurred in the late 1980s, the way in which
SOS-Racisme 'imagined' (Anderson 1983) the French nation remained fairly
constant.
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National Identity and Republican Traditions
In a now classic study of the origins and development of nationalism,
Benedict Anderson argues that the nation is 'an imagined political
community1. It is 'imagined' in the sense that members of a nation, who may
never have direct, personal contact with each other, nevertheless conceive of
themselves as sharing a particular national bond or sense of belonging.
Anderson is not, therefore, suggesting that nations are false or somehow
illusory. His point, rather, is that they are created or constructed ('imagined')
entities. Nations can be distinguished in terms of the different ways or
'styles' in which this process of imagining occurs (1983:15).1
More recently, Frangoise Lorcerie has articulated a similar conception of
national identity. In a discussion of the active role played by French social
scientists in debates about national identity in the early 1990s, she states that:
National identity is the (emergent) result of countless daily
accomplishments by the national population. Taken as a whole, these
accomplishments constitute the process of identisation of the national
population. Among these accomplishments, certain are deliberate
symbolic actions aiming at the identity of the national 'we': they
constitute 'assertions {prises)' of national identity. (Lorcerie 1994: 276)2
The construction and maintenance of a national identity, in other words, is a
continuous, and symbolic, process in which specific representations of the
national collectivity are asserted or, in a more literal translation of Lorcerie's
phrase, 'seized'. She argues that the struggle to impose a particular
conception of national identity is a crucial aspect of politics in democratic
states (1994: 277).
One of the ways in which such identities are 'imagined' or symbolised, and
continuity with the past claimed, is through the invention of national
traditions. As the historian Eric Hobsbawm has explained:
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We should not be misled by a curious, but understandable, paradox:
modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the
opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the
opposite of constructed, namely human communities so 'natural' as to
require no definition other than self-assertion. Whatever the historic
or other continuities embedded in the modern concept of 'France' and
'the French' - and which nobody would seek to deny - these very
concepts themselves must include a constructed or 'invented'
component. (Hobsbawm 1983a: 14)
The invention of a national (or other type of) tradition may have one of three
important political functions. Firstly, it can be a way of defining group
membership or solidarity. Secondly, the invention of a tradition may help to
legitimise specific institutions, social statuses or types of social relationship.
Finally, an invented tradition can play a role in the process of socialisation,
as a vehicle for the transmission of beliefs and values (Hobsbawm 1993a: 9).
There is now a sizeable literature on the invention of national traditions not
only in Western Europe but also elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, as
David McCrone has pointed out, there exists an imbalance in the way in
which the concept of 'invented tradition' has usually been applied: 'The
"construction" of tradition is often a charge made against new or
oppositional nationalisms rather than those of the "centre" whose traditions
are deemed matters of fact, because they are matters of power' (1998: 44).
McCrone emphasises that it is necessary to analyse the invention of tradition
by nationalisms at the political 'centre' as well as the periphery. This is an
important argument, and one which informs the present chapter's
examination of the 're-invention' of the Republican tradition in France
during the 1980s.
My point of departure here is a recognition that the process of national
identity construction through the invention of traditions is not confined to
'the genesis of Nation-states [la genese des Etats-nations)' (Lorcerie 1994:
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247). In the case of France, three key periods (at least) can be distinguished in
the past century and a half. The first is the early years of the Third Republic
(1870-1940), when a major invention of 'Republican' traditions (the
institution of the secular school, ceremonies and monuments) occurred. As
Hobsbawm has shown, these played a crucial role in legitimising and
mobilising support for a relatively fragile social order (Hobsbawm 1983b:
269-73).
The period after the Second World War can be considered a second
important phase of national identity construction or, in Lorcerie's phrase,
'national identisation'. In Deconstructing the nation: immigration, racism and
citizenship in modern France (1992), Max Silverman has analysed the way in
which the idea developed at this time that France had had a long and
successful history of assimilating immigrants and that it had only been
relatively recently, and with the arrival of non-European immigrants, that an
assimilation 'problem' had emerged. Silverman claims that:
The retrospective use of assimilation [was] part of a reformulation of
the nation and nationalism after the war, especially around Gaullism:
that is, grafting a retrospective unity, uniformity and continuity on to
the image of the nation after the chasm of occupation and
collaboration. (Silverman 1992:106)
A distinction was drawn between the 'unproblematic' assimilation of
European immigrants in the past and the inability of contemporary African
and other non-European migrants to assimilate. This formed part of the
racialisation of immigration in the post-war period, and depended on a
reconstruction or 're-invention' of a tradition of assimilation which
effectively ignored historical tensions around migration and the place of
immigrants in French society (Silverman 1992: 95-106).
The third, and most recent, period in the re-invention of a French national
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identity, I would argue, is the 1980s and early 1990s. In an important article,
Frangoise Lorcerie (1994) has analysed the way in which the theme of
integration was taken up at the beginning of the 1990s within the social
sciences, giving rise to a mass of publications on immigration, the nation and
national identity. She argues persuasively that the debate on integration
among social scientists in France during the period 1989-1993 contributed to
the (re-)articulation of a specifically 'Republican' national identity. Lorcerie
analyses the 'assertions of national identity {prises d'identite nationale)'
contained in the work of a number of prominent French social scientists, and
suggests that these authors played a key role in defining and propagating a
'Republican nationalist' version of the nation. In particular, this involved the
development of the notion of a distinctively 'French' model of national
integration based on citizenship, rather than ethnicity, and Republican
values (see Lorcerie 1994: 257ff.). In the remainder of this chapter, I argue
that SOS-Racisme contributed to this process through a series of high-profile
'assertions {prises)' of national identity, in relation to concepts of hybridity
and integration, during the second half of the 1980s.
Multiculturalism, Hybridity and Difference
The relationship between national identity and immigration emerged as a
central issue of public debate in France during the 1980s, in part as a result of
the rise of the National Front (see Taguieff 1994; Schnapper 1994). This led to
a discussion among both anglophone and francophone scholars working on
France about key themes such as 'the right to be different {le droit a la
difference)' and the 'integration' of immigrants. In general terms, anglophone
writers have tended either to defend the former notion (Fysh 1998; Vichniac
1991), or to emphasise the problematic nature of the integration concept in
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current French debates (Silverman 1992; Blatt 1995,1997). Their francophone
counterparts, on the other hand, have usually been sharply critical of 'the
right to be different' (Taguieff 1990a; Guillaumin 1995; Belghoul 1984), but
rather more positive about the integrationist 'model' (Weil and Crowley
1994).
However, a number of prominent French or francophone sociologists have
recently started to reflect upon the possible relevance for France of debates
about multiculturalism taking place in countries such as the United States,
Canada and Britain (see Wieviorka 1996a; Semprini 1997; Martiniello 1997).
In Vers un multiculturalisme frangais (1996) the anthropologist Jean-Loup
Amselle has also broached this subject, although drawing on quite different
sources (the historiography of France and African ethnography). In both
cases, a focus on the theme of multiculturalism is presented as a 'necessary'
response to two phenomena: the 'crisis' of the Republican model of
integration discussed later in this chapter and the emergence and expansion
of Le Pen's National Front (Wieviorka 1996b: 6-7; Amselle 1996:12-18).
Current social scientific interest in multiculturalism is, nevertheless,
occurring largely in the absence of wider public debate of the issue. This
situation is no doubt a logical extension of the gap between academic and
public opinion on the more general question of integration which has been
noted by other researchers (see House 1995: 79). Nevertheless, it stands in
marked contrast to the early 1980s, a period which witnessed prolonged and
at times acrimonious public debate about multiculturalism but produced
comparatively little social scientific discussion of the subject. In the first
section of this chapter I want to examine the nature of SOS-Racisme's
contribution to the exploration of multiculturalism which occurred in France
in the years following the Socialists' victory at the 1981 presidential and
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legislative elections.
An examination of SOS-Racisme's public pronouncements in the period
immediately following the association's creation in 1984 reveals the extent to
which its founders were still in the process of developing a coherent and
consistent vocabulary with which to address questions of anti-racism and
ethnic diversity. A newspaper report on the association's first press
conference, for example, attributes the following comment to Harlem Desir:
our basic step was a desire to start from what each of us was
experiencing around them to show that assimilation is possible, that
multiraciality is sometimes experienced positively. That it is good to
live with foreigners, that it is a way of travelling without going
anywhere and that it is beneficial for society [...]. They [secondary
school students] are experiencing the multicoloured society here and
now. (Liberation, 20 February 1985, my emphases)3
Although the term assimilation was to be avoided in subsequent interviews,
early statements by SOS-Racisme's leadership continued to juxtapose
references to a 'multicoloured', 'multiracial', 'multiconfessional' and
'multicultural' France (see, for example, Desir 1985: 144-5). It was only in the
second half of 1985 that the association's spokespeople began to place greater
emphasis on the notion of multiculturalism and consequently to employ the
adjectives 'multicoloured' and 'multiracial' with less frequency.
One of the problems involved in assessing SOS-Racisme's interpretation of
multiculturalism is that the association never published a manifesto-type
statement of its position, as it was subsequently to do in relation to
'integration'. Moreover, the association used the term for a relatively short
period of time, roughly from the spring of 1985 until the autumn of 1986
when it began to be replaced by the concept of integration (e.g. Le Matin, 30-
31 August 1986). As a result, it is necessary to reconstruct SOS-Racisme's
understanding of the nature of a multicultural society from brief references
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in newspaper interviews and other published sources.
However, it remains difficult to determine the positive meaning which
members of the association attached to the idea of multiculturalism. In an
interview in 1990, for example, Harlem Desir argued that SOS-Racisme never
defined multiculturalism in the 'Anglo-Saxon' sense of the co-existence of
relatively closed 'communities' (1990: 47). This statement is problematic for a
number of different reasons. In the first place, it provides only a negative
definition of the association's conception of multiculturalism which does
little to clarify the issue. Secondly, it assumes that there is a single
interpretation of 'multiculturalism1 in 'Anglo-Saxon' countries. As Marable
(1995: 119) has emphasised, however, there are 'strikingly different and
sometimes conflicting interpretations' of the meaning of multiculturalism in
The Netherlands, Britain and the United States.
Nevertheless, an examination of SOS-Racisme's early statements highlights
two main points. Firstly, the association emphasised that France was a
multicultural society in the sense that young people from different
'communities' lived together in the same housing estates, attended the same
schools and pursued similar leisure activities. As Bouamama (1994: 119) has
indicated, this was a point which had previously been highlighted by the
organisers of Convergence 84 (see also Chapter 1 of this thesis). According to
the leadership of SOS-Racisme, however, the originality of the new
organisation lay in a capacity to reflect the multicultural nature of France in
its own composition. The 1983 March and Convergence 84 were portrayed,
somewhat simplistically, as actions which did not extend beyond the Franco-
Maghrebian community (referred to in the singular), whereas it was argued
that SOS-Racisme had proved successful in also mobilising members of the
Jewish and other communities. The association's spokespeople repeatedly
215
stressed that it was unique in creating 'an intercommunal solidarity (une
solidarity intercommunautaire)' through its campaigns and in its
membership (Desir 1985: 33 and passim). (This was a claim which members
of the association continued to make during the period of my fieldwork: 'The
specificity of the association [i.e. SOS-Racisme] is I think that we are the only
anti-racist association which is not community-based or directly dependent
on a political party.' [Tape-recorded interview with Helene, 10 November
1994.]4)
Thus, members of SOS-Racisme insisted that multiculturalism was not a
political project which they were attempting to realise but rather the reality
of contemporary French society. According to Desir (1985:145), racism could
be explained as a refusal to acknowledge the multicultural composition of
France by a fraction of the population 'sick with old age and fear (malade de
vieillesse et depeur)\ He claimed, in contrast, that SOS-Racisme's popularity
among young people derived from the fact that the latter accepted
'difference' as an aspect of their everyday lives and social relationships:
'Difference is their universe' (Desir 1985:145). Underlying this argument was
the implication that in giving voice to young people's opposition to racism,
SOS-Racisme was also effectively contributing to a 'modernisation' of the
society's self-representation by forcing recognition of cultural diversity.
This leads on to the second point which is that SOS-Racisme's spokespeople
appeared to equate multiculturalism with a positive evaluation of cultural
complexity. Harlem Desir, for example, stated that one of the aims of SOS-
Racisme was to highlight the necessity of 'valuing the richness arising from
the meeting of cultures (valoriser la richesse nee de la rencontre entre toutes
les culturesy (1985: 33). The association repeatedly argued that cultural
differences contributed to the dynamism and strength of the country and
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were to be celebrated rather than rejected (Temoignage Chretien, 12 May
1985; Liberation, 17 June 1985). In so doing, SOS-Racisme again appeared to
adopt one of the objectives of Convergence 84 which had been to challenge
the idea of France as a culturally homogeneous nation. There was, however,
a certain ambivalence about SOS-Racisme's position on this issue, as is
indicated by the following comment by Harlem Desir in the run-up to the
Place de la Concorde concert in June 1985:
The show will demonstrate .. .that multicultural France is not a Utopia.
For a start, on the stage there will be artists representing all the
cultures with which French young people identify ... It will be a
demonstration of the great mixing (metissage) which has already
taken place. (Liberation, 13 June 1985)5
Although Desir refers here to France as a multicultural society, his
subsequent use of the notion of metissage implies a very specific
understanding of cultural complexity and difference. The argument appears
to be that young people identify with a type of hybrid culture, common to
them all, but which incorporates elements from a diverse range of sources.
This is similar to the interpretation of multiculturalism, referred to earlier, as
a form of intercommunal solidarity rather than as the coexistence of
relatively discrete 'communities'. What Desir is suggesting in the passage
above is that 'French culture' is diverse and heterogeneous but it is
nevertheless singular in the sense of being shared by and common to all
groups in society.
In the light of this point, the distance between SOS-Racisme's view of
multiculturalism and the concept of 'the right to be different' becomes
readily apparent. As formulated by the French Socialist Party (PS) from the
mid-1970s onwards, the right to be different implied a recognition of the
specificity of regional identities and cultures through, for example, proposals
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for the teaching of regional languages and a certain level of economic
decentralisation (Safran 1984, 1985). The culmination of this movement
towards cultural and ethnic pluralism within the PS was the 1982 Giordan
Report which held that ethnic, religious and linguistic 'minorities' should not
be deprived of the right to practise their own religion and culture, as well as
to speak their own language (see Vichniac 1991: 43-44). Now, while SOS-
Racisme shared a commitment to supporting cultural diversity, its
conception of a hybrid 'French culture' tended to stress shared cultural forms
(such as the common, albeit diverse, musical tastes of young people) rather
than the existence of a number of separate cultural or ethnic identities. For
this reason, I would suggest that it is mistaken to associate SOS-Racisme
with 'the praising of the right to be different (1'eloge du droit a la difference)'
at this time (Perrineau 1997: 50). Instead, SOS-Racisme sought to highlight
the participation of young people in a common culture and shared activities,
a view which is in fact much closer to a notion of integration than to the right
to be different.
For the same reason, I would argue that while SOS-Racisme's minimal
definition of multiculturalism is open to serious objections, as I indicate
below, it does not involve the ideological contradiction which Taguieff has
described as 'the "pluricultural" contradiction (la contradiction du
«pluriculturel»y (1993: 359). According to Taguieff, the use of terms such as
'pluricultural' and 'multicultural' by anti-racists has frequently masked a
contradiction between two competing positions. The first is represented by
the right to be different, understood as an 'unconditional' commitment to
respect group identities and to ensure their preservation. The second
corresponds more closely to notions of metissage and melange, that is, to the
fusion or eventual elimination of group differences, informed by the view
that difference is the cause of racism. Anti-racist arguments about cultural
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difference have, Taguieff argues, frequently asserted these two incompatible
positions simultaneously (see Chapter 6).
It should be clear from the material presented above that SOS-Racisme has
never adhered to the strict definition of the right to be different which
Taguieff proposes. Rather, the association has fairly consistently adopted the
second orientation, and linked the notion of multiculturalism to that of a
hybrid or syncretic culture. Although SOS-Racisme subsequently abandoned
the language of multiculturalism for a concept of integration, it retained a
vision of France as a society [du melangd (see Desir and SOS-Racisme 1987:
15). (There is some evidence, nonetheless, of the tension between 'egalitarian'
and 'elitist' conceptions of hybridity identified by Taguieff in anti-racist
'discourse' and which I discussed in the last chapter. On the one hand, the
association has insisted that hybridity is universal and effectively part of the
human condition [Desir and SOS-Racisme 1985]. On the other, however, it is
sometimes implied that hybridity [metissage] is a mark of cultural or
aesthetic superiority [e.g. interview with Harlem Desir in Temoignage
Chretien, 12 May 1985].)
Not only did SOS-Racisme's notion of multiculturalism run counter to
previous definitions of the right to be different, however, it also departed
from the concept of a multicultural society which had been developed by
Franco-Maghrebian activists in the early 1980s. According to Bouamama
(1994: 102), the organisers of Convergence 84 rejected the idea that the
national bond was in any sense cultural or identity-based. They argued that
the political unity of the nation did not depend on cultural uniformity but
was constituted instead through citizenship. It followed, as a result, that a
recognition of cultural diversity did not represent a threat to national unity.6
Convergence 84's commitment to multiculturalism was combined, however,
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with a demand for equal rights. Multiculturalism without equality was
viewed as leading only to a perpetuation of injustice and social segregation.
Now, Bouamama argues that it was precisely the link between
multiculturalism and equal rights which was broken by SOS-Racisme. He
suggests that SOS-Racisme redefined multiculturalism simply as a tolerance
for or celebration of cultural diversity without connecting this to the concern
for equal rights and a dissociation of citizenship from nationality which had
characterised Convergence 84's position. In his view, SOS-Racisme thus
contributed to a 'folklorisation' of multiculturalism which reduced it to a
preoccupation with different types of food and music. Moreover, Bouamama
claims that SOS-Racisme further undermined the radical potential of the
concept of multiculturalism by subordinating it to the notion of metissage.
He proposes that in fact SOS-Racisme's promotion of metissage constituted a
denial of the multicultural nature of France:
What is refused here is the existence of several cultures constituent of
a changing French identity. French identity remains single and
monolithic. Ideas of synthesis, mixing and blending logically follow
from this. One goes back to the old idea of the 'French melting-pot', in
which different cultures are mixed, resulting in a single but hybrid
(metissee) culture. To the idea of multiculturalism is opposed that of
mixture. For the affirmation of a wish for convergence is substituted
that of mixture. (Bouamama 1994:123)7
According to Bouamama, this reflected a desire on the part of SOS-Racisme's
leadership and their supporters in the PS to defuse the debate on national
identity which had emerged with the rise of the National Front (FN) in the
early 1980s. In such a context, he suggests, the recognition of a truly
multicultural French identity-with notably a North African or Arab
component-was perceived as running counter to the current state of a public
opinion susceptible to the FN's nationalist rhetoric. In contrast, the notion of
metissage appeared to reaffirm the integrity and cohesiveness of French
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national culture and identity, while still acknowledging its incorporation of
different cultures.
One of the most striking (and unacknowledged) features of the divergences
among anti-racist and Franco-Maghrebian activists in the 1980s around the
notion of metissage is the extent to which they mirrored an earlier debate
involving French colonialists and peoples in the Creole territories of
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana and La Reunion. As Franchise Verges has
explained, French colonialists and nationalists differed in the 1930s and
1940s in their attitudes to metissage. The former supported it as an aspect of
assimilation; the latter were opposed to the notion on the grounds of
safeguarding 'racial purity1. Creole peoples, however, rejected both of these
perspectives. In particular:
African and Caribbean intellectuals ... argued that the assimilationist
version of metissage occulted the unequal relation between European
and non-European cultures. Its aim was nothing more than the
extinction of local and native cultural practices. [...] Metissage was a
term too closely connected with the colonial project to be adopted by
the colonized. If metissage acknowledged the cultural productions in
non-European territories, its use by European assimilationists was
aimed at subsuming these productions into European culture. (Verges
1996:141)
A similar argument is implicit in Bouamama's critique of the emphasis
placed on metissage by SOS-Racisme in the mid-1980s. The association's
marginalisation of the struggle for equality in favour of a minimal notion of
multiculturalism effectively resulted in a concept of hybrid culture which
failed to recognise the power relationships structuring the process of
metissage. As in the case of Creole territories discussed by Verges, metissage
in France during the 1980s implied a recognition of cultural diversity, but it
also carried potentially assimilationist implications which SOS-Racisme's
leadership would undoubtedly have resisted in other contexts.8 What
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remained absent in SOS-Racisme's promotion of the term, in short, was an
interrogation of its historical link with European assimilationism and the
appropriateness of its continued use in a post-colonial context.
In the event, SOS-Racisme was subsequently to substitute alternative terms
for multiculturalism and metissage, at least partly in response to the
emergence of what Taguieff has described as a 'differentialist racism1 (see
Taguieff 1995: Ch. IX).9 The appropriation of the notion of 'difference' by the
far right in order to legitimate inequality and racist exclusion led the
association to reaffirm publicly its opposition to le droit a la difference (e.g.
Desir and SOS-Racisme 1987: 36). In particular, Harlem Desir's comments on
the current affairs television programme L'Heure de verite in August 1987
were widely interpreted as signalling a transition from a multiculturalist
stance to a more 'Republican' concept of integration (Liberation, 21 August
1987; Le Monde, 27 October 1987). It is certainly true that SOS-Racisme's
terminology shifted during this period, but to what extent did this reflect an
underlying conceptual or ideological change?
Integration and the Republican Tradition
In order to address this question, it is useful to begin by setting SOS-
Racisme's choice of terminology in a wider political context. As Frangoise
Gaspard (1992) has outlined, the 1980s witnessed a number of important
changes in the political and administrative language employed to refer to the
incorporation of foreigners and immigrants into French society. Through an
analysis of parliamentary debates, ministerial speeches and administrative
circulars covering a ten-year period (1981-1991), she traces the shifting usage
of the terms assimilation, insertion and integration by left- and right-wing
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politicians during these years. She reveals that at the start of the decade the
Left's interventions in debates about immigration tended to be phrased in
terms of insertion, whereas the Right characteristically employed the word
integration.10 By the time of the its return to power in 1988, however, the Left
had abandoned 'insertion' and 'integration' became 'so to speak the official
term for referring to settled immigrant populations (en quelque sorte le
terme officielpourparler de l'immigration sedentarisee)' (Gaspard 1992: 19).
After a brief period (1986-88) during which the Right increasingly referred to
insertion, it also ended the decade using 'integration' instead.
These brief comments on debates about integration among politicians in
France during the 1980s and early 1990s help to contextualise SOS-Racisme's
adoption of the concept in two ways. Firstly, they indicate that the
association's shift away from the term multiculturalisme in favour of
integration formed part of a wider movement on the political Left towards
the latter notion. Secondly, they raise the possibility that the priority
attached by SOS-Racisme to integration from 1987 onwards reflected, in
Lorcerie's terms, an initial 'assertion of national identity (prise d'identite
nationale)[ by the Republican left which was subsequently theorised by
social scientists. In the remainder of this section, I intend to explore the
concept of integration articulated by SOS-Racisme, providing an assessment
of its strengths and weaknesses and considering the extent to which it
differed from the association's previous interpretation of multiculturalism.
As I have already mentioned, SOS-Racisme's move towards a concept of
integration in 1986-7 was partly prompted by a recognition that the language
of 'difference' had been appropriated by the extreme right. In response, the
association sought to distance itself from the 'ambiguity' of 'the right to be
different' by emphasising the importance of equal rights and integration
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(Desir/SOS-Racisme 1987: 36). The first major public statement of SOS-
Racisme's position on and definition of integration was Harlem Desir's
appearance on L'Heure de verite, which was quickly followed by a book-
length discussion (Desir and SOS-Racisme 1987). Over the next four years,
the association gradually developed a set of detailed proposals for a specific
integration policy and called for the creation of a new government Ministry
for Integration (see SOS-Racisme 1990; Desir 1991).
The term integration had been used by SOS-Racisme's leadership before
1987, but its subsequent definition departed from earlier meanings. At the
time of the 1985 Concorde concert, the association's vice-president Julien
Dray had, for example, referred to 'the conditions of integration of the Beur
community (les conditions d'integration de la communaute beur)[ (Le
Quotidien de Paris, 15-16 June 1985). In a similar way, Harlem Desir later
spoke of the integration of 'communities' into French society (Le Matin, 30-31
August 1986). The concept of integration which SOS-Racisme articulated
after 1987, however, defined it unambiguously as an individual process.
During his appearance before the Nationality Commission created by
Jacques Chirac in 1987, Harlem Desir provided a concise statement of the
association's view of integration at the time:
The Republic is precisely the possibility for men and women of
different origins and cultures to live according to common values, to
adhere to shared principles of law and to be subject to the same
obligations with, in exchange, the same rights. This is our conception
of integration. (Harlem Desir, in Commission de la nationality 1988:
558-9)11
On the basis of this definition, it is possible to identify the different
constituent parts of SOS-Racisme's conceptualisation of integration. In the
first place, integration is presented as a commitment to a set of 'universal'
and Republican values. Secondly, the process of integration involves
224
individuals rather than 'communities' or groups. Thirdly, integration
presupposes a common legal framework and that individuals enjoy equal
rights and obligations. A fourth aspect can be added to the aforementioned,
which is the notion of reciprocity, 'one step on the part of immigrant
populations towards French society and one step by French society towards
immigrant populations {un pas de l'immigration vers la societe franqaise et
un pas de la societe vers 1 immigration)' (Malik Boutih [then Vice-President
of SOS-Racisme], quoted in L'Humanite, 3 May 1990.).12 An example of this
last point is Harlem Desir's proposal to the Nationality Commission that the
nation should grant French nationality at birth to all children of foreigners
(Commission de la nationality 1988: 550).
The promotion of the 'integration' of immigrants and their descendants
continued to be one of the association's primary objectives during the period
of my fieldwork (see Chapter 10). An activist in the local committee of which
I was a member provided the following commentary on the notion:
For me it is a concept which is a French concept and one which
existed beyond SOS-Racisme, or, at least, before SOS-Racisme, well
before. (Except that it is SOS-Racisme which has perhaps named and
popularised it.) And which is that in this country people could arrive
in waves of immigration with their differences, with their cultures,
and French society absorbed them along with something else. That is,
French society plus those people was not equivalent to French society
as it was before; it produced a new French society [...] a new
component was created. But it wasn't a question of different
communities living side by side each other. It was the case that you
were French, you weren't Algerian in France or Italian or Polish. You
didn't go to a Polish school or an Italian school; you went to a French
school. The Republican school. [...] I've always been very proud of
that model, which is different to the Anglo-Saxon model, with which
it is often contrasted, which is a so-called community-based model.
(Tape-recorded interview with Laurence, 7 December 1994)13
The 'French' concept of individual integration is contrasted here with a
supposedly 'Anglo-Saxon' multicultural approach in terms of discrete ethnic
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communities. Laurence also emphasises the difference between integration
and assimilation, presenting the former as a more reciprocal process in
which the host society is itself transformed.
While the reciprocal nature of the integration process has been consistently
highlighted by SOS-Racisme's spokespeople as a positive feature, the
association's use of integration is problematic, and for several reasons. It is
interesting to note in this connection that the weaknesses linked to it are the
same as those which Lorcerie has detected in intellectual debates about
integration in the early 1990s. This provides further confirmation of her
assertion that social scientists involved in this area have abandoned the
integration concept developed within the classical sociological tradition and
uncritically adopted many of the term's meanings in political debate or
common usage more generally (see Lorcerie 1994: 251).
In my view, there are three main objections which can be levelled against
SOS-Racisme's use of integration in its public statements and policy
proposals. I will simply highlight these here and provide a few examples.14
Firstly, the association defines integration in terms of 'common values
(valeurs communes)' 'universal values (valeurs universelles)', 'republican
values (valeurs repubiicaines)', but these are generally not specified. In the
passage quoted above from his appearance before the Nationality
Commission, for example, Harlem Desir leaves implicit the precise meaning
of the phrase 'common values (valeurs communes)1. In a similar way, a
precise and detailed definition of 'republican values' is rarely provided in
much recent sociological work on the nation (see Lorcerie 1994: 258).
Secondly, an examination of SOS-Racisme's public pronouncements reveals a
certain vagueness in the identification of those concerned by the integration
process. Thus, the association varies between calling for the integration of
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'immigrants (les immigre)' and of 'foreigners (les etrangers)\ or more
recently, 'the excluded (les exclus)' (see L'Express, 2-8 October 1987; Le
Nouvel Observateur 14-20 December 1989; L'Humanite, 12 July 1993). The
first two terms are not, of course, synonymous and their conflation masks
the complexity of the populations thereby designated with respect to their
administrative status (see Gaspard 1992: 21; Cordeiro 1992).
A third, and more general, problem with the integration concept is, as the
sociologist Robert Miles has argued, its 'ideological character and role' (Miles
1993: 176). In a penetrating analysis of government reports and policies on
'integration' in The Netherlands, he shows that the notion serves to 'mystify'
social relations and to 'problematise' the presence of immigrants in the
nation-state:
The notion of integration refers generally to a process of mixing or
amalgamation of a previously external population with another, pre¬
existing population in a nation state. The process is defined a priori as
problematic, if not conflictual. The assumption is that the former
population is not yet a participant, or not yet an equal participant, in
social relations. Herein lies the origin of the problematic status of the
concept. For, in suggesting that immigrant populations, or rather
populations of recent immigrant origin, resident in the nation states of
western Europe should now be integrated into the nation state by
means of state intervention, it is denied that they have been, from the
very instant of their arrival in western Europe, an integral part of
these social formations. [...] The notion of integration therefore
exteriorises in thought, and in politics, those populations which are
already, indeed have always been, a constituent element of the social
formation. (Miles 1993:175, emphases in original)
The effect of this, according to Miles, is to turn attention away from issues of
racism, inequality and discrimination, and to transform the presence of
immigrants and their descendants into a 'problem' which needs to be
addressed through state action.
The critique of the integration concept which Miles provides (and which I
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have only partially outlined here) raises serious questions about the
appropriateness of SOS-Racisme's decision to frame its general approach and
specific policy proposals in terms of the notion. I would argue in fact, pace
Taguieff, that the association's emphasis on 'integration' since the 1980s has
been one of the most problematic aspects of its action. This is a point which I
attempt to illustrate in Chapter 10, where I discuss the association's positions
in the 1989 and 1994 'Islamic headscarf' affairs.
Conclusion
From around 1987, SOS-Racisme's adoption and active promotion of a view
of integration led many commentators to claim that the association had
renounced a former commitment to a 'multicultural' or 'pluricultural' vision
of France in favour of a more 'traditional' Republican conception of the
nation and its incorporation of foreigners. This assertion was vehemently
denied on repeated occasions by the leadership who argued that they had
always called for 'a policy of social and cultural integration of immigrants
(une politique d'integration sociale et culturelle des immigres)' (see, for
example, interviews with Desir in L'Express, 2-8 October 1987 and Le
Nouvel Observateur, 14-20 December 1989 as well as Desir 1990: 47). To a
large extent, the material discussed in this chapter lends support to such a
statement. As I have indicated, SOS-Racisme's version of multiculturalism
was opposed to a vision of France as an assemblage of different
communities, and stressed instead the common cultural forms shared by
individual young people of diverse origins. The association was also
formally committed from the outset to equal rights (including the vote at
local elections for resident foreigners), although it accorded less priority to
this issue than had those involved in the 1983 March and Convergence 84.
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On the basis of the material discussed in this chapter I would argue, in fact,
that SOS-Racisme's terminological shifts - from the language of
multiculturalisme to that of integration - mask a fundamental continuity of
the 'style' in which it has 'imagined' (Anderson 1983: 15) the nation and the
place of foreigners and immigrants within it. As I have indicated, the
association's version of multiculturalism was explicitly opposed to the
formation of ethnic communities and ethnically-based forms of political
mobilisation, and was in this sense entirely consistent with an emergent
conception of 'the Republican tradition' of integration. The association's
subsequent adoption of the concept of integration did not reflect a radical
change of perspective, therefore, but rather a consolidation and elaboration
of its earlier position. I have argued, however, that SOS-Racisme's use of the
integration concept is open to a number of serious criticisms and threatens to
blunt the effectiveness of its action against racism.
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Notes
1 It is nonetheless true, as David McCrone has noted, that Anderson's
discussion of 'the institutional mechanisms which sustain and shape the
belief in a people's distinctiveness' is under-developed (McCrone 1998: 6).
2 'L'identite nationale est le resultat (emergent) des innombrables
accomplissements quotidiens de la population nationale. Ces
accomplissments constituent globalement le proces d'identisation de la
population nationale. Parmi ces accomplissments, certains sont des
conduites symboliques intentionnelles visant l'identite du «nous» national:
ils constituent des prises d'identite nationale.'
3 '...notre demarche premiere a ete une envie de partir de ce que chacun de
nous vivait autour de lui pour demontrer que l'assimilation est possible, que
la multiracialite est vecue parfois positivement. Que c'est bien de vivre avec
des etrangers, que ga fait voyager sur place et que c'est une richesse sociale.
[...] La societe multicolore, ils [les lyceens] la vivent ici et maintenant.'
4 'La specificite de l'association, je pense que c'est que l'on est la seule
association antiraciste a ne pas etre communautaire ou [dependant]
directement d'un parti politique.'
5 'La fete fera la demonstration ... que la France multi-culturelle n'est pas une
utopie. D'abord sur le plateau: il y aura des artistes representatifs de toutes
les cultures auxquelles s'identifie la jeunesse frangaise ...Ce sera une
demonstration du grand metissage qui s'est deja opere.'
6 For a more detailed discussion of this point see Bouamama (1992:190-195).
7 'Ce qui est refuse ici, c'est l'existence de plusieurs cultures constituantes
d'une identite frangaise en mutation. L'identite frangaise reste unique et
monolithique. II en decoule logiquement les idees de synthese, de metissage
et de melange. Pour ce faire, l'on reprend la vieille idee du «creuset frangais»
dans lequel se melangent des cultures differentes, pour deboucher sur une
culture unique mais metissee. A l'idee multiculturelle est opposee celle du
melange. A l'affirmation d'une volonte de convergence est substitute celle
du melange.'
8 See also Amselle's (1996) critique of 'le racisme du metissage'.
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9 It is perhaps worth noting in this connection that in 1985 Harlem Desir was
fully aware of the potential (and historical) use of 'difference' to underpin
racism (Desir 1985:142).
10 In the light of this point, the incumbent president of SOS-Racisme's recent
comment that 'Avant SOS, on ne parlait pas d'integration.' (Sylla 1996a: 158)
must be viewed with some scepticism.
11 'La Republique, c'est justement la possibility pour les hommes et les
femmes d'origine differente, de culture differente, de vivre selon des valeurs
communes, d'adherer a des principes de loi communs et d'etre soumis aux
memes devoirs avec, en contrepartie, les memes droits. Voila notre
conception de l'integration.'
12 This is an idea also found in academic discussionns of integration (see Weil
and Crowley 1994; Costa-Lascoux 1991: 9).
13 'C'etait pour moi un concept qui est un concept frangais et qui existait au-
dela de SOS-Racisme, fin avant SOS-Racisme, bien avant. Sauf que c'est SOS
qui l'a peut-etre nomme et vulgarise. Et qui etait que dans ce pays les gens
pouvaient arriver par vagues d'immigration avec leurs differences, avec
leurs cultures et que la societe frangaise les absorbait avec autre chose. C'est a
dire la societe frangaise plus ces gens-la ga faisait pas la societe frangaise
comme elle etait avant, mais ga faisait une nouvelle societe frangaise. [...] Et
c'etait pas des communautes qui vivaient des unes a cote des autres. C'etait,
on etait frangais, on n'etait pas algerien en France ou italien ou polonais. On
allait pas dans une ecole polonaise, dans une ecole italienne, on allait dans
une ecole frangaise. Republicaine. [...] Done moi j'ai toujours ete tres fiere de
ce modele la qui etait un modele different du modele anglo-saxonne a qui on
l'oppose souvent et qui etait un modele commun...dit communautaire.'
14 See Silverman (1992: 139) for a further discussion of this topic. An issue
which is rarely discussed in the debate on integration is its fomer meaning in
the colonial context and the extent to which it has incorporated previous
notions such as assimilation or adaptation. Sayad (1994: 9) argues that this





Leadership, political opportunities, and
organisational identity
The 1993 legislative elections in France altered the political opportunity
structure for social movements by bringing about a significant change in the
configuration of power on the Left. Specifically, an opportunity arose for the
president of the anti-racist organisation SOS-Racisme (among others) to
participate in the formal political process through an invitation from a
centre-left party to stand as a candidate on its list for the 1994 European
elections. This proposal was debated by SOS-Racisme's National Council at a
special meeting held in Paris in April 1994. In the following chapter, I
examine the action taken by SOS-Racisme's president before and during the
meeting, discussing it in terms of Melucci's recent analysis (1996) of the role
of leadership in social movements. My argument, in brief, is that the
exchanges which took place revealed important differences between the
leadership and grassroots activists, both in the assessment of political
opportunities and in the definition of the nature and identity of the
organisation itself.1
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Although the issue of leadership in the contemporary French anti-racist
movement has preoccupied activists for many years, it has attracted
surprisingly little academic attention. Studies of political leadership in
France since the 1960s have tended instead to focus on contrasting styles of
presidential leadership.2 In the last decade, however, interesting work on the
'leadership strategies' of Maghrebian elites in France has started to be
published (Geisser 1997). Nevertheless, there has been relatively little
detailed research on the question of leadership within the broader anti-racist
movement of the past twenty years (notable exceptions are Bouamama 1994
and Abdallah 2000).
The following chapter addresses this gap in the literature by examining
aspects of the leadership role within SOS-Racisme in the mid-1990s. Two
general ideas guide my discussion. The first is that the study of leadership
involves an examination of two types of relationship: on the one hand, that
between 'leaders' and 'followers' (Edinger 1967: 15); and, on the other, that
between 'human agency1 - the purposive activity of leaders and their
followers, and 'political structure' - the opportunities and constraints which
shape such action (Cole 1997:166). The second assumption is that analysis of
political opportunity structures must take into account not only 'objective'
factors, such as the nature of the electoral system, but also the ways in which
different actors perceive the political opportunities available to them
(Tarrow 1988: 430). Leaders and grassroots members of social movement
organisations, for example, do not always share the same perception of the
potential costs and benefits of a particular course of action. As in the case
considered here, fundamental differences in the evaluation of political
opportunities can threaten to undermine organisational unity and the
legitimacy of a leader's position.
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Changing political opportunities for anti-racism in France
The concept of 'political opportunity structure' has proved a useful tool for
analysing the influence of political and institutional factors on the emergence
and development of social movements. It is associated in particular with the
political process perspective of theorists such as Kitschelt (1986), Tarrow
(1988,1994), and Kriesi (1995, 1996). In slightly different ways, each of these
scholars has conceptualised the political opportunity structure for social
movements in terms of a specific set of properties or dimensions of the
political context. This thesis follows Kriesi in regarding the formal
institutional structure of the state, the dominant procedures and strategies
employed by authorities in the face of external demands, and the
configuration of political power as the three key features of the political
opportunity structure (see Chapter 3).
In recent years, the concept of political opportunity structure has been used
by a number of scholars to explain why social movements had such a limited
impact in France compared to other Western democracies during the 1980s.3
Kriesi and his colleagues have suggested, for example, that the formal
institutional structure of the French political system negatively affects social
movements' chances of success. Kriesi refers to France as a 'strong' or 'closed'
state in that it is characterised by a high degree of centralisation, the
dominance of the executive over the legislature and the judiciary, the
cohesion and professionalisation of its system of public administration, and
the infrequent use of 'direct democracy procedures' such as referenda. The
French state, in other words, offers few 'points of access' to social movements
(unlike in more decentralised systems) and is able to act to a large extent
independently of their influence (see Kriesi 1995:171-2).4
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Moreover, Kriesi has claimed that the dominant strategy of the French
authorities with respect to groups challenging the system, such as social
movements, is one of 'total exclusion1 (Kriesi 1995: 174-7). As Duyvendak
(1994: 102-4) has also noted, the strength of the state in France allows the
authorities either simply to 'ignore' social movements or to repress
challengers believed to constitute a serious threat to the system. However,
Duyvendak insists that the exclusion of social movements from the political
system by ruling elites is 'selective' rather than total. He points out that the
French state can, and does, actively encourage and promote some social
movements if their objectives are regarded as coinciding with those of the
authorities (Duyvendak 1994: 105), although I would maintain that this
applies more to specific SMOs than to whole movements (see Chapter 3).
(Kriesi has subsequently revised his view in line with Duyvendak's more
nuanced position [see Kriesi 1996:160].)
Finally, Kriesi and his colleagues have highlighted the nature of the electoral
system and the balance of power both within and between political parties as
a key factor influencing the success or failure of social movements in France.
The second-ballot system used in French parliamentary elections specifies
that in the absence of an absolute majority in the first ballot, only candidates
securing 12.5% of the votes of registered electors can go forward to contest
the second round. In line with many French political scientists, Duyvendak
argues that this tends to produce a left-right bipolarisation which excludes
candidates from smaller parties, such as the Greens, representing the
demands of social movements (Duyvendak 1994: 120; Kriesi 1995: 180).
Duyvendak also points specifically to the configuration of power on the Left
as an important factor in determining the success of failure of social
movements in France. He suggests that the struggle between the Socialist
Party (PS) and the Communist Party (PCF) for Left hegemony in the 1960s
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and 1970s resulted in the marginalisation of 'new' social movements in
favour of a more 'traditional' class politics. Socialist Party support for social
movements during this period was of a limited and instrumental nature, and
effectively ended with the party's victory at the 1981 legislative and
presidential elections (Duyvendak 1994: 119-144; Kriesi 1995: 180-6. See also
Diani 1991; Ladrech -1989; Lewis and Sferza 1987).
This general account of the political opportunity structure for social
movements in France during the 1980s helps to clarify the nature of the
change which led ultimately to the events discussed in the present chaper.
The key point is that the 1993 legislative elections in France transformed the
third aspect of the political opportunity structure highlighted by Kriesi and
his colleagues - the distribution of power amongst political parties,
particularly those on the Left - with important consequences for SOS-
Racisme and other social movement organisations. Five years previously, in
May 1988, Frangois Mitterrand had been re-elected as President of the
Republic. This was followed a month later by a Socialist victory at the
legislative elections, although 13 seats short of an overall majority. Over the
next few years, however, the Socialist Government's popularity declined
dramatically as a result of a series of scandals, public displays of internal
party rivalry and a widely-perceived failure to tackle rising unemployment
(Machin 1993: 599). This culminated in a crushing defeat for the Socialists at
the March 1993 legislative elections. The Socialist vote was halved (to 17.62%
of votes cast), with the party's parliamentary representation reduced from
276 to only 70 deputies. The electoral system ensured that with 44% of the
vote, the centre-right RPR-UDF coalition took 80% of the seats (Flanley 1993).
The Socialists' disastrous results at the 1993 elections added fuel to the
debate about the future of the party and its links with other progressive
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forces which former Prime Minister Michel Rocard had launched in the run¬
up to the poll (Hartley 1993: 420). Arguments about 'the reconstruction of the
left' continued throughout the campaign for the 1994 European elections. A
significant development, in this regard, was the decision by a centre-left
party, the Movement of Left Radicals (MRG), to present its own list of
candidates for the European elections rather than ally itself with the
Socialists as it had done on previous occasions. The MRG list, entitled
'Radical Energy (Energie radicale)\ was headed by Bernard Tapie, the
popular, if somewhat controversial, businessman and president (at the time)
of the football team L'Olympique de Marseille (OM). Tapie had entered
politics in 1988, when he was elected as a deputy in the Bouches-du-Rhone
departement (comprising the area around Marseilles). He subsequently held
a ministerial post, albeit briefly, in the 1992 Socialist Government, prior to
joining the MRG in the spring of 1993 (see Bouchet 1992, 1994). Shortly
before campaigning for the European elections opened, Tapie was placed
under investigation on charges of corruption, and although these eventually
led to his imprisonment (Liberation, 5 February 1997), nothing officially
prevented him from standing for the European Parliament in 1994.
The announcement that Tapie would head a separate MRG list for the
European elections provoked intense political argument in France. There
was widespread speculation that the President of the Republic, Francois
Mitterrand, was acting behind the scenes to promote Tapie, as a way of
'torpedo-ing' the presidential ambitions of Michel Rocard, his long-term rival
within the Socialist Party (Le Nouvel Observateur, 28 April-4 May 1994;
Liberation, 29 April 1994). The MRG stated publicly that its aim was 'to
facilitate the emergence of a "reformist pole", independent of the Socialist
Party, before the 1995 presidential election' {Le Monde, 3 May 1994).5 In line
with this, Tapie actively sought to win over prominent left-wing figures to
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the MRG, inviting them to stand as candidates on its list for the European
elections. Among those who accepted were a former Socialist minister, an
Ecologist, a leading feminist and a trade unionist (Buffotot and Hanley 1995:
3).
One key figure whom Tapie was, however, unable to rally to the 'Radical
Energy' list was Fode Sylla, the then president of SOS-Racisme. Sylla
subsequently confirmed that Tapie approached him on 11 April 1994 with
the offer of a place on the MRG's list of candidates for the June elections
(L'Evenement du jeudi, 12-18 May 1994). The association's executive
committee or National Bureau discussed Tapie's proposal at a meeting in
Paris on 27 April 1994; its members were reported as being generally
favourable to the idea (Le Monde, 29 April 1994). A meeting of SOS-
Racisme's National Council was then called. This comprises representatives
from the association's committees all over France and is its ultimate decision¬
making body.
On the 29 April 1994, members of the National Council duly assembled in an
amphitheatre at the University of Jussieu in central Paris to consider whether
Sylla should accept Tapie's invitation. It quickly became apparent that an
important section of the membership was extremely hostile to the proposal.
Indeed, even before the meeting took place, the association's Parisian
headquarters had received telephone calls from provincial activists, voicing
their opposition to Tapie's offer and, in some cases, threatening to leave SOS-
Racisme altogether were it to be accepted. The National Council debate
provided further evidence of significant divisions within the association. In
particular, it highlighted major differences between part of the leadership
(idirection) of SOS-Racisme and many grassroots activists in relation to the
perception of political opportunities, the definition of organisational identity,
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and the conception of the nature of the leadership role in a social movement
organisation.6
Tensions and contradictions in leadership action
Thus far, I have described how moves to reconfigure the French left in the
wake of the 1993 legislative elections created an opportunity for members of
certain progressive movements, including the president of the social
movement organisation SOS-Racisme, to participate in the formal political
process. In Kriesi's terms, changes in the political opportunity structure
temporarily made the French state less 'closed' to social movements by
increasing, albeit partially, formal access to the party system. It is interesting
to note here that a similar series of events occurred during the campaign for
the 1989 European elections. On that occasion, the incumbent president of
SOS-Racisme, Flarlem Desir, was offered the fifth place on the Green Party's
list of candidates. This was rejected by Desir on the grounds that he intended
to constitute his own 'autonomous' slate for the elections (Le Monde, 31
March 1989).
Although the idea of a separate list was later abandoned, it reflected the
leadership of SOS-Racisme's growing sense of frustration with the apparent
imperviousness of the French public administration and party systems to
external pressure from social movements. Angered in particular by the
failure of the Socialist Party, with which the association has always had close
links, to act on its recommendations concerning immigration and integration
policies, Desir asked in 1990: 'Is the creation of a political party the only
means we have left of making our voice heard?' (Politis, 26 April 1990).7 The
launch of a new political organisation did indeed subsequently appear to
240
Desir and other members of SOS-Racisme's leadership as the most effective
way to overcome the state's perceived unresponsiveness to the association's
actions (Le Monde, 17 June 1992).
The proposed constitution of an independent list for the 1989 European
elections and the creation of a new political movement in 1992 can both be
interpreted as attempts by SOS-Racisme's leadership to maximise the
association's 'means for action' (Melucci 1996: 339). This, as Melucci has
explained, is a key aspect of the leadership role in social movements (see
below). Confronted with a situation in which SOS-Racisme's capacity, as an
association, to influence the political process appeared extremely restricted,
its leadership engaged in a search for additional ways of accessing and
having an impact upon the political system. The favourable reaction of many
members of SOS-Racisme's National Bureau to Tapie's offer of a place on his
list of candidates for the 1994 European elections also reflected this
preoccupation.
Here I shall draw on Melucci's recent work on leadership in social
movements (1996). Although he does not clearly distinguish between
leadership of 'movements', 'groups' and 'organisations' (see Melucci 1996:
339-340), his analysis does provide a useful framework for the events I am
considering. In the following section, I focus specifically on the competing
tasks which leaders of social movement organisations like SOS-Racisme
inevitably face and how their own legitimacy can be called into question,
depending on how they make a decision or respond to particular needs on
the part of the membership.
According to Melucci, the leaders of social movements typically perform five
main tasks. Firstly, they define the movement's objectives; these can be of
two kinds, either general (ultimate or long-term goals) or specific (more
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immediate aims or means to the general ones). In Melucci's view, leaders
play an important role in adapting such objectives to take account of changes
not only within the movement itself but also in the wider society. A second
component of the leadership function is providing 'the means for action'. For
the movement to achieve its objectives, leaders must channel members'
talents and energies effectively, as well as secure additional resources
through contact with, for example, the state and political parties. Thirdly,
leaders are faced with the task of maintaining the movement's structure and
cohesion. This involves regulating tensions within the movement as well as
responding to adversaries' attempts to undermine or destabilise it. As
Melucci emphasises, a crucial factor here is a leader's ability to control the
circulation of information and to manage the effect of external 'stimuli' (e.g.
pressure from other organisations or political opponents) on the movement.
A fourth key leadership role is that of mobilising members' support for the
movement's objectives. Leaders must act in such a way as to ensure
members' continued investment in the movement and agreement about its
aims. Finally, Melucci suggests that leaders have an 'expressive' function
which is central to the process of collective identity construction. They
present members with an image of the movement's identity which can form
the basis of solidarity, identification and 'affective gratification' (see Melucci
1996: 339-340).
As Melucci emphasises, these different aspects of the leadership role become
'intertwined' in the daily life of a social movement. In so doing, they may
pull leaders in opposite directions by making contradictory or irreconcilable
demands. It follows that 'the fulcrum for leadership action is the decision,
that is, the capacity to choose between alternatives and reduce uncertainties'
(1996: 340, emphasis in original). Leaders must, in other words, be able
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accurately to weigh up the potential costs and benefits of particular courses
of action, taking into account the needs and priorities of members.
This is precisely what was at stake in the meeting of SOS-Racisme's National
Council in April 1994. The president of SOS-Racisme, Fode Sylla, was
confronted with a potentially explosive situation which forced him to choose
between several competing options and leadership tasks. In the event, he
decided to privilege the organisation's unity and cohesion over an
opportunity to access new means and resources for action. He did so after
failing to mobilise an adequate support base among the membership in
favour of a specific, short-term goal (going forward as a candidate on Tapie's
list for the 1994 European elections). To rebuild unity, he closed the meeting
by explicitly voicing his agreement wilh an image of the association's
identity presented by a previous speaker who had led opposition to the
proposed action.
The National Council meeting began with a short opening address by Sylla.
As a form of leadership action it exemplified the first task described by
Melucci, that of articulating a movement's objectives. In his remarks, Sylla
attempted to define both the specific aim of the meeting itself and the wider
goals of the organisation. With respect to the first of these, he stated several
times that the meeting had been called with a view to debating Tapie's
proposition in the 'democratic structures of the association' in order to arrive
at a 'collective decision1. He asserted that Tapie's proposition had raised the
question of the association's 'autonomy' and 'independence', and this needed
to be discussed. However, what became increasingly clear in the course of
his intervention was that he personally was not in favour of accepting the
offer. Moreover, the impression he gave was that it had already been
rejected. This was highlighted by his statement that the National Council
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meeting should discuss in general terms, rather than in relation to Tapie's
specific offer, how propositions of this sort should be dealt with in the
future.8
In a way, Sylla's opening statement removed the rationale for the meeting. It
reflected two days of telephone calls and debate between the provincial
committees and the National Bureau in Paris, during which it had become
clear to the leadership (direction) that Tapie's offer threatened to split the
association down the middle. As Sylla himself stated, he would only accept
Tapie's invitation if he had the whole association behind him,9 and this was
manifestly not the case. Nevertheless, the way in which he redefined the
objective of the meeting from the specific to the general left some grassroots
members perplexed: 'Are we here to discuss the future presence of the
president of SOS-Racisme on the European lists or not?' asked one member
immediately after Sylla's opening address.10 Furthermore, although Sylla's
admission that he was in favour of rejecting the offer can be viewed as an
attempt to reassure members deeply opposed to it, and head-off a major
confrontation, the redefinition of the purpose of the meeting only increased
some activists' dissatisfaction with the leadership. When I interviewed
Frangois (a Paris-based activist) some months after the meeting, for example,
he declared:
What was a bit scandalous was the fact that ... there was no
consultation [...]. So, in fact, the decision which was due to be taken -
supposedly all together - was a sham because Fode Sylla knew even
before the meeting that he wouldn't belong to [Tapie's] list. [There
was] no democratic debate. Really, it was done ... It was a struggle for
power, a struggle of the apparatchiks between themselves, but
without the grassroots activists being adequately informed about the
situation. (Tape-recorded interview, 2 October 1994)11
Here members of the National Bureau are dismissively referred to as 'the
apparatchiks' and are presented as primarily concerned with their own
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internal power struggles to the detriment of the interests of the rank and file.
According to this activist, everything had already been decided behind
closed doors, before the meeting had even taken place. He went on to claim
that Michel Rocard had put pressure on Julien Dray, one of the founders of
SOS-Racisme and a Socialist deputy since 1988, to persuade Sylla not to
stand as a candidate on Tapie's list. This sense of behind-the-scenes
manoeuvring was shared by another member I interviewed who commented
that 'you had the impression that there had been a discussion at a higher
level, pressure from above ....'12 (Various rumours to this effect were, in fact,
circulating in the press at the time. For his part, Dray admitted only that he
had advised Sylla against accepting the offer [Le Monde, 29 April 1994],
while the latter strenuously denied that prominent figures in the Socialist
Party had 'intervened' [L'Evenement dujeudi, 12-18 May 1994].)
Leaving aside the question of the influence exerted by Socialist Party in this
matter, it is clear that Tapie's proposition was initially attractive to Sylla and
other members of SOS-Racisme's National Bureau for reasons related to a
second aspect of the leadership role: the mobilisation of resources enabling a
movement to realise its objectives. In Melucci's words, a leader 'must procure
the maximum amount of resources available in the environment by entering
into relations with other groups and organizations and with the society at
large' (1996: 339). Both in Sylla's initial address and in the interventions of a
number of National Bureau members during the meeting, emphasis was laid
on the resources which acceptance of the offer would make available to the
organisation. A succession of National Bureau members, for example,
repeated that Sylla's election to the European Parliament would give SOS-
Racisme a 'platform' from which to promote anti-racism at a European level
and lead the struggle against the far right. One member of the National
Bureau added that the association was currently experiencing difficulty in
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getting its ideas taken up, and that its mobilisations lacked credibility; this
implied that new means for action were needed in order to ensure the
organisation's long-term survival and effectiveness. It was pointed out that
more mundane resources would be forthcoming as well, such as information
but also the salary associated with the post, a not negligible consideration
given that the association's state subsidy had recently been reduced (after the
return of the Right to power in March 1993).
While the leadership's initial attraction to Tapie's offer can be viewed as a
way of maximising the SOS-Racisme's means for action, entering into any
sort of agreement with Tapie was bound to be controversial, given the nature
of the individual involved (as I have already noted, numerous allegations of
corruption surrounded his business dealings). For opponents of the offer, in
fact, the nature of this attempt to maximise resources smacked of
opportunism and 'scheming'. The leadership opened itself up, in particular,
to the accusation that it was putting political expediency before genuine anti-
racist politics. This was one of the main arguments advanced in an article on
the meeting published in the weekly paper of the Trotskyist organisation the
Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), some of whose members were
then actively involved in SOS-Racisme. The article criticised:
all the past and present digressions aimed at subordinating the anti-
racist struggle to extraneous concerns, ones which correspond more
closely to self-seeking machinations, chicanery even, than to a desire
to advance the construction of a collective framework capable of
exerting an influence in favour of equal rights. {Rouge, 5 May 1994)13
In a similar way, Alain (a grassroots activist based in the Paris region) stated
to me in an interview:
Well, what struck me the most about this episode was the lack of
political awareness of a certain number of my comrades, notably in
the National Bureau. It makes them prepared to form all sorts of
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alliances and ends up as a certain opportunism. As in when they say:
'Yes, but Tapie, he is popular in the suburbs (bardieues).' Yes, but well,
just because a number of people are taken in it doesn't mean that the
association should follow suit. (Tape-recorded interview, 22
November 1994)14
What the incident revealed, for this activist, was the political naivete of a
section of the leadership. As I have already indicated, Sylla had stated in his
opening address to the National Council meeting that he personally was
against accepting Tapie's offer. Nevertheless, during the remainder of the
meeting a series of National Bureau members intervened to argue in favour
of a more positive response. They did so by highlighting Tapie's popularity
among the type of young urban people the association itself was attempting
to attract. For the activist quoted above this was not a sufficient reason for
the SOS-Racisme to become involved with Tapie, and instead reflected an
opportunistic approach rather than a principled political position.
Viewed from Sylla's perspective, however, the central question was the
contradiction or at the very least the tension which existed between two of
his tasks as president of SOS-Racisme. The first was that of maximising the
organisation's resources with a view to increasing the effectiveness of its
action and ability to realise its objectives. The second was the need to
maintain the organisation's structure, cohesion and unity. As his opening
address made clear, Sylla had decided that to seek to maximise resources
through accepting Tapie's offer would be to risk provoking a split in the
organisation. In particular, it appeared likely to prompt the departure of
those associated with the Revolutionary Communist League as well as other
members not directly affiliated to any political party. There was, in short, a
balance to be struck between two key components of the leadership role.
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In coming to a decision, Sylla had to assess the membership's reaction and
the strength of opposition to the proposition. A key aspect of the leadership's
attempt to maintain the cohesion of the organisation in the meantime was
control over the circulation of information. A reminder of the time-scale
involved illustrates this point. As Sylla later confirmed in an interview, Tapie
had made the offer on 11 April (L'Evenement du jeudi, 12-18 May 1994). It
was not, however, debated by the National Bureau until the 27 April, and it
was only then that the decision was taken to call a meeting of the National
Council two days later. In so doing, the leadership was obviously attempting
to 'manage' and contain the potential effect of Tapie's invitation on the
membership at large. Nevertheless, grassroots activists were subsequently to
regard the leadership's failure to inform the membership sooner and to give
adequate notice of the National Council meeting as evidence of a lack of
transparency and internal democracy. The Paris-based activist Frangois
(whose description of National Bureau members as 'apparatchiks' I quoted
earlier), for example, expressed his dissatisfaction as follows:
For a start, what was serious about this episode was that ... the
National Council meeting which took place, people were informed
about it the day before. That is to say that three quarters of the
activists from outside Paris, including those from Toulouse who were
among those who had strongly expressed their opposition to the
project, had enormous difficulty in coming to Paris ... to participate in
this decision. I personally was informed the day before by telephone.
(Tape-recorded interview, 2 October 1994)15
The issue raised here is the extent to which the late announcement of the
National Council meeting prevented representatives of SOS-Racisme's
provincial committees, as well as grassroots activists from the Paris region,
from attending. Thus, while the leadership's control over channels of
communication may have successfully limited controversy over Tapie's
invitation to the two-day period leading up to the meeting, it only served in
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the longer term to increase dissatisfaction with the National Bureau on the
part of sections of the membership. It was even claimed that the leadership
only resolved to consult the rank and file when reports of negotiations
between Tapie and Sylla were published in the press {Rouge, 5 May 1994).
So far I have only discussed the first three components of the leadership role
described by Melucci: defining objectives, mobilising resources and
maintaining structure and cohesion. Now I want briefly to consider
examples of the remaining two leadership tasks: mobilising a support base
and reinforcing identity. With respect to the first of these, the National
Council meeting can be interpreted as an attempt by the leadership to
persuade grassroots members that the potential benefits which would flow
from accepting Tapie's offer outweighed any costs. A common theme
running through the interventions by National Bureau members in the
course of the evening was that the association was in the process of 'missing
an opportunity', that it risked 'missing the boat'.16 Indeed, members were
encouraged to accept that the association had to adapt to a changing
environment and take advantage of an opening that was presenting itself. In
this way, the leadership sought to secure members' identification with the
short-term aim of fielding a candidate for the European elections as a means
to the association's more general objectives, such as the struggle against the
far right.
However, both during the meeting and in the course of numerous telephone
conversations beforehand, the leadership's bid to mobilise a consensus in
favour of Tapie's proposition came up against the determined opposition of
several of the most important provincial committees as well as that of
influential Parisian activists. As I indicate in the next section, the opposition
of many grassroots members was based on the view that the association
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would change its identity by accepting the offer. It was not simply a 'fear
(.craintey of the political field (as certain members of the National Bureau
suggested during the meeting) which prevented such activists from
accepting the offer, but rather an often complex and sophisticated distinction
between (party) political action and associative action.
Finally, SOS-Racisme's president was constrained at the end of the meeting
to work towards a reinforcement of the association's identity, in order to
limit the damage caused by the whole incident. The threat to its cohesion
represented by the potential departure of a significant fraction of the
membership required the leadership to attempt to rebuild unity. Sylla did
this at the close of the meeting by projecting an image of SOS-Racisme with
which members on both sides of the argument could identify. During the
debate, one of the most vocal opponents of an agreement with Tapie had
argued that
The offer to appear on Tapie's list is a sign that our association is
worth a lot and that is a tribute to you, Fode, and to the association.
Nevertheless, my view is that the association is worth more than M.
Tapie can afford ... 17
In his closing address Sylla referred explicitly to this statement, claiming that
it neatly summarised the message which members should take away from
the evening's debate. He repeated the phrase that SOS-Racisme was 'worth
more than Tapie could afford', an action which appeared designed to
reinforce a positive, valorising image of the association as well as imply that
it (and the leadership) could not be 'bought'. In so doing, Sylla was
endeavouring to ensure that the meeting ended with a measure of consensus
and unity over the association's identity.
The definition of SOS-Racisme's identity as an anti-racist organisation had in
fact been an important stake in the meeting itself. Speakers on both sides of
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the debate had projected a number of different images of the association's
identity in support of their arguments. In particular, those against the
proposed action sought to mobilise opposition to the leadership by
appealing to an historically important and consensual idea of SOS-Racisme's
specificity. Part of the negotiation (or 'transaction' in Melucci's terms)
between leaders and followers at the meeting, in other words, centred on the
meaning and nature of the association itself.
Debating political opportunities and organisational identity
As will become apparent in what follows, both leaders and grassroots
members were engaged during the meeting in a cost-benefit calculation of
the advantages and disadvantages associated with accepting Tapie's offer.
Ideas about the nature of SOS-Racisme as an anti-racist organisation and its
relationship to the political sphere (or, more precisely, the sphere of party
politics) were also at stake. Although the leadership suggested at the time
that members were reluctant to accept the offer simply out of a 'fear' of the
political field, or because of a 'lack of maturity {pas de maturite)' of debate
within the association, subsequent interviews with grassroots members
revealed rather complex conceptions of the relationship between associative
and (party) political action. In particular, the activists I interviewed tended
to exhibit not an apprehension of politics but rather a strong, deeply-held
commitment to SOS-Racisme's independence and freedom from political
party influence.
The debate which Tapie's proposition provoked revealed the extent to which
opinion differed as to the conditions under which (if at all) SOS-Racisme
should enter the field of party politics. This divergence co-existed, however,
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with significant agreement among members about the nature of the
relationship between the association and young people. Arguments in
favour of accepting the proposition for the 1994 European elections tended,
for example, to suggest that there was a close relationship between Tapie
and young people, on the one hand, and between SOS-Racisme and young
people, on the other which, in turn, implied a convergence of interests
between Tapie and SOS-Racisme. Although other representatives disputed
the appropriateness of viewing Tapie as the champion of young people's
interests - and thus rejected the equation advanced by those favourable to
the proposal - they appeared generally (although not universally18) to agree
with the idea that SOS-Racisme voiced the aspirations and convictions of
young people. Nonetheless, as interviews I conducted with activists later
confirmed, less of a consensus existed concerning the position which SOS-
Racisme as such should adopt with respect to political party competition.
The issue of Tapie's appeal to young people was raised early on in the
National Council meeting by one of the association's co-founders. He
referred to a series of reports which had appeared in the French daily
newspaper Liberation that very morning (29 April 1994). These revealed that
Tapie's level of popularity was highest among young, left-wing people,
especially in the suburbs (banlieues). The newspaper also provided evidence
that support for Tapie among these young people was indicative of their
disaffection with other parties on the left such as the Socialists and the
French Communist Party (subsequent analysis of voting behaviour at the
election itself suggested a similar conclusion, see Grunberg 1995). Citing
these reports the speaker argued that even though fellow activists might not
find Tapie a particularly congenial figure, they could not simply reject him
out of hand or ignore his appeal to a significant proportion of the French
electorate. In particular, the fact that Tapie drew his support from the very
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section of the population - urban young people sympathetic to the Left -
which SOS-Racisme sought to involve in its campaigns was, in the view of
this activist, an important reason for considering the proposition seriously.19
A member of the National Bureau subsequently reiterated this point as a
major reason for accepting Tapie's offer.
A degree of confirmation of these newspaper reports of Tapie's popularity
among 18-25-year-olds was provided by a activist from Marseilles who
emphasised that Tapie represented hope for disillusioned young people in
the suburbs (banlieues). Later, another member of the National Bureau
added that Tapie's appeal derived to a large extent from the fact that both his
'ordinary' background and use of vernacular language distinguished him
from the rest of the French political class. By virtue of these characteristics
and links with an important football club Tapie was, he concluded, 'not a
politician like the others' in the eyes of many young people.20
As these comments make clear, for a number of National Bureau members as
well as representatives of the Bouches-du-Rhone group (comprising the area
around Marseilles), Tapie's popularity among young people was an
important reason for giving his proposal serious consideration. An
important corollary of this argument, which certain speakers took for
granted or implied rather than stating explicitly, was that SOS-Racisme
should be regarded as an association which was not only composed
primarily of young people but also sought to reflect their interests directly in
its campaigns. A former vice-president, for example, prefaced his
intervention in the debate with the statement that: 'SOS is one of the few
organisations today which is in touch with young people'.21 In short, an
argument in favour of accepting the proposition was built up gradually by
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the assertion of two separate links (Tapie/youth, SOS-Racisme/youth)
which together suggested a third (Tapie/SOS-Racisme).
However, activists opposed to entering into an agreement with Tapie
questioned the extent to which he was actually concerned with promoting
young people's interests. Another co-founder of the association and (at the
time) member of the Revolutionary Communist League, for example,
dismissed as 'populism' Tapie's much publicised comment that he would
make unemployment illegal for those under 25 and require firms to hire
hundreds of thousands of young people (cf. Buffotot and Hartley 1995: 5).
According to this activist, the fact of the matter was that Tapie pursued his
own commercial interests, not those of young people. Despite his undoubted
popularity among this category of the population, the activist claimed that
Tapie had long advocated policies detrimental to young people. In an
important intervention in the debate, he added:
Tapie has a programme which is a/7fr-young people. His policies
would not solve the problem of unemployment but would actually
make it worse. In my view, it is clear that Tapie is for the interests of
big business, for 'the winners'. Is that our ethic (morale)! No, this
association has a tradition of arguing for equality. Then there is the
matter of the corruption allegations against Tapie. These are not side
issues. Tapie represents the anti-model of the moral generation. For
that reason, I recommend that we don't get mixed up in this at all. It
would be a step backwards for our movement ,..22
The description of Tapie as 'the anti-model of the moral generation' here is
particularly interesting. In the mid-1980s, the phrase 'the moral generation'
was coined in France as a way of referring to the group of young people who
had reached adolescence in the period since the election of Mitterrand and
the Left at the start of the decade. These young people were supposed to
have abandoned political 'ideology' (i.e. the revolutionary ideals of the 1960s
and early 1970s) in favour of a set of core moral values such as equality,
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democracy, and solidarity (Joffrin 1987; Reynaud 1980). The young members
of SOS-Racisme were widely regarded as emblematic figures of the so-called
moral generation (see Joffrin 1987: 59-70; Dray 1987), and it is this image of
the association to which the activist is appealing in the passage quoted
above. Rather than highlighting a potential convergence of interests between
Tapie, young people and SOS-Racisme (the strategy adopted by a section of
the leadership), the activist in question emphasises a divergence of identity.
He argues against accepting the proposition by emphasising the contrast
between SOS-Racisme, a symbol of the moral generation, and Tapie a
politician/businessman surrounded by corruption allegations.
A similar definition of SOS-Racisme's identity in terms of morality and an
ethical stance was articulated by other activists during interviews conducted
subsequently. An activist based in Paris, for example, acknowledged the
potential benefits which the organisation would have been able to draw from
Fode Sylla's election to the European Parliament. Nevertheless, he insisted
that this would have been outweighed by the damage inflicted on SOS's
image. Alain summarised his position on Tapie's proposition as follows:
I personally was totally opposed to it. That is to say that if this
business had gone ahead, I would have left [the association], I have an
image of moral conduct {la morale) which I associate with SOS-
Racisme, even if there are struggles for power and so on (which seem
to me to be rather inherent in the nature of things in the political
realm). This was in total contradiction with the image of Tapie which
is, in my view, an image of utter dishonesty, bad faith ... In no way
could it be acceptable, as far as I was concerned. (Tape-recorded
interview, 22 November 1994)23
The activist directly contrasts the image of SOS-Racisme as principled and
'moral' with that of Tapie as dishonest and corrupt. He too brings into play
an historical representation of SOS-Racisme (as part of the 'moral
generation') in order to justify his opposition to the proposition. This
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emphasises once again how the assessment of political opportunities by
activists was inextricably bound up with conceptions of the association's
identity and public image.
The question of identity was also central for other activists, albeit in a
slightly different way. As Laurence (another activist from the Paris region)
stated in an interview, a key concern was SOS-Racisme's future identity as an
association-.
If Fode [Sylla] joined Tapie's list, that would mean, as far as I'm
concerned - and it's what I said within the association at the time -
that SOS [-Racisme] would change its nature. It would no longer be an
anti-racist association: an association would become a political
movement. (Tape-recorded interview, 7 December 1994)24
For this activist, then, the implications of accepting Tapie's offer would be
fundamental and far-reaching for the nature and identity of the organisation.
The involvement of the association's president in the political field as a
member of the European Parliament would change the way in which the
association would be viewed by potential members. The danger of SOS-
Racisme becoming a political movement would be that the association would
thereby cut itself off from sections of the population. A first issue for this
activist, therefore, was the possibility that accepting the offer would restrict
the association's appeal and undermine its potential for becoming a mass
movement. Secondly, however, associating SOS-Racisme politically with
Tapie would fundamentally alter the nature of the organisation itself. Later
in the interview Laurence used a fascinating analogy in order to clarify the
difference between associative and more narrowly (party) political activism:
There is a saying which goes that an activist in an association is in the
zone of the prophet and the political activist is in the zone of the king.
So there is one who enlightens, who makes statements, who expresses
values and convictions and so on, and there is another who carries
things out, who acts ... It's not at all the same role. And personally I
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want SOS [-Racisme] to continue in the role of a prophet because ...
SOS [-Racisme] was a reference-point in society, it still is a reference-
point. A reference-point for moral values, it has defended certain
things, moral values. If you enter politics, the reference is no longer
the same.25
The distinction here is between two different kinds of activity: on the one
hand, action in an association which involves the expression and defence of
moral values and convictions; and on the other, political action which is
presented as more pragmatic, the putting into practice of certain policies or
orientations. Both can be seen as part of the political process in the widest
sense, but the distinction or separation of roles is a crucial one for this
activist.
As the material examined in this section has demonstrated, the meeting of
SOS-Racisme's National Council in April 1994 was the site of an important
debate about the definition of political opportunities and the nature of the
association's identity and public image. The section of the leadership
favourable to Tapie's proposition for the 1994 European elections and those
strongly opposed to it drew on and discussed a range of ideas about political
and associative activism as well as SOS-Racisme's links with young people.
Resistance to any form of agreement with Tapie was so strong among the
grassroots members, for reasons I have highlighted, that the leadership was
in the end forced to abandon any hope of realising this objective.
Conclusion
The five years since the events discussed in this chapter have witnessed a
dramatic upsurge of social movement activity in France. The massive public
sector strikes of November-December 1995 (Mouriaux and Subileau 1996)
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have been followed by a series of further protests by French workers
(Wolfreys 1999), as well as hunger strikes and occupations by undocumented
foreign residents or sans-papiers campaigning for residence permits
(IM'media/ REFLEX 1997), AIDS activism (Martel 1996: 213-322) and the
winter 1997-1998 movement of the unemployed (Royall 1998). Against this
background, the 'autonomy' of social movements from party political
'leadership' has emerged once again as a key issue for both activists and
social scientists (see Aguiton and Corcuff 1999; Brochier and Delouche 2000:
163-178).
As far as leadership and autonomy within the anti-racist movement are
concerned, two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis presented
in this chapter. Firstly, the different components of the leadership role
distinguished by Melucci can create competing if not contradictory demands
for leaders in concrete situations. The continued legitimacy of their own
position and the movement's unity more generally may both depend on a
leader's capacity to evaluate the potential advantages and disadvantages of
particular courses of action and to assess members' need and priorities
accurately when coming to a decision. Secondly, significant differences can
exist between leaders and grassroots members of social movements over the
nature and definition of political opportunities and collective identities. On
the basis of the material examined here (and the more recent events alluded
to above), future leadership strategies within the French anti-racist
movement must acknowledge the importance attached by many grassroots
members to 'autonomy' from political parties and the specificity and
distinctiveness of associative activism. How to increase the anti-racist
movement's political influence, while recognising this desire for




The 1999 European elections resulted in an interesting twist to the events
described in this chapter. In the months leading up to the poll, the autonomy
and independence of social movement organisations with respect to political
parties again became the subject of debate. This was not confined only to
activist circles, but was conducted in and through the national press to a
much greater extent than in 1994. As early as August 1998, in particular, a
daily left-of-centre newspaper printed an 'Appeal for the autonomy of the
social movement' which was to provoke a considerable amount of (at times
very public) controversy {Liberation, 3 August 1998). Signed by many
prominent association activists, trade unionists and intellectuals, the appeal
rejected the idea of 'a hierarchical and instrumental relationship between the
social movement and the institutional mode of political representation'.26 It
implied that this conception was inducing certain (un-named) parties to
consider forming lists of candidates for the forthcoming European elections
which would include social movement actors. The appeal declared that such
an initiative would be equivalent to the 'political utilisation {utilisation
politique)' or domination of social movements and lead to a 'dead-end
{impasse)'.
This assertion of autonomy was in fact a direct response to perceived moves
by the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) and the French Communist
Party (PCF) to harness or exploit social movement action for their own ends.
As one member later commented, the Revolutionary Communist League
viewed its own role as providing political leadership around which left-wing
forces could 'federate {federer)'. This Leninist conception of the relationship
between party and social movement was, however, rejected by many
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movement activists as out-dated or inappropriate. The Communist Party, on
the other hand, was attempting to persuade prominent trade unionists and
representatives of associations to stand as candidates on its list for the
forthcoming European elections. Many (but not all) movement activists were
similarly opposed to this strategy, dismissing it as 'pure electioneering (une
logique purement electoraliste)'. Facing competition not only from the
Greens but also from the far left LO-LCR coalition, the PCF was widely
considered to be motivated primarily by a concern to protect or if possible
boost its share of the vote in the June poll (see Brochier and Delouche 2000:
163-179).
In the months following the August 1998 appeal, the question of autonomy
was debated with increasing intensity, as the Communist Party actively
sought to 'open' its list of candidates for the European elections to social
movement actors.27 Although the PCF's initiative continued to be portrayed
by many as a 'take-over (recuperation)', a small number of movement
activists eventually did decide to accept its offer. Indeed, when the Party
finally published its list in February 1999, the first twelve candidates - those
with a realistic chance of election (une place d'eligible) - included six non-
Communists. Among these figured a trade unionist, several prominent
feminists, and Fode Sylla, who had recently resigned as president of SOS-
Racisme amid reports of mounting criticism of his leadership within the
association itself.28
Sylla's decision to stand as a candidate on the PCF list appeared to be
underpinned by a sense of frustration at his previous lack of success, as
president of an association, in influencing the political process. For example,
he was quoted by a newspaper in mid-February as declaring:
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I've had enough of people who make promises, who talk endlessly
about young people, women, immigrants, but when you ask them
about the right to vote the shutters go up! (Le Monde, 20 February
1999)29
This remark would have been interpreted as a scarcely veiled attack on the
governing Socialist Party. As such, it echoes Harlem Desir's criticism in 1990
(discussed above) of the unresponsiveness of the party system - and the
Socialists in particular - to outside pressure from anti-racist associations such
as SOS-Racisme. In each case, a perception that the state was 'closed' to social
movements and their demands led the individual involved to seek
alternative means of influencing the political process. For both former
presidents of SOS-Racisme, the June 1999 elections enabled them finally to
realise this ambition: Sylla was elected to the European Parliament on the
PCF list, while Desir successfully stood as a Socialist Party candidate
(L'Humanite; 15 June 1999).30
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Notes
1 I am grateful to Silvia Kobi (University of Lausanne) for drawing my
attention to the importance of the concept of political opportunity structure
in her comments on an early version of this chapter presented at the
conference 'Identite collective et representation symbolique' held in Paris, 3-6
July 1996.
2 See, for example, Hoffman (1967), Cole (1997, 1998: 71-80) and Thody
(1998). This focus is perhaps understandable, given the increased power
conferred on the President of the Republic by the 1958 Constitution and the
subsequent (albeit uneven) 'presidentialisation' of the French political
system.
3 This view of 'French exceptionalism' has been challenged by Appleton, who
has argued that 'current trends show that on many dimensions France is not
so atypical in terms of the organisation and activities of these NSMs'
(Apppleton 1999: 57). However, Appleton misses the point of the debate,
which was about the impact of such movements not their 'organisation and
activities'.
4 Appleton has argued recently, however, that 'the portrayal of the French
state as "closed" reverts to some of the more stereotypical views of it and
ignores the important literature in both English and French on the real
impacts of deconcentration and decentralisation' (1999: 73). To a certain
extent this is true, although the state in France remains more centralised and
'closed' to external demands than in the other countries in Kriesi's study
(Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands).
5 '... de favoriser l'emergence d'un "pole reformiste", independant du Parti
socialiste, avant l'election presidentielle de 1995.'
6 The notes I took during the meeting also reveal an enormous disparity in
the amount of participation by male and female activists in the debate.
Including Sylla's opening and closing statements, I recorded twenty-nine
separate interventions in the debate from twenty-two different speakers. Of
these, only one was by a female member of the association (the comment
quoted in note 16 below), despite the fact that at least a third of those present
in the amphitheatre were women. This is consistent with studies in
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educational and other contexts which have highlighted men's and women's
'differential access to talk' and the variety of factors on which it depends
(Graddol and Swann 1989: 69-94). In the case of the National Council debate,
the latter would undoubtedly include age and status (the representatives of
the provincial committees tended to be men in their forties, while many of
the younger men were members of the National Bureau), but possibly also
the 'gendered' appeal of Tapie himself, given his prominent association with
a major football club. In the absence of more substantial data, however, these
must be viewed only as hypotheses.
7 'La creation d'un parti politique serait-elle le seul moyen qu'il nous reste
pour nous faire entendre?'
8 'Comment faire face a ce genre de proposition?' was the question Sylla
posed.
9 Sylla made this point several times, stating that 'Je ne partirai pas si je n'ai
pas l'association derriere...', and 'II n'est pas question de partir sans
l'association.'
10 'Est-ce qu'on est ici pour discuter de l'eventuelle presence du president de
SOS-Racisme sur les listes europeennes ou non?'
11 'Ce qui est un peu scandaleux, c'est qu'en fait ... il y a eu aucune
consultation [...]. Done en fait la decision qui devait etre prise soi-disant en
commun etait fausee parce que Fode Sylla deja meme avant cette reunion
savait qu'il n'appartiendrait pas a cette liste. ... Alors la encore, aucun debat
democratique. Vraiment, ga s'est fait ... C'etait lutte de pouvoir, une lutte
d'apparatchiks entre eux, mais sans que les militants de base soient un peu
informes sur la situation.'
12 'T'avais l'impression qu'il y avait eu une discussion au-dessus, des
pressions ...' (Tape-recorded interview with Didier, 28 November 1994)
13 '... toutes les derives passees et actuelles visant a subordonner le combat
antiraciste a des interets exterieurs a celui-ci et plus proche de la manoeuvre
aventuriste, voire de la magouille, que d'une volonte de faire avancer la
construction d'un cadre collectif capable de peser pour l'egalite des droits.'
14 'Alors, ce qui m'a le plus frappe dans cette histoire, c'est le manque de
conscience politique d'un certain nombre de mes camarades, notamment du
Bureau national, qui leur rend prets a toutes les alliances et atteint un certain
opportunisme. C'est a dire: "Oui, mais Tapie, il plait dans les banlieues." Oui,
mais bon, c'est pas parce qu'un certain nombre de gens se gourent que
l'association doit adherer a cette erreur.'
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15 'Deja ce qui est dramatique dans cette histoire, c'est que ... ce CN [Conseil
national] qui avait lieu, les gens etaient prevenus un jour avant. C'est a dire
que les trois quarts des provinciaux dont les Toulousains qui faisaient partie
de ceux qui s'etaient opposes fermement a ce projet, ont eu enormement de
mal a ... venir participer a la decision. Moi, j'etais prevenu un jour avant par
telephone.'
16 The phrase 'On risque de laisser passer [or 'rater'] le train' was used by
three separate speakers, while a fourth described Tapie's offer as 'une
opportunity ... un train qui passe qu'il faut prendre'.
17 'L'invitation de la part de Tapie est un signe que notre association vaut
cher. C'est un hommage a toi, Fode, et a l'association. Je pense neanmoins
que notre association vaut plus cher que M. Tapie peut payer.' The speaker
was Gerard Filoche (see section of Appendix 2 on the Revolutionary
Communist League [LCR]).
18 Thus, one older activist insisted: ' II faut s 'adresser a 1'ensemble de la societe
... pas qu'a la jeunesse. (We need to address society as a whole ... not only
young people.)'
19 The actual phrase used was: 'Tapie mord sur un public, les jeunes, qui est
aussi le notre.' The verb 'mordre sur' literally means 'to make a dent in, to eat
into'. Its figurative use here conjures up an intriguing image of the
relationship between the parties involved!
20 'II n'est pas un homme politique comme les autres.'
21 'SOS est une des rares organisations aujourd'hui qui est en rythme avec la
jeunesse.' The speaker was Malek Boutih, who was subsequently to become
president of SOS-Racisme (see Postscript).
22 'Le programme de Tapie est un programme anfrqeunes. Sa politique ne
resoudrait pas le chomage mais l'aggraverait. Pour moi c'est clair que Tapie
est pour l'entreprise, pour les "gagnants". C'est notre morale, ga? Non, la
tradition de cette association est pour l'egalite. Et puis, il y a les histoires de
corruption. Ce ne sont pas des histoires secondaires. Tapie represente
l'antimodele de la generation morale. Alors je conseille qu'on ne mette pas
un petit doigt derriere ga. Ca serait une regression pour notre mouvement.'
Once more, the speaker is Gerard Filoche.
23 'Moi, j'y etais totalement oppose. C'est a dire que si cette affaire s'etait faite,
je serais parti. J'ai une image de la morale que j'associe a SOS meme s'il y a
des phenomenes de pouvoir et tout ga (qui me semblent inherents un peu a
la nature des choses dans le domaine politique). La, c'etait en totale
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contradiction avec l'image de Tapie qui est, a mon avis, une image de la
malhonnetete complete quoi, vraiment l'image de la malhonnetete, la
mauvaise foi. [...] II ne pouvait absolument pas pour moi etre acceptable.'
24 'Si Fode rentre sur la liste de Tapie, qa veut dire que, pour moi - et c'est ce
que j'ai dit au sein de l'association a ce moment-la - SOS changerait de
nature. Elle n'est plus une association antiraciste: une association devient un
mouvementpolitique.'
25 'II y avait une phrase d'antan qui disait que le president d'une association il
est dans la zone du prophete et le militant politique il est dans la zone du roi.
Done il y en a un qui eclaire, qui dit des choses, qui exprime des valeurs, des
convictions et cetera, et il y a un autre qui execute, qui fait ...C'est pas du
tout le meme role. Et moi je veux que SOS reste dans le role du prophete
parce que ... SOS etait un referent dans la societe, c'est encore un referent.
Un referent de valeurs morales, elle a defendu des choses, dont les valeurs
morales. Si tu rentres dans le jeu politique, ce n'est plus la meme reference.'
26 'un rapport hierarchise et instrumentalist du mouvement social vis-a-vis
du mode de representation politique institutionnel.' (Appel pour l'autonomie
du mouvement social)
27 It is interesting to note, therefore, that in three successive European
elections (1990, 1994 and 1998) relatively small French parties (the Greens,
MRG and PCF respectively) sought to boost their electoral performance by
attracting well-known figures from outside the party to stand as their
candidates. This raises a number of questions which I am not able to consider
here. For example, to what extent were each the parties involved 'in decline'?
Also, is this 'openness' only found in European elections? If so, what does
this tell us about the relative importance which is attached to such elections
by political elites?
28 From 1996 onwards, Sylla's positions on immigration quotas and the
regularisation of undocumented resident foreigners had also resulted in a
significant loss of credibility in wider activist circles (see Alaux 1996). He
was replaced by Malek Boutih, a former vice-president of SOS-Racisme, the
association's first Franco-Maghrebian president, and a leading member of
the Socialist Left current within the Socialist Party (Le Monde, 17 March
1999).
29 'J'en ai marre des gens qui font des promesses, qui parlent sans cesse des
jeunes, des femmes, des immigres, et puis qui disent : le droit de vote?
Rideau, la tete a Toto.'
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30 In the light of this, it is difficult not to agree with Mogniss Abdallah's
comment (2000: 75) that: 'It has to be admitted that SOS-Racisme has put in
place a training school for political cadres capable of renewing its
recruitment of young people and and training new anti-racist elites. (Cest la
qu'il faut bien reconnaitre a SOS Racisme la mise en place d'une ecole de
formation de cadres politiques capable de renouveler son recrutement dans
la jeunesse et de former de nouvelles elites antiracistes.y
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Chapter 9
Constitutional Reform, Asylum Rights
and Protest Mobilisation
The focus of this chapter is on SOS-Racisme's campaign in the autumn of
1993 to mobilise opposition to a government proposal to reform the
constitutional right to asylum. This was the centre-point of the association's
activity at a national level during the first five months of my fieldwork, and I
was able to follow it almost from beginning to end. The chapter focuses on
two main themes. The first is the way in which SOS-Racisme sought in a
newspaper article and in the leaflets it distributed at demonstrations and
elsewhere to portray the centre-right government as undermining 'the
republican tradition' of asylum rights in France, and itself as the defender of
that same tradition. The second is the association's media strategy: the
example here is its use of a controversial poster in order to attract media
attention and publicise its campaign against the reform of asylum rights. The
two themes are inter-linked as one of the issues which arose in internal
debates about the poster was its role as a mobilising tool.
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Schengen, Asylum Rights and Constitutional Reform
One of the first pieces of legislation to be introduced by the new centre-right
government which was elected in 1993 was proposed by Charles Pasqua, the
Interior Minister, and concerned the entry and residence rights of foreigners
(Costa-Lascoux 1994b). The Socialist Party and the French Communist Party
opposition were unable to prevent the passing of the Pasqua Laws1 in July
1993 as they held only a tiny minority of the seats in the National Assembly.
However, they immediately referred a number of the provisions set out in
the Pasqua Laws to the Constitutional Court which is responsible for
ensuring that new legislation does not infringe the French Constitution. On
13 August 1993, the Constitutional Court delivered a judgement in which it
censured eight articles contained in the Pasqua Laws (Liberation, 16 August
1993) as being unconstitutional. The Court's decision provoked a political
controversy in which the alleged political bias of its members and the nature
of the cohabitation between a right-wing Prime minister (Balladur) and a
left-wing President (Mitterrand) were central points of contention.
Over the next four months this debate was played out primarily in relation
to the article of the Pasqua Laws regarding the right to asylum and whether,
in the light of the Court's decision to censure it, a reform of the Constitution
was necessary to implement the Schengen Agreement. It is beyond the scope
of the present chapter to provide a detailed account of the controversy
provoked by the Constitutional Court's judgement concerning the Pasqua
Laws. Nevertheless, a brief outline of the debate surrounding the reform of
the Constitution is necessary before I turn to consider the strategies
deployed by SOS-Racisme to oppose restriction of asylum rights.
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Article 24 of the 1993 Pasqua Laws removed an asylum-seeker's right to
make an application for asylum in France if a previous request had been
refused by another EU member state. According to Pasqua, this change was
necessary in order to implement the provisions on the responsibility for
dealing with asylum requests contained in the Schengen Agreement, to
which France was a signatory state. The original Schengen Agreement was
signed by France, Germany and the Benelux countries on 14 June 1985, and
was followed by the Schengen Implementation Agreement on 19 June 1990.
The Agreement was subsequently incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty.
The Schengen Agreement's stated objective was to promote the free
movement of citizens of EU member states, as well as of goods and services,
through the gradual abolition of controls at common internal borders (see
Fernhout 1993; O'Keefe 1995; Philip 1994). The removal of internal border
checks, however, was held to require 'compensatory' measures at external
borders in order to control the movements of immigrants into the territory
covered by the Agreement (1985 Schengen Agreement, Article 17). As a
result, the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990 contained, among other
provisions, measures designed to introduce a common visa policy and to
facilitate the harmonisation of asylum policy among the participating
member states.
With respect to the right to asylum, the 1990 Schengen Implementation
Agreement set out a framework for determining which one of the member
states party to it was responsible for examining any given asylum request
(Title 2, Chapter 7). As a result, an asylum-seeker was prevented from
making a series of applications in different EU countries, so-called 'asylum
shopping' (cf. d'Oliveira 1993). In other words, Schengen introduced a
division of responsibility between its signatory states concerning the
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treatment of asylum applications. One state (usually the state of first entry)
was defined as responsible for considering a request for asylum and, if this
was refused, for ensuring the deportation of the asylum-seeker from the
Schengen area. For example, if a refugee were to request asylum in
Germany, after being refused asylum in France, it would be the
responsibility of the French government to take that person back and
ultimately to deport them.
In summary, the Schengen Agreement identified which signatory state had
the responsibility for dealing with an individual request for asylum and was
intended, at least in part, to prevent asylum seekers from making a series of
requests in different EU countries. Article 24 of the 1993 Pasqua Laws was
presented as an application of this provision of the Schengen Agreement. It
held that a person could not register at the OFPRA (the French Office for the
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) if they had already had a
request for asylum refused in another EU member state.
However, in its ruling dated 13 August 1993, the Constitutional Court found
this Article (and a further seven) to be contrary to the French Constitution.
More specifically, the Court ruled that the asylum provision of the Pasqua
Laws contravened Article 4 of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution which
holds that: 'Anyone persecuted because of his pursuit of liberty has the right
to asylum within the territories of the Republic.'2 The Court judged that the
French Republic had an obligation (devoir) to respect the right to asylum on
its territory, whatever conditions application of the Schengen and Dublin
Agreements imposed (Liberation, 16 August 1993).
The French Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, reacted angrily to the
Constitutional Court's ruling and claimed that it rendered the Schengen
Agreement inapplicable. According to Pasqua, the abolition of internal
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border controls could not take place without the 'compensatory measure
{mesure compensatoire)' represented by the introduction of a division of
responsibility with respect to asylum requests. He claimed, furthermore, that
the Court's decision that the Republic had a duty to consider a request for
asylum even if a person's application had been refused in another European
country would lead to a 'considerable increase (augmentation considerable)'
in the number of requests made in France. Consequently, Pasqua concluded
that a reform of the Constitution would be required in order to implement
the Schengen Agreement (Liberation, 16 August 1993).
Pasqua subsequently proposed that a new clause be introduced into the
Constitution making the treatment of asylum requests of persons having
transited by another European country a matter of discretion rather than
obligation. The need for such a reform was, however, contested by a number
of jurists who argued that a legislative solution was possible and emphasised
that in a previous decision (27 July 1991) the Constitutional Court had ruled
that Schengen was not incompatible with the Constitution (Le Monde, 3
September 1993). Political commentators, on the other hand, speculated that
Pasqua had ulterior motives in pushing for a reform of the Constitution. In
particular, it was suggested that Pasqua's decision was a purely political one
designed to put pressure on Mitterrand (whose consent would be required
for the Constitutional amendment to be passed). The intended effect of the
proposed reform, it was claimed, was to push Mitterrand into choosing
between his commitment to European construction (Schengen) and his
defence of human rights (asylum policy) {Le Monde, 3 September 1993. Cf.
Keraudren 1994). In spite of these reservations and a concerted campaign on
the part of anti-racist, immigrant and human rights organisations the reform
was passed on 20 November 1993.
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The Campaign Against the Reform of the Constitution
At the same time as the political and juridical debates were being played out
a number of anti-racist, human rights and immigrant organisations launched
a campaign to mobilise public opinion against any reform of the Constitution
which would restrict asylum rights. In the remainder of this chapter I focus
on several of the strategies deployed by one anti-racist association - SOS-
Racisme - both independently and as part of a wider network of
organisations to oppose Pasqua's proposed amendment of the French
Constitution. I analyse in turn a newspaper article and a poster produced by
SOS-Racisme in the course of a three month period (September-November
1993). In so doing, my aim is to identify the bases upon which SOS-Racisme
sought to mobilise the French population in defence of the right to asylum.
An evaluation of the extent to which the contemporary anti-racist movement
in France is in crisis can only proceed, I would argue, from such a critical
investigation of specific recent campaigns.
An important reason for focusing on SOS-Racisme's campaign against the
reform of the Constitution in the autumn of 1993 lies - as was the case in the
last chapter - in the relative novelty of the political context within which it
was launched. As I have explained in earlier chapters, SOS-Racisme was
founded in 1984, that is, during the Socialists' first period in office (1981-
1986). Although the relationship between the association and the Socialist
Party is more complicated than many commentators have recognised
(Closets 1990; Yonnet 1993), it is true that substantial grants from Jack Lang's
Culture Ministry contributed significantly to SOS-Racisme's early success
and high media profile (see Chapter 1). In the latter half of the decade, the
link between the Socialist Party and SOS-Racisme evolved, partly as an effect
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of shifts in the balance of power between different tendencies (associated
with Mitterrand and Rocard respectively) within the former. Nevertheless,
the association continued to maintain close ties with the Party, in particular
through the presence on its National Bureau of members of the Socialist Left
tendency of the Socialist Party. This is headed by a deputy named Julien
Dray who was a key player in the creation of SOS-Racisme and continues to
exert an important (even determining) influence on the political positions it
adopts (see Chapters 8 and 10).
The victory of a centre-right UDF-RPR coalition at the legislative elections in
March 1993 potentially represented a more far-reaching transformation of
the political context than the election of Chirac as Prime Minister in 1986.
The defeat inflicted on the Socialists was crushing, resulting in an
overwhelming majority for the UDF-RPR government under Balladur in the
National Assembly. This collapse in the electoral support for the Socialists
was followed by a period devoted to rethinking and rebuilding the Left. Its
immediate consequence in the autumn of 1993, however, was a significant
de-mobilisation of party activists which was apparent throughout the
campaign against the reform of the Constitution to restrict asylum rights.
The Socialist Party (and the PCF for that matter) played a very minor role
both in the political and media debate about the right to asylum and in the
concomitant mobilisation of activist organisations in its defence (Le Monde,
3-4 October and 15 October 1993).
The implications of the dramatic change in the political landscape occasioned
by the 1993 legislative elections were highlighted by Fode Sylla, the
president of SOS-Racisme, in his opening address to the association's
National Council meeting in Paris on 26 September 1993. The demoralisation
of the Left in the aftermath of the elections, he argued, required SOS-Racisme
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to adopt a pro-active and offensive stance vis-a-vis the government and
Pasqua's proposed reform of the Constitution. In particular, he claimed that
Mitterrand would not intervene unless a 'social movement (mouvement
social)' emerged expressing its opposition to a restriction of asylum rights. It
was, however, difficult to identify the potential source of any such
mobilisation in the current political context. Left-wing party activists were in
the process of analysing the reasons for their defeat in the elections and other
anti-racist and human rights organisations were, according to Sylla,
adopting a wait-and-see policy (attentisme) with respect to asylum reform.
Certain organisations were even advising against attempting to plan
demonstrations for fear that a poor turn-out would only demoralise activists
even further.
After highlighting the demoralised state of left-wing (party and
organisational) activists, Sylla stressed that it would consequently be
incumbent on SOS-Racisme to mobilise resistance to Pasqua's proposed
reform of the Constitution. He argued repeatedly that SOS-Racisme needed
to be the 'driving-force (animateur)' behind opposition to the government, if
necessary 'dragging along (entrainer)1 other organisations in its wake. It was
imperative, he continued, to confront head-on the government's proposed
limitation of the right to asylum and the rhetoric it was currently employing
when addressing immigration-related issues. Rather than passively waiting
for Pasqua's next move, there was a need for SOS-Racisme 'to go on the
offensive (mener des actions offensives)', giving press interviews, planning
demonstrations and organising public meetings in schools, universities and
other workplaces. Although calling for joint strategies involving a range of
activist groups, he concluded that SOS-Racisme should be at the forefront of
the battle against the reform of the Constitution.
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SOS-Racisme was subsequently to play a prominent part in the organisation
of a series of demonstrations in Paris against the reform of the Constitution
and a public meeting bringing together a range of 'experts' (jurists,
sociologists, politicians, human rights activists) to debate the right to asylum.
In addition, the association produced a series of leaflets which it distributed
in an attempt to mobilise public opinion against the Pasqua Laws and the
restriction of asylum rights. Alongside these strategies, however, SOS-
Racisme also published an article in the daily newspaper Le Monde and
produced a poster as part of its campaign against the Constitutional
amendment. I will conclude this section by commenting briefly on the article.
The next section will provide a more detailed discussion of the poster, with a
view to identifying the ways in which SOS-Racisme sought to mobilise
public and political opinion through this means.
On 24 September 1993 the daily newspaper Le Monde published an article
by Fode Sylla, the president of SOS-Racisme, entitled 'The Duty to Welcome
(Le devoir d'accueil)\ The article sets out to refute a number of arguments
concerning 'illegal' immigration and the right to asylum which had been
advanced by the government in order to justify its decision to propose a
Constitutional amendment. In the first section, Sylla challenges Pasqua's
claim that only a 'technical' and 'limited' reform of the right to asylum is
being envisaged:
Behind the softly-softly approach and the reassuring argument about
a simple legal modification necessitated by the application of the
Schengen Agreement, what is in fact at stake is an attempt to break
with the Republican tradition.3
What is interesting here is the way in which Sylla presents Pasqua's proposal
as not a relatively minor reform but rather as an assault on a part of the
country's republican heritage. In a similar way, the petition which the
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association launched at around the same time presented the right to asylum
as 'the honour of the Republic and of international society (1'honneur de la
Republique et de la societe internationale)' (SOS-Racisme petition 'Contre
toute reforme du droit d'asile', October 1993). In both cases, the association
sought to portray itself as a defender of republican values and institutions
under attack from the members of the government (this is a point I develop
further in this next chapter).
'A refugee named Charles de Gaulle'
In the following section I present an analysis of the poster which played an
important part in attracting media attention to SOS-Racisme's campaign
against proposals to reform the constitutional right to asylum. I discuss both
the 'symbolic economy (economie symbolique)' (Ramognino 1994) of the
poster itself and also the different responses which it provoked among
members of the association in the course of a National Council meeting in
September 1993. I argue that the internal debate sparked off by the poster
revealed conflicting interpretations of the nature of the campaign in which
SOS-Racisme was involved and the political orientation it should adopt.
High profile and often controversial posters became a trademark of SOS-
Racisme during the 1980s and the poster used as part of the asylum rights
campaign was, in this respect, no exception (see Figure 9). It takes the form
of a photograph of Charles de Gaulle, in his General's kepi, beside which is
printed an identification sheet containing the following information: 'Name:
De Gaulle; Surname: Charles [sic]; Occupation: General; Entry: June 40;
Status: Political Refugee'.4 At the bottom of the photograph the following








Non a la reforme du droit d'asile.
SOS RACISME -14 cit6 GRISET 75011 PARIS - T6I. 48 06 40 00
Figure 9 SOS-Racisme Poster: 'Non a la reforme du droit d'asile'
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respected the right to asylum in 1940. No to the reform of the right to
asylum.'5 In much smaller letters underneath the association's name, address,
symbol (the hand) and telephone number complete the poster.
I present a detailed analysis of reactions to the poster later in this section, but
a brief explanation will be provided here as a way in to discussing the debate
which it provoked in the press and at SOS-Racisme's National Council
meeting in September 1993. The photograph captures de Gaulle in military
uniform (clearly indicated by the kepi) and dates back to the Second World
War when he led the Free French opposition to the Vichy regime (see
Cobban 1965: 195). The identification sheet which accompanies the
photograph makes reference to the fact that in June 1940 de Gaulle escaped
to London where he was granted political asylum by the British authorities.
At an immediate level, therefore, the poster recalls a specific historical
moment when the survival of de Gaulle, a national hero who was
subsequently to be elected (in 1958) as the first president of the Fifth
Republic, depended upon the existence of the right to asylum in another
country.
However, the poster plays not only on de Gaulle's role as a symbol of
national resistance but also as the founder of the party political tradition in
France which bears his name. A Gaullist party, the Union pour la Nouvelle
Republique (UNR), was formed in the run-up to the 1958 legislative elections
with a view to securing support in the National Assembly for de Gaulle's
government. It was subsequently to undergo a series of transformations,
culminating in the founding, in 1976, of the neo-Gaullist Rassemblement
pour la Republique (RPR) under the leadership of Jacques Chirac. As both a
political philosophy and a party apparatus, therefore, Gaullism has survived
the death of de Gaulle in 1970. Indeed, as the right's victory in the 1993
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elections was to testify, it continues to exert a significant influence on
contemporary French politics in the Fifth Republic (see Hazareesingh 1994:
261-287).
An awareness of these aspects of the history of post-war French politics, the
emergence of a specific political tradition identified with de Gaulle, enables
us to appreciate the finer point which the poster is making. As the president
and vice-president of SOS-Racisme wrote at the time: 'We were anxious to
address the Interior Minister [Pasqua], who initiated this law, and to remind
him that Gaullism itself was born in exil' (Le Monde, 4 September 1993).6 In
other words, the poster calls Pasqua's attention to the fact that the Gaullist
political tradition with which he is identified, as a member of the RPR party,
can be traced back to the period when its founder, de Gaulle, was granted
asylum by Britain. The implication is, of course, that had Britain not
respected the right to asylum in 1940 the political family to which Pasqua
and many of his government colleagues belonged would not have
materialised. In short, the poster urges Pasqua not to reform the right to
asylum by reminding him that ultimately it made possible his own political
existence.
SOS-Racisme launched the poster towards the end of September 1993 and it
immediately provoked a storm of protest among RPR deputies which was
widely covered by the press. Jean-Louis Debre, who subsequently succeeded
Pasqua as Interior Minister but at the time was assistant General Secretary
and Spokesperson of the RPR, stated that the poster had aroused the
'indignation' of his fellow Gaullists:
The Gaullists, better than anyone, know what our country owes to
Great Britain, to the courage and goodwill of the British people
during the Second World War ... France and Great Britain have
historically always been at the forefront of the battle for human rights
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and freedom, and they will remain so in the future. (Le Monde, 4
October 1993)7
As Debre's communique indicates, RPR deputies objected to what they
perceived as a questioning both of the party's acknowledgement of France's
historical debt to Britain and, more generally, of its commitment to human
rights. The use of the image of de Gaulle to score such party political points,
they maintained, was inappropriate.
A similar argument was advanced by Daniel Amson in the daily newspaper
Le Quotidien de Paris? For Amson, the key issue raised by the poster was
the legitimacy of using national symbols such as de Gaulle for 'partisan' or
factional ends. He declared his own position on this matter to be the
following:
Historical figures, by virtue of the very fact that they are a part of the
common heritage of the nation, cannot lend themselves to partisan
use. ... Unless I am mistaken, General de Gaulle never spoke on the
subject of the right to asylum. It is, therefore, improper today to
invoke his memory in support of an argument which no-one can say if
he would have criticised or defended. (Le Quotidien de Paris, 4
October 1993).9
This short passage is, in my view, worth considering in some detail for it
highlights the complex position of de Gaulle in French political history and
the reason why the poster was to prove so controversial.
In the first sentence quoted above, Amson states that de Gaulle's historic
contribution to the French nation is such that it transcends political divisions.
The implication here is that, as in some sense an embodiment of the nation at
a particular point in its history (the Second World War), de Gaulle stands
outside - or, more accurately perhaps, above - the arena of party politics.
This is, of course, the impression which de Gaulle himself subsequently
sought to foster during his presidency (1958-69), by emphasising his distance
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from the Gaullist party, the UNR, during this period (see Hazareesingh 1994:
268).10 In the first part of his article, Amson reintroduces this notion of de
Gaulle as being 'above politics' through representing him as belonging to the
nation's heritage as a whole and not to any one group within it. From this it
follows, at least for Amson, that the poster can be criticised for its illegitimate
use of a national symbol to promote the opinions of a particular political
faction or movement.
It should be noted, however, that in the original passage quoted above
Amson levels a second criticism at the poster which differs slightly from the
one which has just been outlined. As well as condemning the poster's
'partisan' use of an historical figure of national importance, he also accuses
SOS-Racisme of attempting, in effect, to put words into de Gaulle's mouth.
Briefly stated, his point appears to be that the poster fosters the impression
that de Gaulle personally would have supported the association's position in
the current conflict with the government over the right to asylum. According
to Amson, such an assumption is unwarranted owing to the fact that de
Gaulle's own views on the general question of asylum rights were never
formally recorded. As a result, it is impossible to know whether he would
have agreed or disagreed with SOS-Racisme's campaign. In the light of this
Amson contends that it is unacceptable for the poster to identify de Gaulle
even implicitly or indirectly with a particular stance on the right to asylum.
Amson's second objection thus rests on the assumption that the poster
attempts to align de Gaulle himself, as a political actor, with the position
adopted by SOS-Racisme vis-a-vis the government's reform of asylum rights.
On this reading, a fundamental issue is whether de Gaulle can hypothetically
be regarded as, in linguistic terms, an 'enunciative source (source
enonciative)'n of the phrase 'M. Pasqua, it is a good thing that countries
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respected the right to asylum in 1940' printed at the bottom of the poster. In
other words, could this statement conceivably be attributed to de Gaulle
himself, rather than or as well as to 'SOS-Racisme'? As we have seen, Amson
would answer that it is wrong to do so since any views which de Gaulle may
have held about the right to asylum are not publicly known.
Although there is an apparent logic and plausibility to Amson's critique of
the poster, I would argue that in an important way it simply misses the
point. The question of whether de Gaulle would have supported or opposed
SOS-Racisme's campaign against asylum reform is surely a side-issue if not
an irrelevance. The poster is not concerned with de Gaulle's views as such on
the right to asylum but highlights instead the fact that during the Second
World War he was a political refugee in Britain (as emphasised by the
inclusion of an identification sheet in English beside the photograph). It is
the relationship between de Gaulle's war-time status as an exile and his
subsequent role in founding the political tradition bearing his name to which
the poster draws attention. Moreover, as the president and vice-president of
SOS-Racisme indicate in the extract from the Le Monde article quoted earlier,
the poster was intended as a vehicle for the association to remind Pasqua of
the circumstances in which Gaullism originated. The pointed comment
addressed to Pasqua at the bottom of the poster is thus articulated by the
'SOS-Racisme' named underneath and not by the figure 'frozen' in the
photograph.
However, in spite of the limited value of Amson's analysis of the poster his
remarks do serve to emphasise the complexity of de Gaulle's place in French
history, as both a national hero and president 'above politics' and a (party)
political actor. As I have already mentioned, during the period of his
presidency de Gaulle sought to distance himself from the system of party
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politics and, in particular, from the Gaullist party, the UNR. If we take
voting behaviour as an indicator, de Gaulle was indeed successful in raising
the presidential institution above traditional political divisions. The changes
he introduced, by means of referenda, to the Constitution (1958), Algerian
self-determination (1961) and election of the president (1962) attracted a level
of electoral support far beyond that enjoyed by the UNR. Nevertheless, as
Hazareesingh has pointed out, a 1967 opinion poll revealed that 'almost two-
thirds' of those questioned considered that de Gaulle 'acted primarily as the
leader of the majority Gaullist party' rather than in an independent manner
(1994: 268-9). There is some evidence, then, that the public perception of de
Gaulle, particularly near the end of his presidency, identified him with a
partisan stance, implicated in rather than above party politics.
The preceding comments underline the dual nature of de Gaulle's legacy and
corresponding image in contemporary France. On the one hand, he stands as
a symbol of national resistance and post-war unity; on the other, he
represents a particular ideological current in French politics. SOS-Racisme's
poster plays on the tension between these aspects. However, within the
association itself there were contrasting evaluations of the poster's
effectiveness when it was presented by the National Bureau to members
assembled for a national meeting in September 1993.
A number of members commented on the poster in the discussion which
followed. One activist stated: 'It doesn't shock me (Ca me choque pas)\
describing the poster more as a 'wall photograph (unephoto de mur)[ which
was pleasing to look at but did not grab your attention. A second member
disagreed, claiming that the poster would succeed in attracting people's
attention by its unusualness. It was not customary for large pictures of de
Gaulle to appear on the streets of the outlying estates and this would induce
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people to look more closely. The heaviest criticism was levelled at the poster
by a representative from Toulouse who asserted that not everyone could be
expected to know the history behind the poster, especially young people 'in
the suburbs (en banlieue)'. It would, as a result, be necessary to explain it.
The same activist also expressed some scepticism about the effect the poster
would have on the members of the Gaullist RPR party and whether it would
indeed cause pressure to be brought on Pasqua by his colleagues. A more
positive assessment was made by a fourth speaker who suggested that the
poster was effective since by portraying de Gaulle as an asylum-seeker it
separated the right to asylum from immigration. He found it 'interesting
(interessantey and said that it did not merit 'the wrath (les foudres)' which it
was incurring.
As these comments indicate, a range of evaluative criteria were employed by
the members of SOS-Racisme who voiced their reaction to the poster at this
meeting. I would like, however, to draw out the implications of just one of
the remarks cited above: that young people in the outlying estates would not
understand the poster. The speaker here raises the issue of the identity of the
intended addressee of the poster: who is going to be looking at it? Most
obviously the poster situates Pasqua himself in the position of spectator. The
association repeated this strategy in a subsequent poster protesting against
the Interior Minister's immigration legislation which made it more difficult
for French nationals to marry a person not having French nationality. The
later poster contained a photograph of a white woman and a black man
hugging each other with the caption: 'Mixed couples (les couples mixtes)
wish M. and Mme Pasqua a Happy Valentine's Day.' (The association's more
recent posters have adopted a different strategy.) As far as the poster of de
Gaulle was concerned, however, the president of SOS-Racisme explained at
the meeting that one of its aims was to play on divisions internal to the RPR
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in the hope that Pasqua's colleagues would bring pressure to bear on him to
withdraw the constitutional reform. In other words, the poster was directed
at 'the political class' more generally.
The activist whose comments I have cited, however, questions the impact of
the poster on an addressee of a radically different nature. This person is
young and lives in the suburbs of one of the large conurbations which
implies, given the social and 'racial' segregation of urban space, that she or
he is also likely to be poor, working-class and black (the term 'banlieue' has
the same sort of connotations as 'inner cities' has in Britain). The question
asks, in other words, about the effect of the poster on young people who
might be willing to join the association.
There appears to be a tension here between the leadership's and provincial
activists' understandings of the principal 'constituency' which the poster was
designed to mobilise. The leadership clearly intended it to bring pressure to
bear on Pasqua within his own party to withdraw proposals to amend the
Constitutional right to asylum. The activist quoted above, however,
appeared to view the function of the poster as also (or even essentially) being
to mobilise the wider public to participate in its demonstrations and
encourage them to bring pressure to bear on the politicians. There appears to
be a difference of appreciation about which of these two should have
priority: is the poster's primary purpose to play on internal tensions in the
RPR party (in which case all the contextual information necessary to 'read'
the poster could be safely taken for granted: de Gaulle as founder of RPR,
war-time experiences in Britain and status)? Or is it primarily intended as a
tool for mobilising public protest (in which case the 'readability' of the poster
is a real issue)? The leadership and sections of the membership appeared to
take the former view, while some of the provincial representatives adopted
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the latter. The question is the type of 'opinion' which was to be influenced
and mobilised: the political elite and existing activists, or potential members
and the public more generally. This leads on, finally, to the issue of the
nature and role of SOS-Racisme as an anti-racist association. The tension
which I discussed in Chapter 2 between a conception of SOS-Racisme as, on
the one hand, primarily engaged in national campaigns to influence public
opinion, or, on the other, a grassroots organisation committed to concrete,
daily action against racism, is present below the surface here again.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed some of the varied types of protest and
conventional action which were involved in SOS-Racisme's 1993 campaign
against proposals to reform the constitutional right to asylum. Various
constituencies were targeted in the course of the campaign. Mobilisation of
the public in forms of protest such as street demonstrations was attempted
through an appeal to defend 'the republican tradition1 from attack by the
centre-right government. A letter published in Le Monde newspaper and the
series of leaflets the association distributed at this time were the principal
means by which SOS-Racisme sought to get this message across. The
organisation of a public debate involving many prominent intellectuals was
an additional means by which the association sought to inform the public.
Running alongside this, the association collected signatures for a petition.
A narrower constituency was targeted in the poster campaign discussed in
the final section of the chapter. This addressed Pasqua himself directly and
appeared intended primarily to bring pressure to bear on the individual
himself, notably from within his own party, to withdraw the proposed
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reform. The emphasis here was not so much on the republican tradition but
rather the origins and history of Gaullism in France and its current
incarnation in the RPR party of which Pasqua was then a prominent
member. The poster did not appear intended by the leadership as a tool to
mobilise public protest (it did not publicise any specific actions organised by
the association) but more as a way of attracting media attention to SOS-
Racisme's campaign through generating controversy (and in this it was
undoubtedly successful) and bringing pressure to bear directly on Pasqua
himself (rather than indirectly through street protest).
In summary, SOS-Racisme's campaign enjoyed both success and failure. On
the positive side, its poster attracted media attention and generated a certain
amount of controversy which helped to publicise its campaign. More
negatively, however, the association's attempt (with others it should be
noted) to mobilise 'republican' opinion in street protests against the
proposed reforms attracted little public support beyond the ranks of existing
activists. A combination of aspects of the 'political opportunity structure'
contributed to the relative failure of the demonstrations: the recent change of
government and support for Pasqua; the demobilised state of potential allies
such as left-wing parties following the election; the uncertainty over the




1 The Pasqua Laws contain a reform of the nationality code, a bill relating to
identity checks and provisions on immigration control and the conditions of
entry and residence of foreigners (see Costa-Lascoux 1994).
2 'Tout homme persecute en raison de son action en faveur de la liberte a
droit d'asile sur les territoires de la Republique.'
3 'Derriere la maniere feutree et le discours rassurant sur une simple
adaptation juridique rendue necessaire par l'application des accords de
Schengen, c'est bien d'une tentative de rupture dans la tradition republicaine
qu'il s'agit.1
4 As I noticed over two years after completing my fieldwork, the
identification sheet lists the name and surname of de Gaulle in the incorrect
order. The confusion probably resulted from the fact that the English word
'name' is a faux ami of the French 'nom': the former is often used to refer
simply to a person's first name, the latter is only employed in the sense of the
English 'surname'.
5 'M. Pasqua, heureusement qu'en 1940, des pays respectaient le droit d'asile.
Non a la reforme du droit d'asile.'
6 'Nous avons tenu a interpeller le ministre de l'interieur, qui est a l'initiative
de cette loi, et a lui rappeler que le gaullisme lui-meme est ne dans l'exil.'
7 'Les gaullistes, mieux que quiconque, savent ce que notre pays doit a la
Grande-Bretagne, au courage et a la volonte du peuple anglais pendant la
seconde guerre mondiale ... La France comme la Grande-Bretagne ont
toujours ete, dans l'histoire, a la pointe du combat pour les droits de
1'homme et les libertes, et elles y resteront demain.'
8 This edition of Le Quotidien de Paris also carries a commentary by Jean-
Richard Sulzer (a professor at the Universite Paris-Dauphine) who claims
that the poster commits an 'historical error' (erreur historique) by
representing de Gaulle as a 'simple political refugee' (un simple refugie
politique) when in fact he was the head of an exiled government.
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9 'Les personnages historiques, par le fait meme qu'ils appartiennent au
patrimoine collectif de la nation, ne sauraient se preter a une utilisation
partisane ... Le general de Gaulle n'ayant jamais-sauf erreur-parle du droit
d'asile, il n'etait pas convenable d'invoquer aujourd'hui sa memoire au
soutien d'une these dont personne ne peut dire s'il l'aurait critiquee ou
defendue.'
10 Subsequent presidents of the Fifth Republic have also attempted with
varying degrees of success to avoid being over-implicated in party politics in
order to portray themselves as representatives of the nation as a whole (see
Thody 1998; Cole 1998).
11 I am employing the same terminology here as used by Ramognino (1994)
in her analysis of political posters.
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Chapter 10
Headscarves, Secularism and Political
Change
This final chapter aims to contribute to debates about the 'crisis of anti-
racism' in France by comparing the different arguments used and positions
adopted by SOS-Racisme during two phases of the so-called headscarves
affair {1'affaire des foulards islamiques ). I examine the interventions made
by representatives of SOS-Racisme in the controversy which erupted in 1989
and again in 1994 over whether secularism - widely perceived as an essential
feature of the Republican tradition-required the exclusion of young Muslim
women wearing the hidjab from state schools.
Although the headscarf affair has been the subject of considerable discussion,
little to date has been published on the perspectives of members of anti-racist
associations such as SOS-Racisme. The following chapter is intended as a
contribution towards filling that gap in the literature. (For discussions of
other aspects of the 'affair' see, in particular, Beriss 1990; Gaspard and
Khosrokhavar 1995; Minces 1996; Monnet 1990.)
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An Overview of the 1989 and 1994 'Headscarf Affairs'
The so-called Islamic headscarves affair began in October 1989 when Ernest
Cheniere, the headteacher of a state school in Creil (to the north of Paris),
suspended three young Muslim students for wearing headscarves.
According to Cheniere, the young women's insistence on wearing the
headscarf to their classes constituted an infringement of the secularism
{lai'cite) of the Republican school, enshrined in French law. The suspension
of the three young women was challenged by a number of anti-racist
organisations and attracted the attention of the national media. Over the next
two months the affair evolved into a 'psychodrama' in which, for many, the
national identity of France and the future of Republican values were at stake.
Finally, the Education Minister, Lionel Jospin, referred the matter to France's
highest administrative court, the Conseil d'Etat, which ruled that wearing a
headscarf to school was not in itself an infringement of secularism. Under
this ruling, the headscarf could only be prohibited under certain conditions,
the most notable of which was its use as an instrument of proselytism (see Le
Monde, 29 November 1989).
In the public debate over the headscarf SOS-Racisme aligned itself with
Jospin in opposing the exclusion of young Muslim women, a position which
alienated the association from many of its traditional supporters on the so-
called 'secular left {la gauche lai'que )'. SOS-Racisme argued that the issue
should be resolved through negotiation between teachers, parents and the
students themselves at a local level and on a case-by-case basis away from
the glare of the national media. Harlem Desir, the president of SOS-Racisme,
argued repeatedly that his organisation was not in favour of the headscarf -
which it viewed as a symbol of women's oppression - but believed that it
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was only through their exposure to secular, Republican values at school that
young women themselves would decide to stop wearing it.1
As Silverman (1992: 112-3) has pointed out, however, the conflict between
apparently polarised positions concerning the headscarf should not obscure
the existence of an underlying consensus on 'the French model of
universalist secularism'. Both SOS-Racisme and Jospin, on the one hand, and
their opponents, on the other, shared a fundamental commitment to
Republican secularist values; they differed only on the most effective means
of promoting these. The dichotomy between universalism/ secularism and
difference, in terms of which the affair was constructed, remained
unchallenged.
The wearing of headscarves in school again became the focus of intensive
media interest at a national level in the autumn of 1994, following the
publication of an interview in the weekly magazine Le Point with the then
Education Minister, Frangois Bayrou on 10 September 1994. The contents of
this interview were widely reported and discussed in national newspapers
over the course of the next week, setting in motion a wider public debate
involving teachers, politicians, representatives of religious organisations and
human rights/anti-racist activists.
Bayrou's intervention was implicitly critical of the Conseil d'Etat's ruling on
27 November 1989 which had effectively resolved the first phase of the
headscarves affair. He claimed that this ruling had subsequently proved
difficult to apply in practice and that he had come under pressure from
headteachers to clarify the 'uncertain' situation which had resulted. In the
magazine interview, Bayrou announced his intention to send a circular to all
headteachers in the state sector calling on them to ban the wearing of
'conspicuous (ostentatoires )' religious signs by students in their schools.2
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Crucially, the circular assumed a distinction between 'discrete' and
'conspicuous' religious phenomena, arguing that the latter (in which
category Bayrou placed the headscarf) were inherently associated with
proselytism and thus a threat to Republican secularism. Although it was
argued by some commentators that religious signs by their nature were
'conspicuous', the circular was portrayed by Bayrou as providing
headteachers with the clear guidelines they required in order to respond
confidently to perceived attacks on the secularism of the Republican school.
The initial reaction of many of the members of SOS-Racisme who assembled
in Paris for a meeting of its National Council on 24 September 1994 was to
reject Bayrou's circular and reassert the association's 1989 position -
opposition to the exclusion of young women wearing the hidjab . However,
on 13 October 1994 the National Bureau sent a circular to all activists inviting
them to a special meeting to debate the issue further. On this occasion a
section of the leadership spoke in favour of a modification of the 1989
position to take account of 'developments' in the intervening period. In
particular, they claimed that it was no longer a question of a few young
women wearing headscarves because of parental pressure, but rather of a
concerted attack on Republican secularism by 'Muslim Fundamentalists
(integristes musulmans )'. A change in SOS-Racisme's position was also
required, they argued, in order to counter the attempt by such
'fundamentalists' to present themselves as the legitimate representatives of
all North Africans in France (SOS-Racisme Circular 13 October 1994).
At the end of the meeting a resolution proposed by members of the National
Bureau was passed which stated SOS-Racisme's opposition to the wearing of
all religious signs in school and called on the French National Assembly to
introduce the appropriate legislation.3 In so doing, the association sought to
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distance itself from Bayrou's circular which it described as 'discriminatory
(discriminatoire)' in that it effectively designated Islam as the sole adversary
of Republican secularism. SOS-Racisme's resolution, it was argued, avoided
such a scapegoating of immigrants and Muslims in particular by demanding
equal juridical treatment for all religions. However, the resolution was also
intended to safeguard the secularism of the school from attack by supposed
Islamic fundamentalists who, it was claimed, were manipulating the young
women wearing the headscarf in order to undermine a central institution of
the French state. As an internal circular indicated, the underlying strategy of
the association was that of portraying both the 'fundamentalists' and the
right-wing government (which had attempted to reduce the funding of state
schools relative to the private sector the previous January) as opponents of
the Republican school as a tool for the promotion of secularism and equality
(SOS-Racisme Circular, 13 October 1994).
Leadership Action and a Local-Level Debate
In September 1994, the issue of Bayrou's circular and the specific incidents in
schools involving young women wearing the headscarf were debated at
SOS-Racisme's first National Council meeting after the summer break.
Although this did not satisfy all those present, and particularly a number of
teachers confronting the issue directly, the association decided to maintain
its 1989 position in favour of negotiation and 'dialogue' and against
exclusion. However, over the next few weeks the issue continued to be
discussed in meetings of the association's National Bureau. A section of the
leadership began to argue for a change in the position to take account of
'new' developments. This was reflected in a circular which the National
Bureau sent to members:
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Since [the last National Council meeting at] the end of September, a
new element has emerged: Islamic fundamentalists intend to take
advantage of the opportunity offered to them by [Bayrou's] circular
by launching an offensive in which they aim to present themselves
as the representatives of people of Muslim origins, and particularly
North Africans in France. This offensive meets the government's
double objective: to place immigrants in the same category as
fundamentalists, on the one hand, and to have the immigrant
population structured in terms of separate communities, on the
other. The logic of the government and of the fundamentalists is
opposed to all the values that we defend. One and the other are
opponents of integration and equality. (SOS-Racisme Circular, 13
October 1994, one paragraph break omitted)4
The circular continued by claiming that:
In such a context, the association finds itself in a difficult situation:
- If we call for the abrogation of the circular and for the girls not to
be excluded, we will find ourselves, whether we like it or not,
tagging along behind the fundamentalists who have the same
demand.
- If we accept exclusion because we want to put an end to the
fundamentalists' offensive, we will find ourselves agreeing with a
government which persists in raising the anti-immigrant stakes and
which points the finger at Islam as the sole adversary of secularism.
(SOS-Racisme Circular, 13 October 1994)5
As a result of this, the National Bureau proposed to reconvene the National
Council in order to debate the issue further and to take account of this
altered context. It set a date near the end of October and invited members to
attend the meeting in Paris.
In the meantime, the local committee with which I was involved, like others
throughout France, discussed the question of the headscarf affair and
whether a change in position was needed. As within the National Bureau
itself, there were significant differences of perspective on this issue as the
following account of the committee meeting I attended illustrates.
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Event: Meeting of Parisian committee of SOS-Racisme, October 1994
This was an evening meeting of the local committee of which I was a
member. It was held in central Paris and attended by a dozen activists. One
of the points which was discussed was the issue of 'the headscarf' and the
circular sent to schools by the Education Minister, Frangois Bayrou. [The
following exchanges have been reconstructed from detailed notes I took
during the meeting.]
Luc: In 1989, the association had held a National Council meeting
where almost unanimously the position had been adopted that the
school is the best path to integration for the young girls (1'ecole est la
meilleure vole d'integration pour les jeunes filled) in question and
that the situation should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Negotiation rather exclusion. Now members of the association in the
provinces are telling us that the SOS's position is not understood (le
discours de SOS n 'est pas lisible) either by students or teachers on
the ground. There is also a radicalisation of the young women with
respect to four years ago. They are not girls being pressured by their
families, but rather young women of 17 or 18 who are militants
(militantes).
So, certain people in the association are arguing that in several
respects the situation is different from in 1989 and that the original
position should be changed. There is currently a debate between two
positions within the association. The first is that the original position
is the right one and we should continue to negotiate and debate in
order to integrate the young women. The second is that
fundamentalists (integristes) are now using the issue in order to gain
ground and we cannot tolerate that (on nepeutpas tolerer ga). Those
holding this second position argue that all conspicuous
(ostentatoires) religious signs should be banned. They are calling for
a law to this effect.
[After this introduction there was a period of silence.]
Anne [shaking her head from side to side]: It's so hard to adopt a
position.
Christophe: In 1989 I was not in favour of excluding the young
women. SOS's position seemed to me to be the most 'intelligent' one,
in inverted commas, even if the veil (voile) was anti-feminist (anti-
feministe). However, I've since changed my position, for two
reasons. Firstly, there is the situation in Algeria and the rise of
fundamentalism which threatens people's safety. Secondly, as far as I
understand the Qur'an states that Muslims should adapt themselves
to the customs of the countries where they are (les musulmans
devaient s'adapter aux coutumes des pays la ou ils etaieni). As a
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result, my position is that it is necessary to ban the headscarf
(.foulard) completely from schools.
Nicolas: We have to remember that the wearing of the headscarf in
schools is not new. That's a first fantasy to destroy. Secondly, there's
not a headscarf problem, it's Bayrou's circular which creates the
problem. Secularism is not honest {honnete) in this respect: there are
crosses inside schools and in certain regions of France the Catholic
Church inside the school itself is very strong. It's not as simple as it
looks. In 1989 I supported SOS's position and I still do. The school is
the only possibility which the girls have of integrating {pour
s'integrer). That should be remembered. We shouldn't call for a law
forbidding all signs. That is the last resort. I'm still in favour of
negotiation, I think this would succeed.
Ariane: I feel that the most serious action would be to exclude the
young women. In 1989-90 I believed that the headscarves were not a
threat to secularism {les foulards n 'etaient pas une menace pour la
laicite) and that the outcry was a French psychosis {une psychose
frangaise). What I would like to know is whether a network of
fundamentalists does indeed exist? Is there any reality to the
reports?
Nicolas: It's not entirely a fantasy, but not all Islamic associations are
fundamentalist!
Ariane: What annoys me is that Bayrou pretends to defend
secularism when he was responsible for the proposal to reform the
Falloux law which would have diverted funds away from state
schools. I think that the circular should be seen in the context of the
government's measures as a whole, including the Pasqua Laws,
which are intend to stigmatise foreigners {stigmatiser les etrangers).
I'm more in favour of dialogue on a case-by-case basis, although that
is perhaps Utopian now, as things may have gone too far and a law is
needed.
Christophe: Perhaps the circular is intended by the Right to be a
way of break secularism definitively {une maniere de casser la laicite
definitivement), even though it's a fundamental principle of the
Republic {un principe fondamental de la Republique). Or perhaps
that is too Machiavellian!
[Christophe's suggestion is greeted with some scepticism by those
present.]
Nicolas: But part of the Right is against Bayrou's circular too, and
there's pressure from the Catholic Church.
Luc: It's clear that the circular resolves nothing. It's also clear that
headscarves are appearing not just anywhere but in the estates {cited)
which have been completely deserted by associations and political
parties. The fundamentalists {integristes) are the only ones to try to
fill this vacuum (vide) and create social links. What I'm afraid of is
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that other girls are going to be led to wear headscarves as a result of
family pressure or a desire to be like the others. The present case just
shows that the fundamentalists are aware of the contradictions
which exist and are using them to advance their aims. In my view, if
we give in now, the situation will just degenerate. I think the
association should adopt a firm and rigid position.
Alain: I feel that we are caught in a trap (on est dans un piege), and
I'm afraid in case the association does not raise the debate above this
trap. I think we're being forced into a position unnecessarily ...
This account of the debate at the local committee meeting highlights some
important points. The first of these is the fact that the situation in Algeria
(where a number of un-veiled women had recently been murdered) weighed
heavily in the analysis of some members, who appeared to fear that the
'contagion' would spread to France. Another issue for members was the
nature and extent of the influence of Islamic 'fundamentalists' in French
housing estates. Finally, members expressed concern about the possibility
that the association was being forced - or trapped - into modifying its
position by either the right-wing government or the 'fundamentalists'.
Tensions and Differences
When the National Council was convened in late October 1994, a lively
debate took place between most of the leadership (National Bureau
members) and some sections of the membership, on the one hand, and other
members, particularly those sympathetic to the Revolutionary Communist
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League, who were firmly opposed to any change in the association's position
on the issue of the headscarf, on the other. The differences of opinion were so
entrenched that in the end the proposition to call for a ban on all religious
signs in schools was put to a vote (the only time a vote was held during a
National Council meeting during the period of my fieldwork) and passed.
Nevertheless, significant differences remained between members on this
issue, as I was able to identify when I conducted interviews with a number
of grassroots and National Bureau members in the weeks which followed. In
the rest of this section, I consider the nature of these differences.
In interviews I asked activists to give their views of SOS-Racisme's apparent
change of position on the headscarf issue and on the extent to which there
were underlying similarities or continuities. One local activist told me:
Between the position that was taken in 1989 and that which was
taken in 1994 there is effectively an evolution, since the 94 position is
to call for a law so that in schools all religious signs are banned, of
whatever sort they are, whether that be the Christian cross, Jewish
kippa or Islamic headscarf. No religious sign must enter. It's the
secular school, full stop.
And didyou agree with that change?
Personally, yes, because from the outset I was in favour of saying
that the school was a place where there shouldn't be any sign. Well
it's true that there are some signs which are more visible than
others, but one cannot say that we'll close our eyes to those which
are not visible and forbid those which are visible. Either one
disregards them all or one bans them all and I think that a ban is
better just the same because that should stay at the school gates.
Outside, everyone has the right to dress however and wear whatever
they want. But the school is all the same republican and secular. It's
one of the great foundation stones of the French Republic and I think
that it shouldn't be undermined. (Tape-recorded interview with
Marc, 25 November 1994)6
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This activist argued for a very rigid interpretation of secularism which was
not shared by all those I interviewed. Nevertheless, others supported the
association's change of position on a number of grounds. One of these was
the nature of the situation in the French housing estates. As Nicolas, who
radically changed his position between the committee meeting and the time
when I interviewed him, stated:
So, SOS's position is to say that it is really necessary to clarify the
situation. But we cannot, we will not let ourselves be caught out by
these militants because to take the same position as in 1989 is to play
into the hands of these Islamic fundamentalists and it is to allow
them, to offer them media exposure and it is to allow them to spread
a certain number of ideas in that community. (Tape-recorded
interview with Nicolas, 17 November 1994)7
In a similar way, a member of the association's National Bureau summarised
the leadership's (and now the association's official) position as follows:
Now we think that the situation is completely different because we
have seen what is happening at Goussainville, at Mantes-la-Jolie and
at Lille, which is that many of the young girls who are wearing the
headscarf are doing so as militants for fundamentalism. That is to
say that behind ... We went to Goussainville. There are organised
political groups of fundamentalists ... of Islamic fundamentalists,
who are using the young women, either they [the girls] are
convinced themselves, or they are manipulated by these political
groups but really ... it's really being done in an organised fashion.
And we think that these young girls, in any case, even by discussing
things with them, that is to say, them being at school, they do more
harm at school, they pose a threat to the school and the other young
girls than the school could do them good if they were not
excluded.(Tape-recorded interview with Helene, 10 November
1994)8
For other activists, however, it was 'the Islamic threat' in countries such as
Algeria which was a key factor influencing their view:
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It seems to me that Islamic threats are stronger, at any rate closer to
us. Stronger, no, because ...there had been Iran before, there had
been Iran and Iraq, there had been other countries ... But now it's
Algeria, it's closer to us geographically. Therefore, people feel more
threatened and in the event of a threat, one is sometimes led to
abandon a certain tolerance. And as I was against exclusion, notably
on the ground that people [i.e. immigrants] must adapt, that they
don't want to adapt to everything because that it too much to ask of
them, so now I think that it's a defence measure, the defence of our
society. Of the secular school in any case. That said I would be
favourable to a ban on all religious signs .... (Tape-recorded
interview with Christophe, 19 October 1994)9
The deteriorating situation in Algeria and an increase in attacks on women
appearing in public without the 'veil (voile)' preoccupied many other
activists and made them more favourable to a ban on all religious signs in
France.
Several of those I interviewed, however, expressed more reluctant support
for the new position and emphasised the difficulties they had making a
decision. Although she agreed with the change, the following member of the
National Bureau began in the course of the interview to question whether
the association may not have exaggerated, or in her term 'over-estimated',
the influence of Islamic 'fundamentalists' in French housing estates:
Me personally, I had real trouble making a decision because it's true
that for a few ... Personally, I think that we over-estimated a little
but ... It's true that there is a fundamentalist offensive in the suburbs
(banlieue) and in schools; that you cannot deny, there's a real change
in that respect compared to 1989. But I think that all the same we
over-estimated. And that for several dozens of young girls, there are
perhaps a few hundred, I don't know, who are really
fundamentalists - I think that the majority of young girls who wear
the headscarf are not fundamentalists - and that in fact in order to
exclude those who are really fundamentalists, everyone is put is the
same basket and everyone is excluded. Because you can't make a
two-speed law, saying that those women are judged to be
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fundamentalists, they are excluded, while for others the headscarf is
judged to be more a cultural practice, so they are not excluded. You
can't... A law cannot be made like that. Therefore, from the moment
when you can't do that, you are obliged to exclude everyone. And I
personally find that very, very difficult to tolerate exclusion on the
pretext that it is necessary to exclude certain women who are not
necessarily in the majority. I find that it's that which poses the
problem. (Tape-recorded interview with Helene, 10 November
1994)1°
On the other hand, several members of the local committee of which I was a
member did not agree with the association's change of position and call for a
ban on all religious signs in state schools. In different ways, they considered
it either as an admission of failure, or a tactical or political error. This
perspective was articulated very forcefully by Alain, the oldest activist in the
committee, and someone not affiliated to either the Socialist Party or the
Revolutionary Communist League:
I think that the law is not going to resolve a fundamental problem:
this is the fact that secular associations, including SOS, are losing
ground, that the political field ... the left, the political alternative
represented by the left is losing ground ... because it is unable to
understand and react in the face of an economic system ... unable
effectively to respond to unemployment and so on. The left is
incapable of responding to that. Therefore, it is quite normal that the
Muslim (islamistes) associations which have been making significant
progress in the Arab world for the past ten years, end up by taking
root in the European Arab world (dans le monde arabe europeeri).
Even if the school gates are closed to young girls wearing the veil (en
voile), that won't prevent, at that same time, the entry of young boys,
future barbus, who will cause chaos and proselytise. And above all it
won't prevent the social organisation, the social development of
Islamism. So, in fact, I think that it was good for the association to
have had to debate this issue again, to have talked about this affair
again. But on the other hand, this matter of the law, that strikes me,
really, as yet another example, it's a political failing, a weakness of
political thought. (Tape-recorded interview with Alain, 22
November 1994).11
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For Alain, then, the association's position did no address the underlying
issue which was the failure, on the one hand, of previous Socialist
governments to tackle rising unemployment in France's peripheral housing
estates, and, on the other, of associations such as SOS-Racisme to create some
sense of social solidarity in those areas.
For Laurence, a former president of the committee, the issue was more the
definition of secularism which informed SOS-Racisme's approach:
I don't agree with the position which says that it is necessary to
exclude all religious signs at schools because that is not my vision of
secularism. I think that secularism needs to be rethought, and needs
to be rethought differently. Between the moment when Jules Ferry
gave concrete expression to it on paper and today, I find that there
are things to take into the analysis. So I personally was not in
agreement with this position. [...] I'm not saying that they must
never be excluded. One can come to, be brought to exclude them but
for me that is a pedagogical failure. Exclusion is always a failure.
(Tape-recorded interview with Laurence, 7 December 1994)12
She emphasised that her own position on the subject of the headscarf had not
altered:
Personally, on the position about the headscarf in 94, I haven't
changed my position since 89. I think exactly the same things, I'm
even more confirmed in my position. I think that the facts have
shown that it is through the school that young girls remove the
headscarf. I don't want to minimise the role of fundamentalism in
this country and the importance which the headscarf may have
acquired in certain places [...]. But with respect to SOS-Racisme's
change of position, I think that they made an error in their analysis -
and that is what I said to them - and they are getting caught in the
fundamentalists' trap in my opinion. For me ... I didn't understand
why the others have changed position. (Tape-recorded interview
with Laurence, 7 December 1994)13
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Alain, however, had a very simple explanation of the events which had just
taken place within the association. He raised the issue of the role which
Julien Dray, one of the association's founder members and a Socialist Party
deputy since 1988, continued to play within it. He suggested that:
There are coup d'etat attempts by Julien Dray [...]. That is to say that
if you hang around a bit at SOS, you get to learn that 'Julien', in
inverted commas, 'Julien' has been past and that 'he wants ... he says
...it is necessary that ...' As far as the Tapie affair was concerned, I
didn't really understand where he situated himself. At any rate, with
the headscarf affair, I understood where he situated himself. That is
to say that the National Council met and said: We adopt the same
position as in 89. Then we learn that Julien thinks that 'it's not the
same, we need to see' and so on. And off we go! The National
Council is reconvened ...
Soyou think thathe...?
He induced that, he convinced a certain number of people and I
think that there are members ... certain members of the National
Bureau do not agree but since Julien said it, it has to be done. (Tape-
recorded interview with Alain, 22 November 1994)14
This raises questions about the association's independence and leadership,
similar to those considered in the last chapter. To what extent is the
association's elected leadership an independent force or instead heavily




This chapter has attempted to reveal some of the tensions which existed
underneath the official declaration of SOS-Racisme's change of position on
the issue of the headscarf which was released to the press in October 1994. It
has highlighted a range of perspectives, from a fairly hard-line, even
intolerant version of republican secularism, to a more flexible, open
approach. What was common, however, to all the activists in SOS-Racisme I
interviewed, or with whom I discussed the issue in other contexts, was an
opposition to the headscarf itself. As one activist emphasised to me: 'We
have never been in favour of the wearing of the headscarf, we have always
been in favour of not excluding the young girls .... That is the association's
position.' (Tape-recorded interview with Helene, 10 November 1994)15
Beneath the apparent abandonment of the 1989 position, therefore, were
important continuities. In particular, there was a failure to consider the
headscarf as anything other than a symbol of women's oppression.
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Notes
1 'Je suis, moi, persuade que c'est au sein de l'ecole publique que ces jeunes
filles s'emanciperont. Dans le cadre de l'ecole publique, par l'acces aux
connaissances, par la confrontation avec un autre univers que l'univers
familial, par l'esprit sceptique qu'elles y acquerront, ces adolescentes ont des
chances d'echapper a l'obscurantisme.' (Harlem Desir, in Liberation 21
October 1989)
2 'Nous pouvons accepter a l'ecole des signes religieux discrets, cela s'est
toujours fait. Pas de signes si ostentatoires qu'ils separent les jeunes entre
eux.' (Le Monde 11-12 September 1994) ['We can allow discrete religious
signs in school, that's always happened. Not religious signs which are so
conspicuous that they separate young people from each other.]
3 'SOS Racisme s'exprime done clairement contre le port de tout signe
religieux dans les ecoles et pour qu'une loi soit votee en ce sens a
l'Assemblee nationale.' (Resolution of the National Council of SOS Racisme,
22 October 1994)
4 'Cependant, depuis fin septembre, un element nouveau est apparu: les
integristes musulmans veulent profiter de 1'occasion qui leur est offerte par
cette circulaire pour lancer une offensive qui vise a se presenter comme les
representants des personnes d'origines musulmanes, et singulierement des
maghrebins en France. Cette offensive satisfait le double objectif du
gouvernement : assimiler les immigres aux integristes d'une part, et avoir
une structuration de rimmigration par communautes separees d'autre part.
La logique du gouvernement et des integristes va l'encontre de toutes les
valeurs que nous defendons. L'un comme l'autre sont des adversaires de
l'integration et de l'egalite.'
5 'Dans un tel contexte, l'association se retrouve dans une situation difficile:
'- Si nous demandons l'abrogation de la circulaire et que les filles ne soient
pas exclues, nous nous retrouvons, qu'on le veuille ou non, a la remorque
des integristes qui ont la meme revendication.
'- Si nous acceptons l'exclusion parce que nous voulons mettre un terme a
l'offensive des integristes, nous nous retrouvons en accord avec un
gouvernement qui ne cesse de faire de la surenchere anti-immigres et qui
montre du doigt l'lsam comme seul adversaire de la lai'cite.'
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6 'Entre la position qui a ete prise en l'annee 89 et celle qui a ete prise en 94 il
y a eu effectivement une evolution, puisque la position de 94 est pour
demander une loi afin que dans les ecoles tous les signes religieux soient
interdits quels qu'ils soient, que ga soit la croix chretienne, la kippa juive ou
le foulard islamique, aucun signe de religion doit rentrer c'est l'ecole lai'que
point.
'Et est-ce que tu es en accordavec ce changement-la?
'Moi, oui parce que moi j'etais des le depart pour dire que l'ecole c'est un lieu
ou il y aurait a avoir aucun signe . Enfin c'est vrai qu'il y a des signes qui
sont plus visibles que d'autres mais bon on ne peut pas dire a ceux qui sont
pas visibles on ferme les yeux et ceux qui sont visibles on les interdit. Alors
ou on ferme a tout le monde ou on interdit et je pense que l'interdiction est
mieux quand meme parce que bon ga doit rester a la porte de l'ecole. Apres,
en dehors chacun a le droit de s'habiller, de porter ce qu'il veut. Mais c'est
quand meme l'ecole republicaine et la'ique et ga c'est un des grands
fondements de la Republique frangaise et on pense qu'on ne doit pas y porter
atteinte.1
7 'Done, la position de SOS c'est de dire il faut vraiment clarifier la situation et
mais on ne peut pas, on ne veut pas se laisser pieger par ces militants parce
que prendre la meme position qu'en '89 c'est de faire le jeu de ces militants
islamistes et c'est de leur permettre justement, c'est leur offrir une vitrine
mediatique et c'est leur permettre de faire passer aupres de la communaute
un certain nombre d'idees.'
8 'Maintenant on pense que la situation est completement differente parce
que ce qu'on a vu, ce qui se passait a Goussainville, a Mantes la Jolie et a
Lille, c'est que les jeunes filles qui portent le voile, elles le font beaucoup plus
par militantisme integriste. C'est a dire que derriere...On est alle a
Goussainville, il y a des groupes politiques organises,
d'integristes...d'integristes musulmans, fondamentalistes, qui
instrumentalisaient les jeunes filles, soit elles sont convaincues, soit elles sont
manipulees par ces groupes politiques mais vraiment...c'est vraiment de
fagon organisee. Et on pense que ces jeunes filles, de toute fagon, meme en
discutant avec elles, c'est a dire qu'en etant a l'ecole, elles font plus de mal a
l'ecole, elles menacent plus l'ecole et les autres jeunes filles que l'ecole ne
pourrait leur faire du bien si on ne les excluait pas.'
9 'II me semble que les menaces islamistes sont plus fortes, en tout cas plus
proches de nous, plus fortes non parce que ... il y avait eu l'lran avant, il y
avait eu l'lran et l'lraq, il y avait eu d'autres pays...Mais maintenant c'est
l'Algerie c'est plus proche de nous geographiquement. Done on se sent plus
menace et en cas de menace parfois il y a une certaine tolerance qu'on est
amene a abandonner. Et autant j'etais totalement contre l'exclusion,
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notamment pour ce principe que on peut...que des gens doivent s'adapter,
qu'ils ne veulent s'adapter a tout parce que c'est trop leur demander. Autant
maintenant je me dis que c'est une mesure de defense, de defense, de defense
de notre societe. De l'ecole lai'que en tout cas. Cela dit, je serais meme
favorable a ce qu'on banisse tout signe religieux....'
10 'Moi, je suis ...moi, j'ai eu vraiment du mal a trancher parce que c'est vrai
que pour quelques ...moi, je pense qu'on a un petit peu surestime... autant
que c'est vrai qu'il y a une offensive de l'integrisme dans les banlieues et a
l'ecole, ga on ne peut pas le nier, par rapport a 89, il y a un vrai changement
par rapport a ga; mais je pense que meme si ce phenomene existe et va en
croissant-je pense qu'on a quand meme surestime et que pour quelques
dizaines de jeunes filles, on a peut etre quelques centaines j'en sais rien, qui
sont vraiment integristes, je pense que la majorite des jeunes filles qui
portent le foulard n'est pas integristes et que de fait, pour exclure celles qui
sont vraiment integristes, du coup on met toutes les autres dans le wagon et
on exclut tout le monde parce qu'on ne peut pas faire une loi a deux vitesses
en disant celles-la on juge qu'elles sont plutot integristes, on les exclut, celles-
la on juge que c'est plutot culturel, done on ne les exclut pas. On ne peut
pas...une loi ne peut pas faire ga. Done a partir du moment ou on ne peut
pas faire ga on est oblige d'exclure tout le monde, moi je trouve que c'est tres
tres difficilement tolerable d'exclure sous pretexte qu'il faut exclure certaines
qui ne sont pas forcement la majorite. Je trouve que c'est ga qui pose le
probleme.'
nJe pense que la loi ne va pas regler un probleme de fond: c'est que les
associations lai'ques, y compris SOS, sont en recul, que le champ politique
...la gauche, l'alternative politique de la gauche est en recul...parce qu'elle a
une incapacity de comprendre et de reagir face a une organisation
economique ...Done, effectivement de repondre au chomage et tout ga.
Done, ga, la gauche est incapable de reagir face a ga. Done, effectivement,
c'est normal que les associations islamistes qui sont en pleine progression
depuis dix ans dans le monde arabe finissent par s'implanter dans le monde
arabe europeen ...et que ...On peut toujours interdire les portes des ecoles
aux jeunes filles en voile par une loi, on empechera pas a ce moment-la,
l'entree des jeunes gargons, futurs barbus, qui viendront semer la merde, et
feront du proselytisme. Et puis on empechera surtout pas, c'est qu'on
n'empechera pas l'organisation sociale, le developpement social, d'un
developpement islamiste. Bon. Done, en fait, cette affaire, je trouve que ce
qui y etait bien pour l'association c'est d'avoir redebattu de ga, c'est d'en
avoir reparle, done, de cette affaire. Et aussi je pense que l'esprit de tout le
monde ...Tout le mone a compris des trues, a analyse des trues un peu
differement. Mais par contre, l'histoire de la loi, ga me semble, alors
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vraiment, encore une true, e'est une faiblesse politique quoi, une faiblesse de
pensee politique.
12 Je suis pas d'accord avec la position qui dit qu'il faut exclure tous les signes
religieux a l'ecole parce que ce n'est pas ma vision de la la'icite. Je crois que la
la'icite doit etre repensee et doit etre pensee differement. Entre le moment ou
Jules Ferry l'a concretises sur le papier et aujourd'hui je trouve qu'il y a des
choses a integrer dans l'analyse. Done moi je suis pas d'accord avec cette
proposition. [...] Et je dis pas qu'il faut jamais les exclure. On peut arriver,
etre amene a les exclure mais pour moi e'est un echec pedagogique,
l'exclusion e'est toujours un echec.
13 'Moi, je...sur la position du foulard en 94, moi je n'ai pas change de
position depuis 89 done je pense exactement les memes choses, meme encore
plus renforcees. EL je crois que justement les faits nous ont montres que e'est
par l'ecole que les jeunes filles enlevent le foulard. Et je ne veux pas
minimiser le role de l'integrisme dans ce pays et l'importance que le foulard
peut avoir pris dans certains endroits. [...J Par rapport au changement de
position de SOS-Racisme, je pense qu'ils ont fait une erreur d'analyse et e'est
ce que je leur ai dit et ils fonctionnent dans le piege integriste a mon avis.
Pour moi...Je n'ai pas compris pourquoi les autres avaient change de
position.'
14 'II y a des tentatives de coup d'etat de Julien Dray [...]. C'est a dire que
quand tu traines un peu a SOS, t'apprends comme ga que 'Julien' entre
guillemets, 'Julien' est passe et qu'il voudrait que ... il a dit que ... il faut que
...Sur l'affaire Tapie, je n'ai pas bien compris ou il se situait. En tout cas, sur
l'affaire du foulard, j'ai compris ou il situait. C'est a dire que le Conseil
national s'est reuni et dit: On adopte la meme position qu'en 89. Et puis on
apprend que Julien pense que c'est pas pareil, il faut voir, et tout ga. Et hop!
Reconvocation du Conseil national avec ...
'Done tupenses que c'etaitlui...?
'C'est lui qui a induit ga, qui a convaincu un certain nombre de gens et je
pense qu'il y a des membres ... certains membres du Bureau national qui ne
sont pas d'accord mais comme Julien l'a dit il faut y aller quoi.'
15 'On n'a jamais ete pour la porte du foulard, on a toujours ete pour essayer





It is now six years since I stood in the Elysee-Montmartre concert hall in
central Paris watching the tenth birthday celebrations of the anti-racist
association SOS-Racisme. Important aspects of the political context - and
opportunity structure - for anti-racist action in France have changed in the
intervening period. Twelve months after walking slowly and painfully onto
the stage to cut SOS-Racisme's birthday cake in December 1994, Francois
Mitterrand died of cancer. The 1995 presidential election was won by the
right-wing candidate, Jacques Chirac, although by an unexpectedly narrow
margin. Two years after that, one of the Socialist Party politicians I had seen
mingling with other guests in the hall of the Elysee-Montmartre, Lionel
Jospin, became Prime Minister at the head of a left-wing coalition
government.
There have also been significant changes within SOS-Racisme during this
time. The success of the National Front at the 1995 municipal elections
prompted the association to campaign more directly against Le Pen's party.
The association's credibility in the eyes of many sections of the anti-racist
movement was, however, damaged by its conditional (or, some would claim,
half-hearted) support for the action of the sans-papiers - undocumented
resident foreigners - from 1996 onwards (see Alaux 1996; Abdallah 2000). In
the spring of 1999, its president, Fode Sylla, resigned in order to stand as a
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Communist Party candidate in the forthcoming European elections. He was
replaced by a former vice-president of the association, Malek Boutih, the first
person of North African origin to hold that office. At a local level, the
committee with which I was involved for eighteen months still exists, but
many of those I knew are no longer active within it. Some have moved away
from Paris, while others have chosen to concentrate on political party
activism instead.
Nevertheless, certain continuities exist, as the photograph reproduced as
Figure 11 illustrates. Taken during the 1998 May-Day demonstration in
Paris, this image draws attention to several points which I have discussed
over the course of this thesis. On the one hand, the slogan on the placard in
the top left-hand corner - 'Le Pen, Hands off the Republic! (Le Pen, Touche
pas a la Republique)' - highlights the way in which the association continues
to portray itself as a defender of republican values and institutions. On the
other, the juxtaposition of the stickers which the young women pictured in
the foreground have on their clothes and the placards they are holding
symbolises the ongoing links between SOS-Racisme and other types of
organisation in its 'nebula1, in this case the secondary school students'
federation, the FIDL.
More significantly, SOS-Racisme (and, to a certain extent, the anti-racist
movement as a whole) is still confronted with a number of the strategic and
ideological choices or dilemmas analysed in this thesis. The aim of the
present, concluding chapter is to review these challenges facing SOS-
Racisme at the start of the twenty-first century. This chapter will also
summarise the arguments which the thesis has advanced in favour of an
ethnographic approach to social movements and their constituent
organisations.
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Figure 11 Anti-Racist Demonstrators in Paris, 1 May 1998 (Photo: J. Hurd)
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Politics, Anti-Racism and Republicanism in France
The events discussed in this thesis occurred against the background of
growing public debate, and controversy, about a 'crisis' of anti-racism in
contemporary France. In such a context, as the sociologist Michel Wieviorka
has argued:
the role of the social sciences is most certainly not to judge the issue
too quickly, to take a stand in activist fashion. It is much more to
clarify the debate and, as a result, to transform into an object of
analysis that which is still above all a stake in ideological and political
conflicts with strong echoes in the media. Anti-racism is an action, a
set of practices and discourses, and deserves to be studied as such ....
(Wieviorka 1993c: 417).1
Since its creation in 1984, SOS-Racisme has been at the heart of this
controversy, and has been heavily criticised by journalists, other anti-racist
activists, and academics (most notably, the political philosopher Pierre-
Andre Taguieff). In line with Wieviorka's recommendation, however, this
thesis has attempted to provide a detailed, sociological analysis of both the
'discourse' and (especially) the practice of SOS-Racisme as an anti-racist
campaigning association over an eighteen-month period in the mid-1990s. In
so doing, it has highlighted the partial, out-dated or even distorted image of
the association which has frequently underpinned journalistic and academic
critiques.
Nevertheless, it has also identified a number of unresolved issues or
weaknesses which continue to undermine the effectiveness of SOS-Racisme's
action against racism, discrimination and inequality in France. These can be




A first tension is between two of the activities which SOS-Racisme's National
Bureau identified, in a discussion document circulated at the 1993 Congress,
as being essential to the association's future development (see SOS-Racisme
1993b). These were: on the one hand, local-level activism to ensure the
association's 'implantation' in the social fabric; and, on the other, high-profile
national campaigns to influence public opinion (campagnes d'opinion). The
issue is the extent to which the association and its members have not only
the resources (in terms of time, numbers of activists and funding) but also a
commitment to pursue these two objectives simultaneously.
As I have shown, there is effectively a structural barrier to the achievement
of both aims in the case of the association's Parisian committees. The Paris-
based National Bureau, which has primary responsibility for co-ordinating
national campaigns, is composed of only twenty or so members, many of
whom are also active in local committees located in and around the capital.
In order to conduct national campaigns, the leadership is thus dependent on
local activists in Paris to distribute leaflets, put up posters, collect signatures
for petitions and represent the association at demonstrations. Almost
inevitably, this leads to local-level initiatives being marginalised, simply
because the activists concerned have a finite amount of time and energy to
put into the association.
However, the issue is not simply one of limited resources. The nature and
identity of SOS-Racisme itself is also at stake here. At the July 1993 Congress,
the leadership obviously intended that SOS-Racisme should remain an
association which was not only committed to campaigning on national issues
through the use of posters, petitions and demonstrations to attract media
314
and public attention, but also engaged at a local-level in a daily struggle
against specific instances of racism, inequality and discrimination through
the action of its local committees. Nevertheless, it is clear that among the
membership, and to a certain extent the leadership too, there was a view that
priority should be given to one or the other of these two orientations.
This reflected opposing underlying conceptions of the association's nature
and role. On the one hand were those who considered SOS-Racisme to be
primarily an instrument for informing and influencing public opinion on
questions of immigration and racism. The association was regarded
essentially as 'a vector for public opinion (un vecteur d'opinion)', in the
phrase of the activist I quoted in Chapter 2. On the other hand, however,
there were members who emphasised above all the importance of creating
strong local links and orienting the association's activity more towards the
grassroots level. One example of this was the repeated calls made by one
member of the committee of which I was a member for the group to take up
local issues and seek to raise its profile and attract support locally.
The origins of this tension between an emphasis on local action or
alternatively on national campaigns can be traced back to the nature of SOS-
Racisme's emergence in the mid-1980s. The association achieved national
prominence, through press interviews and the organisation of a series of
initiatives including the free concert in June 1985, before it had a
membership base and structure of grassroots committees. It was only later
that the association began to attach importance to 'a local-level anti-racism
(un antiracisme deproximite)' (interview with Harlem Desir in Le Monde, 18
June 1988). The issue of the relative weight to be given to the type of
national, high-profile events on which SOS-Racisme's early reputation was
based, as opposed to more specific, local initiatives necessary to ensure a
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measure of credibility and its future expansion, is part of the legacy of that
initial period which continued to pose problems for the association in the
mid-1990s.
Difference
A second tension which I have identified in the 'discourse' and practice of
SOS-Racisme, and it is one which poses a challenge for the anti-racist
movement in France as a whole, is between, on the one hand, a recognition
of ethnic and cultural differences and, on the other, a commitment to a
universalist or 'Republican' conception of individual integration into the
nation-state. This is a point which has been made in general terms by the
sociologist Michel Wieviorka:
There is a structural problem which constantly undermines anti-racist
action, and which its protagonists are not always capable of
formulating correctly. I refer to the opposition between the
contradictory universalist and the differentialist orientations of anti-
racist action which are difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to
overcome. (1997b: 147)
This is one of the most difficult issues for anti-racism in contemporary
France and elsewhere. As Wieviorka again has pointed out:
[A]nti-racism has no choice. It has to navigate between the Scylla of
universalism and the Charybdis of differentialism, and to encourage
the continual and pragmatic search for an articulation of the two
registers. [...] anti-racism can avoid defeat (which a liberal train of
thought would refer to as the opposite) only by taking as its target the
refusal of anything which separates or opposes the universal values of
law and reason to the specific values of a given culture. (1997b: 149)
In various chapters of this thesis, I have examined the way in which SOS-
Racisme has attempted to reconcile 'universalism' and 'difference' through
the concept of integration, defined as a dynamic, reciprocal process.
However, I have also emphasised the problematic nature of this concept, in
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contrast to most mainstream French academics and other commentators
(such as Taguieff, although not Wieviorka). The position which SOS-Racisme
adopted during the 1994 'Islamic headscarf affair', as discussed in Chapter
10, highlighted many of the difficulties associated with the integration
concept and its potentially assimilationist and exclusionary nature. Finding a
more appropriate way of articulating a commitment to universalism with
some recognition of difference remains a key task not only for SOS-Racisme
but also the anti-racist movement in France more generally.
Autonomy andMediation
The final issue which SOS-Racisme confronted in the mid-1990s and which
continues to face the anti-racist and other social movements in France today
is the need to balance political autonomy and mediation. Writing in the early
1980s, the Italian sociologist Alberto Melucci claimed that one of the
distinguishing features of contemporary forms of collective action was its
'refusal to accept any political mediation' (1980: 220). In his view, this
constituted a significant problem for the effectiveness and the development
of such action. Arguing that the relationship between social movements and
political parties was 'the central knot for any project of social
transformation', he stated that:
[social movements] require political mediation and can only survive if
the demands they carry are interpreted and mediated by the political
system. Such a mediation cannot, however, absorb the entire charge of
the demands, which express themselves through collective action. The
movement continues to exist beyond its political mediation. (Melucci
1981:190-1.)
According to Melucci, it is crucial for the future of a democratic society not
only that political parties prove capable of mediating and representing the
interests and demands of social movements, but also that these movements
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are able to retain an autonomous existence. In other words, there is a need
for 'the dualism between power and collective demands' to be maintained
(1981:191).
Striking an effective balance between autonomy and mediation is one of the
most important challenges which social movements and their constituent
organisations have to confront. The case of SOS-Racisme, as one of the most
prominent organisations within the anti-racist movement, is revealing in this
respect. The association's independence (or otherwise) from political parties,
notably the Socialist Party, has been a highly controversial issue ever since
its creation in 1984, both for its members and other sections of the anti-racist
movement, as well as for academic commentators and journalists. This thesis
has revealed that in the mid-1990s the association was still seeking an
acceptable way of advancing its ideas and policy proposals through co¬
operation with political parties, without sacrificing its autonomy in the
process.
The controversial politician and businessman Bernard Tapie's invitation to
the then president of SOS-Racisme, Fode Sylla, to stand as a candidate on his
list for the 1994 European elections highlighted this. As I explained in
Chapter 8, a section of the leadership was very attracted to this idea as a
means of securing 'a political outlet (un debouche politique)' for the
association's ideas and of increasing its influence. However, they came up
against the determined opposition of many grassroots activists who
considered that such a course of action would undermine the association's
credibility and put its political independence into question. Nevertheless, as
I indicated in Chapter 9, in the absence of support from left-wing parties,
SOS-Racisme was unable to mount an effective campaign against a reform of
asylum rights in the autumn of 1993. This only served to highlight further
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the continuing need for the association to find a means of reconciling the
twin imperatives of autonomy and mediation.
Ethnography, Social Movements and Anthropology
On a more general level, finally, I have pursued two main objectives in this
thesis. Firstly, I have sought, through a detailed study of the French anti-
racist association SOS-Racisme, to contribute towards the development of an
anthropology of social movements, as an alternative to the current
'invisibility' (to borrow Escobar's word again) within the discipline of such
forms of collective action. Secondly, I have endeavoured to demonstrate the
importance of an ethnographic approach, involving long-term participant
observation, to social movements and their constituent organisations. In so
doing, however, I have confronted the same 'double challenge (double defi)[
which Abeles and Rogers have suggested is encountered by anthropologists
who choose to conduct fieldwork 'at home':
They need to demonstrate the efficacy of [their] approach, sometimes
in the face of the scepticism of neighbouring disciplines which have
up until that point 'occupied the field'. Furthermore, the development
of an anthropology of the near makes an in-depth reflection on field-
sites and methods, a significant revision of concepts even, increasingly
indispensable. (Abeles and Rogers 1992: 7)2
The present thesis has attempted to respond to both of these challenges. On
the one hand, I have developed an argument in support of increased use of
participant observation, as part of a more general ethnographic approach, in
social movements research. In contrast to scholars such as Touraine, I have
claimed, and sought to illustrate in various chapters of the thesis, that
participant observation is a highly effective tool for generating insights into
processes of collective identity construction. On the other, I have argued that
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the emergence of an anthropology of social movements in this country
requires a re-examination of the conceptual and theoretical weaknesses of
post-war political anthropology. Key concepts in current social movements
research - political opportunity structure, collective identity and social
movement (organisation) - I have proposed, are valuable resources for a
political anthropology committed to understanding aspects of contemporary
mass politics. In addition to the more specific points about the relationship
between politics, anti-racism and republicanism in France summarised
earlier in this conclusion, these are the two more general arguments which
the various chapters of this thesis have sought to make.
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Notes
1 'Dans une telle situation, le role des sciences sociales n'est assurement pas
de trancher trop vite, de s'engager sur un mode militant. II est bien
davantage d'eclairer le debat et, par consequent, de transformer en objet
d'analyse ce qui est encore avant tout l'enjeu de conflits ideologico-politiques
a fortes resonances mediatiques. L'antiracisme est une action, un ensemble
de pratiques et de discours, qui merite d'etre etudiee a ce titre ...
2 'II leut faut en effet demontrer l'efficacite de cette approche en se heurtant
parfois au scepticisme des disciplines voisines qui ont jusqu'ici «occupe le
terrain». En outre, le developpement d'une anthropologic du proche rend de
plus en plus indispensable une reflexion en profondeur sur les terrains et les
methodes, voire des remaniements conceptuels consequents.'
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Appendix 1
List of Archives and Dossiers Consulted
1. Resource Centres
Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris
Bibliotheque de l'lnstitut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris
Bibliotheque nationale, Paris
Centre d'Information et d'Etudes sur les Migrations Internationales, Paris
SOS-Racisme, National Bureau Archives
2. Press Archives
Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris
Centre de documentation sur la presse: coupures de presse
(a) 141/085: SOS-Racisme
Tome 1: 20/2/85 - 31/12/85
Tome 2:1/1/86-27/3/90
Tome 3: 28/3/90-
(b) 302/5: Enseignement Prive-La'icite
Tome 20:1/10/89 - 1/90 (Affaire du foulard islamique)
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Appendix 2
List of Individuals and Organisations
Interviewed
(A) SOS-Racisme
'Alain': member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 22/11/94
' Ariane1: member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 3/12/94
'Christophe': member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 19/10/94
'Claude': member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 11/12/94
'Didier': member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 28/11/94
'Frangois': member of Comite Stop-Racisme Z (Paris) 2/10/94
'Helene': member of National Bureau (Paris) 10/11/94
'Juliette': member of Legal Commission (Paris) 18/11/94
'Laurence': member of Comite Stop-Racisme Q (Paris) 7/12/94
[former member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris)]
'Luc': member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 3/10/94
'Marc': member of Comite Stop-Racisme Y (Paris) 25/11/94
'Nicolas': member of Comite Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 17/11/94
'Pascale': member of National Bureau and member of Comite 24/11/94
Stop-Racisme X (Paris)
'Patricia': member of National Bureau and member of Comite 18/10/94,
Stop-Racisme X (Paris) 10/11/94
The first names of SOS-Racisme activists who agreed to be interviewed have
been changed in order to preserve their anonymity.
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(B) Other Organisations
CAIF (Conseil des associations immigrees en France) 5/12/ 94
CIMADE (Comite inter-mouvements aupres des evacues) 6/8/93
CNCDP (Comite national contre la double peine): Nordine 8/12/94
IZNASNI and two other members
LDH (Ligue des droits de l'homme) 6/8/93
MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitie entre 5/12/94
les peuples): Alain CALLES, Assistant General Secretary
MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitie entre 17/11/94
les peuples): Albert LEVY, former General Secretary
(Q Additional Interviews
FARINE, Philippe: Municipal Councillor (PS), Paris and 6/12/94
Member of Haut conseil a l'integration (HCI)
NB: All interviews were conducted in Paris and, with the exception of those
with representatives of the CIMADE and LDH, were tape-recorded.
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